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ABOUT THE EDITORS
Dr. Aisling Reynolds-Feighan received her B.A. and M.A. in Economics from University
College Dublin, Ireland, and her Ph.D. from the University of Illinois in 1989 in the field of
Regional Science. She has been a College Lecturer at University College Dublin in Economics
since 1990, where she teaches Transport Economics and Regional Science courses. Her main
research interests are in air and road transport, with particular emphasis on the links between
transport and regional economic development. She has published several studies examining the
impacts of airline deregulation in the US and Europe including The Effects of Deregulation on
U.$. Air Networks (Springer-Verlag, 1992).
Dr. Brent D. Bowen is Director and Professor, Aviation Institute, University of Nebraska at
Omaha. He has been appointed as a Graduate Faculty of the University of Nebraska System-
wide Graduate College. Bowen attained his Doctorate in Higher Education and Aviation from
Oklahoma State University and a Master of Business Administration degree from Oklahoma City
University. His Federal Aviation Administration certifications include Airline Transport Pilot,
Certified Flight Instructor, Advanced-lnstn_nent Ground Instructor, Aviation Safety Counselor,
and Aerospace Education Counselor. Dr. Bowen's research interests focus on aviation
applications of public productivity enhancement and marketing in the areas of service quality
evaluation, forecasting, and student recruitment in collegiate aviation programs. He is also well
published in areas related to effective teaching. His professional affiliations include the
University Aviation Association, Council on Aviation Accreditation, World Aerospace
Education Organization, International Air Transportation Research Group, Aerospace Education
Association, Alpha Eta Rho Intemational Aviation Fratemity, and the Nebraska Academy of
Sciences. He also serves as program director and principal investigator of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration funded Nebraska Space Grant and EPSCoR Programs.
A TR G President's Foreword
The Air Transport Research Group of the WCTR Society. was formally launched as a
special interest group at the 74 Triennial WCTR in Sydney, Australia in 1995. Since then, our
membership base has expanded rapidly, and now includes over 400 active transportation
researchers, policy- makers, industry executives, major corporations and research institutes from
28 countries. Our broad membership base and its strong enthusiasm have pushed the group
forward, to continuously initiate new events and projects that benefit the aviation industry and
research communities worldwide.
It became a tradition that the ATRG would hold an international conference at least once
a year. As you know, the 1997 conference was held in Vancouver, Canada. Over 90 papers,
panel discussions and invited speeches were presented. In 1998, the ATRG organized a
consecutive stream of 14 aviation sessions at the 8t" Triennial WCTR Conference (July 12-17:
Antwerp). Again, on 19-21 July, 1998, the ATRG Symposium was organized and executed every
successfully by Dr. Aisling Reynolds-Feighan of the University College of Dublin.
As in the past, the Aviation Institute at the University of Nebraska at Omaha (Dr. Brent
Bowen, Director of the Institute) has kindly agreed to publish the Proceedings of the 1998 ATRG
Dublin Symposium (being co-edited by Dr. Aisling Reynolds-Feighan and Professor Brent
Bowen), and the Proceedings of the 1998 WCTR-ATRG Conference (being co-edited by
Professors Tae H. Oum and Brent Bowen). On behalf of the ATRG members, I would like to
express my sincere appreciation to Professor Brent Bowen and to the staff at the Aviation
Institute of UNO for their efforts in publishing these ATRG proceedings. Also, I would like to
thank and congratulate all the authors of the papers, for their fine contribution to the conferences
and the Proceedings.
Finally, I would like to draw your attention to the ATRG newsletter and the ATRG
website (www.commerce.ubc.ca/atrgf) which will keep you informed of the ATRG operations
and forthcoming events. On behalf of the ATRG Networking Committee, I would also appreciate
it very much if you would encourage others in the field, to sign up for ATRG membership.
Thank you for your attention.
Tae H. Oum
President, ATRG
ATRG c/o Prof. Tae H. Oum
Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration,
University of British Columbia, 2053 Main Mall
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Rile Symposium
The ATRG held its Research Symposium at
University College Dublin, Ireland in July 1998,
following the main WCTR meetings.
The symposium attracted 106 delegates from 17
countries. Additionally a plenary session yielded
three views on the future prospects for European air
transport.
The Proceedino_s
Once again, on behalf of the Air Transport Research
Group, the University of Nebraska at Omaha
Aviation Institute has agreed to publish the
Proceedings of the ATRG Symposium in a three-
volume monograph set.
Proceedings Order Information
The Proceedings of the 1998 ATKG Symposium are
contained in a three-volume monograph set. Orders
within the U.S. are $7.50 (U.S.) per monograph
volume, and international orders are $10.00 (U.S.)
per monograph volume to cover the costs of printing,
shipping, and handling. Allow 4-6 weeks for
delivery.
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Globalization of Airline Networks and Airline Alliances
OUTLINE
1. Background and Government Policy Towards Alliances
2. Current Status of Alliances
3. Area of joint activities
4. Reasons for alliance formation
5. Effects of Alliances on Carriers and Passengers
- Trans-Aflantic Alliance Study
- Asia-Pacific Codeshare Alliance Study
- Policy Implications
6. Summary and Future Research Needs
I. Background and Government Policy Towards Alliances
Background.
• International aviation remains heavily regulated by bilateral agreements
,_ Airline business restricted by these agreements.
• Consumer preference on airlines with extensive networks
Inducing airlines to establish global networks.
• Some major carriers have attempted to penetrate overseas services by adding spokes to
their domestic hubs.
• Many airlines use strategic alliances to form global service networks.
Government Policies
(A) United States
- 1967: First domestic alliance
Allegheny(USAlr)+Commuters
- early 1980's: Trunk carriers + Regional feeders alliances
- 1986: First int'l alliance
Air Florida + British Island on London-Amsterdam route
- 1988: US began to require govt approval for int'l codesharing alliance
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- US began to use, in bilaterai negotiations, the permission to allow foreign carriers to do
codeshare alliances involving US domestic routes.
e.g. NW+KLM, UA+LH, BA+AA, Recent Bilaterals with Asian countries (Singapore,
Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan, Philippines, Thailand, Hong Kong, Korea, Japan, China, etc.)
- US uses Anti-trust immunities to codesharing alliances to encourage foreign countries to sign
open skies agreements with the U.S.
e.g. KLM/NW (Nov, 1992), LI-I/UA (May,1996)
Recent Developments in the U.S.
Northwest/Continental (March, 1998)
NW: 14% of CO's share
American Airlines/US Airways (April, 1998)
Frequent flyer program + codesharing
Delta Air Lines/United Airlines (April, 1998)
not including European flights
US Carriers' Recent Inter-continental Alliances.
American Airlines/Asiana (Oct. 1997)
Codesharing
American Airlines/China Eastern Airlines (Feb. 1998)
Codesharing
American Airlines/Japan Airlines (Feb. 1998)
Codesharing
United Airlines/All Nippon Airways (March, 1998)
Marketing
American Airlines/TACA (May, 1998)
Codesharing + frequent flyer program
American Airlines/Iberia (May, 1998)
Codesharing + frequent flyer program
Northwest/Air China (May, 1998)
Operational and Marketing
Delta Air Lines/Air France (June, 1998)
Codesharing
(]3)European Union
- EU cardersdonotrequiregov't approvalfor alliances among themselves involving intra-EU
routes
- Individual EU states have different perspectives on eodesharing with Non-EU carriers:
• UK and Netherlands: supportive.
• Italy: restrictive
- EU requires disclosure of identity of the operating carrier of a eodeshared flight, and limits the
number of times a codeshared flight is displayed on CRS display to twice.
II. Current Status of AUiances
SEE TABLE 1:
- More than 380 alliances by 171 int'l carriers as of 1996
- 16% of the alliances involve equity investment.
- More than 50 new alliances have emerged every year since 1994.






'98 '96 '95 '94 change(98/94)
502 389 324 280 79.3%
195 171 153 136 43.4%
56 62 58 58 -3.4%
446 327 266 222 100.9%
121 71 50 n/a
(Source) Airline Business (1994-98)
SEE TABLE 2:
• European carders tend to have more equity alliances than North American or Asian
carders.
• Large carriers tend to invest in smaller carrier: for closer coordination of operations,
exercise of control, durability of relation???
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Investor Airlines (a)
TABLE 2. Equi_ Investment Alliances































































































(Sources) Airline Business (1995-98), Flight International (1996)
(Note) Investor airlines in North American, European, Asian continents only
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SEETABLE 3:
TABLE 3showschanges in the number of the world's top-30 airlines' alliances during the past
three years.
• AF has formed the largest number of alliances among the top-30 carriers.
Alliances involving the 30 top airlines account for more than 90 per cent of the total alliances
as of 1996.
Forming strategic alliances is not just a fad or passing phenomenon. The alliance race will
likely continue until bilateral air treaties are liberalized completely or restrictions on foreign
ownership of airlines disappear.
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TABLE 3 Top Airlines' Alliance Race
'98 '96 '95 '94
Air France 27 (7) 31 (13) 34 (13) 25 (12)
Lufthansa 14 (I) 26 (4) 25 (3) 25 (5)
Malaysia Airlines 24 (i) 19 (i) 19 (I) 17 (i)
KLM 21 (3) 18 (4) 14 (3) I0 (4)



























12 (2) 17 (2) 8 (2) 7 (2)
24 (4) 16 (4) 9 (4) 9 (4)
18 (2) i5 (2) 13 (2) 14 (4)
iS (0) 15 (0) 14 (0) i2 (0)
20 (I) 14 (3) I0 (3) 9 (3)
16 (3) 13 (5) 8 (5) Ii (5)
18 (0) 13 (0) 14 (0) 12 (0)
12 (0) 12 (2) 9 (i) 9 (i)
26 (2) 12 (I) 8 (I) 6 (I)
I0 (2) il (2) 8 (2) I0 (i)
14 (2) ii (0) 9 (2) 9 (2)
18 (I) i0 (i) 7 (i) 9 (I)
7 (0) I0 (0) 12 (0) ii (0)
13 (2) 9 (2) 5 (2) 6 (I)
9 (1) 9 (1) 8 (1) 5 (1)
13 (i) 9 (i) 6 (i) 4 (i)
16 (2) a (3) 7 (3) 7 (3)
5 (0) 8 (o) 7 (o) I (o)
i0 (0) 7 (I) 6 (o) 6 (o)
12 (2) 6 (i) 2 (I) 3 (i)
5 (0) 6 (o) 5 (o) 3 (o)
i (0) 5 (3) 7 (i) 5 (o)
5 (1) 5 (2) 5 (2) 4 (2)
io (0) 4 (o) 5 (o) 3 (o)
7 (i) 4 (O) 4 (O) 4 (O)
420 (42) 360 (60) 296 (57) 261 (55)
(Source) Airline Business (1994-98)
(Note) The number of equity investment alliances is shown in the parentheses.
IH. Joint Activities Among Alliance Carriers
Based on the analysis of 46 alliances between the top-30 airlines, areas of coordination are
identified as:
• Coordination of ground handling
• Joint use of ground facilities
• FFP Linkage
• Codesharing operation
• Block space sales
• Coordination of flight schedule
• Exchange of flight attendants
• Joint development of systems
• Joint advertising andpromotion
• Joint maintenance
• Jointpurchuse of aircraft/fuel
Types of Alliances.
TYPE 1: Simple route-by-route alliance (28 cases)
• Involves lower level of coordination on a few routes•
• KLM-JAL on Tokyo-Amsterdam-Zurich route ('93.1)
• Air Canada - Korean Air on Vancouver-Seoul route ('94)
TYPE 2: Broad commercial alliance (9 cases)
• One-step advanced form from the simple route-by-route alliance.
• Collaboration on more than a few routes - Linking networks, and feeding traffic to each
other's hub airports
• UA - LH alliance linking U.S and European networks
• DL-VS on US cities-London routes ('94.4)
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•Some broad commercial alliances are deepening - proving durable.
TYPE 3: Equity alliance (9 cases)
• Most advanced form; at first thought 'most durable'
• Cooperates in almost all areas of joint activities
• One-way investment (investing airlines wants control);
- Risky, Unstable
= KLM-NW ('92.1 I); AA-CP ('94.4)
Two-way investments: e.g., DL-SR-SQ
- More stable
- Does not attempt to control
- Literature: 50%-50% joint venture is far more stable and long-lasting
9
Degree of Coordination for Each Type of Alliance
Joint Activities
Type i* Type 2 Type 3
Coordination of ground handing 5 7 9
(18%) ** (78%) (100%)
Joint use of ground facilities 13 9 9
(46%) (i00%) (100%)
Shared Frequent Flyer Program 9 9 6
(32%) (100%) (67%)
Codesharing or Joint Operation 25 9 9
(89%) (100%) (100%)
Block Space Sales i0 4 3
(36%) (44%) (33%)
Coordination of Flight Schedule 4 9 9
(14%) (100%) (100%)
Exchange of Flight Attendants 1 2 5
(4%) (22%) (56%)
joint Development of Systems 1 2 3
(4%) (22%) (33%)
Joint Advertising and Promotion 0 3 4
(33%) (44%)
joint Maintenance 0 0 1
(11%)
Joint Purchase of Aircraft/Fuel 0 0 4
(44%)
T 0 T A L 28 9 9
(Notes) * Type I: Simple route-by-route alliances (28 cases), Type 2: Broad commercial
alliances (9 cases), Type 3: Equity alliances (9 cases).
• * The number in parenthesis is the percentage of a particular joint activity within
the type of alliance.
(Sources) Airline Annual Reports, Airline Business 1994-96, Airline Marketing News,
Asian Aviation News, Aviation Europe, Flight International, Geliman





Reasons for Alliance Formation
Network expansion by linking between partners' networks
• Consumer preference on airlines with extensive networks.
Strategic alliances allow the partners:
to expand no. of destinations (eg) LH/UA
to access to attractive airport (eg) DL/VS(Virgin)
to enter thin markets (eg) QF/AV
(Avianca)
Increasing traffic feed between partners
Mutual traffic feed traffic
increase load factors without having to increase flight frequency.
USAir feeds its domestic traffic onto BA flights to London at five US gateways.
BA's load factor on the five routes increased
72.4% _ 73.8% after the alliance
• Increase flight frequency via codesharing
Cost Savings
• Reduce unit cost via economies of scale, scope, and tm_c density
eg. Joint purchase and promotion
Economies of scale
Linkage of networks .=1) Economies of scope
Mutual traffic feed _ Economies of traffic density
Improve quality of service
Customer services are normally enhanced by coordinating flight schedules, locating
departure gate close to the connecting flights' arrival gates, coordinating baggage
transfer, etc.
e
A trans-Atlantic alliance study (Park, 1997) found that schedule delay times are
reduced by 12-25% after alliance, depending on the routes.
Schedule delay time = time between passengers' desired departure and actual
departure times
Expand passengers' itinerary choices:




Demand curves for BAJUSAir, KLM/NW, and LH/UA shifted up after the
alliances
6. CRS display advantage:
Codeshared flights get listed three times on CRS screen;
Codeshared flights get listed prior to intedine flights on CRS screen;
Multiple and priority display of codeshared flights together "crowd out" other
airlines' flight info on CRS screen.
V. Effect of alliances on Carriers and Passengers
- Trans-Atlantic Alliance Study
- Asia-Pacific Codesharing Alliance Study
- Other studies
- Policy Implication
(A) Trans-Atlantic Alliance Study (Park, 1997)
(a) BA/USAir, KLM/NW, and LH/UA (complementary alliances) increase aggregate demand on the
alliance routes, while DL/SN/SR (parallel alliance) decreases aggregate demand on the
alliance routes.
(b) After the KLM/NW and DL/SN/SR alliances, equilibrium fares on respective alliance routes
decreased by 22% and 19%.
(c) Altogether, equilibrium annualpassenger volume increased by an average 35,998 passengers,
while equilibrium air fares decreased by an average of $41 on the alliance routes.
-_ Consumers in the North Atlantic markets are generally better off due to the alliances.
(d) Service improvement: Schedule delay time (decreasing function of frequency) is significantly
reduced only for the case of complementary alliances.
(e) Most alliance partners have experienced greater traffic increases on their alliance routes than
those on non-alliance routes.
(B) Effects of Airline Code-sharing Agreements:
Asia-Pacific Alliances
• Objectives of Oum-Park-Zhang (1996) Study
- to measure systematically the effects of code-sharing between non-market-leaders on
market leader's behaviour and air fares.
The Method and Empirical Results:
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Developedamodelbasedonprofit maximizationbehaviourof n oligopoly fu'ms in a
market.
Applied it to a panel dam for 57 transpacific air routes over the 1982-92period.
Codesharing between two non-leader major carriers makes the market leader behave more
competitively. As a result, the leader's output rises by 10,052 passengers per year and its
price falls by $84 per passenger.
It's important to distinguish the demand effect from the collusive/competitive effect.
Future work:
. to use true O-D data rather than using route segment data;
. desirable to estimate followers' equations as well.
(C). Other studies
- Bruckner (1997), "The Economics of Intemationatl Codesharing: Analysis of Airline
Alliances"
(Beneficial effect of codesharing outweighs harmful effect)
- Park and Zhang (1998), "Complimentary vs. Parallel Alliances"
(Two types of alliances have different effects on total output and consumer surplus;
complimentary alliances is always positive)
(D) Policy Implications of the Studies
To encourage alliance partners to coordinate beyond-gateways, in addition to coordinating
between gateways.
O- Complementary alliances
Need to be cautious in granting anti-trust immunity when the major benefit of an alliance
occurs by pooling capacity on the same route.
Need to encourage alliance between minor players in a market dominated by a major player
as this will strengthen the aligned competitor
Need to monitor the partners' combined flight frequency before/after the alliance (to see if
there is a case for anti-trust measure)
VI. Future Direction of Global Network Formation and Research Agenda
Future Direction of Global Network Development.
• Global network will be formed via strategic alliances among a group of airlines _om each
continent.
Airlines will continue to face severe difficulty establishing a global network through
13
M&A.
Major strategic alliances will become more stable because each partner willhave incentive
to stick with a global alliance group.
- Cost of getting out of a major alliance network will increase over time.
A limited number of major global networks will be formed via strategic alliances of airlines
from each continent.
- Each alliance is likely to include:
one major North American carder as an anchor carrier;
one major European as an anchor carrier; and
one or more Asian carders (possibly an anchor carrier ?)
one ormore South American carders
-Anchor carderswillcapturca majorityof long-haul intercontinentalservices,while their
juniorpartnerson each continentwillprovideprimarilyfeeder servicesto hubs of
theiralliancenetwork.
Future Research
What are the factors contributing success of an alliance?
Indepth study comparing commercial alliances vs. equity alliances
Regional structureof airlines
14
A4: Airport_ and Aviation
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Strategic alliances have occurred in a broad spectrum of industries including the airline
industry. This paper presents a model that examines the effects on market outcome and welfare
of two types of strategic airline alliances: complementary vs. parallel alliances. It is identified
that the two alliances have different effects on total output and consumer surplus. The
complementary alliance is likely to increase total outpu4 while the parallel alliance is likely to
decrease it. Consequently, the former increases consumer surplus, while the latter is likely to
decrease it. We find sufficient conditions under which each type of alliance improves total
welfare. The empirical test results from the tram-Atlantic alliance routes for the 1990-94
period, confirm the theoretical predictions on partners' outputs and total output.
1. INTRODUCTION
Strategic alliances have occurred in a broad spectrum of industries including the automobile,
commercial aircraft, electronic equipment, robotics, steel, and telecommunications industries
(Business Week July 27, 1992; Economist September 1 I, 1993). Among these industries, the
airline industry has had a large number of alliances which have been spurred on by regulatory
barriers such as the lack of access to domestic markets by foreign carriers, limits on foreign
ownership, or simply the fear of being left behind (Gallacher and Odell, 1994).
In order to attract more passengers in an increasingly competitive environment, major
international airlines have been seeking to extend the range of their network and access new
markets, i Some carriers have tried to expand overseas services by adding foreign spokes to
their domestic hub cities. Since this approach requires enormous funding to build such a
global network, with bilateral restrictions sometimes limiting their ability to expand
international services, most international carriers have focused on integrating two or more
existing networks through international airline alliances.
Strategic alliances allow carriers to expand the reach of their networks and services to many
parts of the world where it may not be economical to do so on their own or where there may
be a lack of authority to operate their own flights. These alliances range from simple route-
by-route alliances to broad commercial alliances, and to equity alliances, z
Alliances may provide opportunities for partners involved to reduce costs by coordinating
activities in some fields: joint Use of ground facilities such as lounges, gates and check-in
counters; codesharing 3 or joint operation; block space sales; j mt advertlsmg and promotion;4- O- , ,
' In airllne markets, there are demand forces such that consumers prefer airlines which serve a large number
of points over ones which serve a smaller number of points, with all other factors such as prices held constant
CTretheway and Oum (1992)).
2 We analyzed 46 international alliances being formed between the world's top-30 airlines in order to
identify the areas of joint activities between alliance partner,s and measure the extent of coordination. Based on
the extent of coordination, 28 cases were classified as simple route-by-mute alliances, 9 eases as broad
commercial alliances, and 9 cases as equity alliances. The equity alliance is the most advanced and durable
form of alliances. It involves strategic linkage between both partners' flight network. One example is the
KLM/Northwest alliance signed in January1993. KLM invested in 25% of Northwest's voting shares and 49%
of its equity as of March 1993, and they received antitrust immunity from the U.S. government in November
1992. Although each carrier's management remains separable due to foreign ownership limit, they can closely
coordinate. They are able to achieve a high level of integration without fear of legal challenges from
competitors and are able to discuss market strategy and pricing.
3 A codesharingagreementisa marketingarrangementbetweentwoairlineswhereby one airline's
designatorcode isshown on flightsoperatedby itspartnerairline.For example,Lufthama has been
codesharingon UnitedAirlines'flightbetweenFrankfurtand 25 U.S.interiorcitiesviatwo ofUnited'shubs
(ChicagoO'Hareand WashingtonDulIes).For theeffectsofcodesharing,seeHadrovic(1990)andGellman
ResearchAssociates(1994).
'* If two carriers make a block space sale agreement, each carrier can buy a block of seats in the other
carrier's flights and resell them to passengers. For example, Air Canada and Korean Air have signed on such
an agreement on the Seoul-Vancouver-Toronto route, under which each buys 48 seats from the other's flights
exchangeof flight attendants; and so on. As a result, the partners may become more cost-
effective and increase their competitiveness.
Allian:es also produce several benefits for consumers. Alliance partners can better
coordinate flight schedules to minimize travellers' waiting time between flights while
providing sufficient time for connections. Joint baggage handling eliminates the need to
retrieve and re-check baggage at connecting places, and thus reduces the risk associated with
interline handling in which no one carrier has the sole responsibility for the baggage.
Consumers' choices can increase due to alliances. For example, consider a passenger who
wants to fly from Indianapolis to Lyon. She could fly Indianapolis-Washington, D.C.-
Frankfurt-Lyon on United-Lufthansa partners' flights. She could also fly Indianapolis-
Pittsburgh-London-Lyon on British Airways-USAir alliance flights. Alternatively, she could
fly Indianapolis-Detroit-Amsterdam-Lyon on KLM-Northwest alliance flights. Without the
alliances, she would have to interline on several different carriers with great inconvenience.
Although alliances generate benefits for both partners involved and consumers, it may reduce
the number of competitors and thus increase the combined market power of alliance partners.
As a result, the partners may increase air fares if they behave collusively and abuse their
strengthened market power. On the other hand, it is also possible for air fares to decrease
since alliances between non-market-leaders can increase their competitiveness against the
market leader. By focusing on "complementary" alliances in the trans-Pacific markets, Oum,
Park and Zhang (1996) empirically show that the alliances between non-leaders reduce the
leader's equilibrium price.
Despite the growing importance of international airline alliances, few researchers have
devoted effort to constructing formal models of the alliances.S This paper constructs a formal
model to examine the effects on market outcome and economic welfare of different types of
alliances: "complementary" and "parallel" alliances. The "complementary" alliance refers
to the case where two firms link up their existing networks and build a new complementary
network in order to feed traffic to each other. Major strategic alliances such as
K.LM/'Northwest can be regarded as this type of alliance. For example, KLM and Northwest
signed the "complementary" alliance by which they were able to connect 88 U.S. cities to 30
European and Middle Eastern cities via Northwest's hubs (Boston, Detroit, and Minneapolis)
and K.LM's Amsterdam hub, as of December 1994 (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1995).
The "parallel" alliance refers to collaboration between two firms competing on the same
routes. Two types of parallel alliances are considered: "no shut-down" and "shut-down"
parallel alliances. The difference between the two is that each partner continues to
individually provide services on the route in the first type, while two partners intem'ate their
on the route.
s The international airline issues have been investigated by researchers. The effects on pricing of bilateral
agreements were investigated by, among others, Abbott and Thompson (1991), and Maillebiau and Hamen
(1995). The effects of alliances have been empirically investigated by, among others, Youssef and Hansen
(1994), Gellman Research Associates (1994), and Oum, Park and Zhang (1996).
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servicesin thesecondtype. For example,Air CanadaandKoreanAir implementedthe "no
shut-down" parallel allianceon theVancouver-Seoulroute. DeltaandSabenaformedthe
"shut-down"parallelallianceon theNewYork-Brusselsrouteon whichDeltastopped flyingand purchased a block of seats from Sabena.
More specifically, this study investigates the following questions: After alliance partners
make a particular type of alliance in a specific market, what happens to the partners' and non-
aligned competitors' outputs in that market as well as in other markets? What happens to
profit for the partners and the competitors due to the alliance? What happens to total output
and air fare in that market as well as in other maricets9 Under which conditions do the
alliances improve economic welfare?
In the next section, the Basic Model is considered to compare pre-alliance, complementary
alliance, and parallel alliances situations. Section 3 examines the effects of complementary
alliance on market outcome and total welfare. Section 4 investigates the effects of two types
of parallel alliances on the partners' outputs and total welfare. Section 5 provides the Extend
Model by relaxing some conditions assumed in the Basic Model. Section 6 tests some
testable predictions associated with the effects on firms' output and total output. Section 7concludes.
2. THE BASIC MODEL
2.1 Pre-aIiiance Situation
In order to analyze the effects of alliances on market outcome and economic welfare, we need
to construct a pre-alliance situation first where none of airlines have yet to make any type of
alliance. As depicted in Figure 1, a network is considered, consisting of three gateway cities
located in different countries: A, B and H. There are three origin and dest_tion markets,
AH, BH and AB, and three firms (or carriers) are operating in the network. Firm 1 is
assumed to serve all three markets (AH, BH and AB) using its hub-and-spoke network.
Firms 2 and 3 are assumed to serve AH and BH markets, respectively.6
If travellers want to fly from city A and arrive at city B by firm l's airplanes, they must
change airplanes at the hub airport H. Or, they can use two segment flights, separately
provided by firms 2 and 3, in order to arrive at their final destination. However, it is
assumed that in the pre-aIliance situation, travellers do not use multiple carriers' interline
connecting services because of poor connections between firms 2 and 3. 7
Note that two madonai carriers are assumed to operate on each route of the network. Since international
_air services between two cities are mainly decided by bilateral
agreements between the two countries involvingme two crees, this assumption seems to be reason,able.
If connections must be made at connecting airports or hubs, less of the traveller's time will be required
with a single airline than when the trip involves switching airlines, because a single airline's connecting flights
are more likely to reduce waiting time at the connecting airports and lower probability of baggage being lost
than multiple airlines' interline connecting flights.
2.2 Complementary Alliance Situation
Consider a situation where firms 2 and 3 make a "complementary" alliance. Both firms
jointly provide connecting services for passengers travelling between cities A and B, while
continuing to provide local services as before. In order to compete with firm l's connecting
services, the partners enhance quality of their connecting services. For example, the partners
can adjust arrival and departure flights to minimize waiting time between flights while
providing sufficient time for connections. They can also re-locate departure gates for
connecting flights close to arrival gates, coordinate baggage transfer, and cooperate other
joint activities at the connecting airport. They agree to share revenues and costs arising from
the connecting services.
To examine the effects of this alliance, we need to consider demands and costs. Consider
demands first. The "full" price demand model is considered from the viewpoint that each
firm's demand in each market depends not only on its air fare, but also its service quality (De
Vany, 1974; Panzar, 1979). Assuming that consumers can place a dollar value on service
quality, each firm's demand in each market in the complementary alliance situation may be
written as
I t t #r i--1,2, i,j
! l t
Qauf Dsn(p.s, plas ) for i=I, 3, i_j
I I l
Q.. :D..(O.., for i:1, 2+3,i,j
where pt, is the full price of using carrier i's service in market k, which is the sum of air
fare, denoted by pt, and value of service quality. Solving the demand functions for pt, may
yield the following inverse demand functions:
t dt.-t ..JPk = t(Idt,_tJ for k=AH, BH,AB, i'_j.
We assume that outputs of rival carriers are substitutes in each city-pair market:
Odkt <0, for k=AH, BIt, AB, i_j.
aQ/ (I)
The value of service quality can be regarded as cost of service quality from the viewpoint of
carriers. Two different costs of service quality are considered: (i) schedule delay cost on
each route, and (ii) inconvenient connecting cost at the connecting airport.
The schedule delay cost is a passenger's schedule delay time arising from the difference
between the passenger's desired departure and actual departure time. Research has found that
the schedule delay cost depends largely on the carrier's flight frequency, which in turn
depends on its total traffic (e.g., Douglas and Miller, 1974). Thus, if Q is the total
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passengerscarried by carrier i on route k, then the schedule delay cost may be written as
g/k(Q)- It is assumed that g'(')<0, that is, the schedule delay cost of an airline declines with
! t Iits traffic on the route. The schedule delay cost for the non-stop services is gk(Q_ +QAa) for
k = AH and BH, while the schedule delay cost for the connecting service is the sum of the
i i I 1 t t
schedule delay cost on each of two local routes, gAu(Q,,t ÷ Q,,n) ÷gnu(Qnu ÷ Q,_n).
The second component of the cost of service quality is a passenger's inconvenience cost due
to connections. Carlton, Landes and Posner (1980) estimate that travellers place an extra cost
of $13-17 (in 1978 dollars) for a single carrier's one-stop connecting services, as compared
to its non-stop services. This extra cost for alliance partners' connecting services will be
even larger, if the partners' connecting service is inferior to the single carrier's connecting
service. For convenience of analysis, without loss of generality, we assume that the
inconvenient connecting cost for the single carrier's connections is zero, but that for the
partners' connections, denoted by y, is positive. However, the partners' connecting cost wiIl
decrease as the level of their coordination increases at the airport H.
Carrier i's production cost function on route k may be expressed as ¢kt(Q), implying its
round-trip cost of carrying Q passengers on the route. Note that Q represents total
passengers carried by the airline on the route. This production cost function reflects
tl C t/' 0. zeconomies of traffic density, satisfying Ck (Q)>0 and _ (Q)<
Given these demand and cost specifications, profit function for the non-aligned carrier and
aligned partners can be expressed as:
]'TI== t'l lid I "- 1 I l 1
-&at(Q_n + _ l t t
+ 0 1 rat i t.tl I t._ (..2.3)x
-gn.CQ+. + (2)
I 1
-c_(Q.. +g_'_) ' '- Ca.(Qa- +Q_a)
(3)
*Caves, Christensen and Tretheway (1984) disringui._ between economies of traffic density and economies
of fh-m size. Economies of traffic density mean that output is expanded by increasing flight frequency within
a given network. Economies of firmsize imply that output is expanded by adding points to the network. Many
studies reach a common conclusion: roughly constant returns to firm size exist, while sizeable economies of
traffic density exist up to fairly large voIumes of traffic (See, for example, Caves, Christensen, Tretheway andWindle (1987)).
there are no network
where superscript c stands for complementary alliance.
It can be shown that 8_c/dQ_gQ_u = 0. This implies that
comp[ementarities between 1oca! services. We can also show that
_lc i ! it! i t/
=_2g k (.)_g, (.).(Qtk+Q_s)-c k (.), k =AH, BH. (4)
__t.,^t
_kC_As
In (4), the first term is positive because an airline's schedule delay cost decreases with its
traffic. The second term is positive if g is linear or concave. The third term is also positive
because of economies of traffic density. (4) can be positive even if g is convex. More
generally, we assume that (4) is positive, implying that there exist network cornplementarities
between local and connecting services. In other words, a carrier's marginal profit from a
local service increases as its connecting passengers increase.
In (1), outputs of rival carriers are assumed to be substitutes in each city-pair market. We
further assume that in each market a carrier's marginal profit decreases as the output of the
competitor increases:
0_r_
..<0, k=AH, BH,AB, i_j,
, j (S)
8QkaQ,
which implies that within each market the outputs of duopolists are "strategic substitutes" in
the terms of Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985).
2.3 Parallel Alliance Situation
Next, consider another post-alliance situation where firms 1 and 2 make a "parallel" alliance
in a sense that they were competitors in the AH segment of the network before the alliance,
but now they coordinate or integrate their operations in that segment. For convenience of
notation, among the parallel alliance partners, firm 1 is called as a hub partner, and firm 2
as a non-hub partner. Firm 3 is called as a non-partner.
Two types of parallel alliances are considered. The first is that each partner continues to
provide local services in the AH segment and choose their quantities to maximize their joint
profits. For example, Air Canada (a hub partner) and Korean Air (a non-hub partner) have
implemented this style of parallel alliance on the Seoul-Vancouver-Toronto route since 1993.
Another type is that the partners integrate services in the AH segment in a way that the hub
partner continues to provide local services, but the non-hub partner stops producing local
services. For simplicity of analysis, k is assumed that the partners equally share revenues
and costs arising from the joint services. For example, Delta and Sabena formed this sort of
parallel alliance on the New York-Brussels route where Delta StOlSlSed non-stop services after
the alliance.
Since the non-hub partner shuts down its operation in the second case, the first case is
referred to as "no shut-down" parallel alliance, the second as "shut-down" parallel alliance,
hereafter. For both cases, firm 3 continues to operate alone in the BH segment as before.
For consistency of analysis, we consider the same demand and cost specifications as used in
the complementary alliance. In particular, by using the "full" price demand specification,
the inverse demand functions for the parallel alliance may be written as
p,4t d I . _t
u = AU(_AU'QIAa) fori=l,2, i_j
t !
P_.-'_;.(Q..,_.) f,,,. _--z,3, _.,j
pl B 1 !=d/_a(Q._s)
where OA_ is positive for the "no shut-down" case; O_ is zero for the "shut-down" case.
We still assume that conditions (I), (4) and (5) hold.
3. EFFECTS OF COMPLFaMENTARY ALLIANCE
3.1 Effects on Firms' Outputs and Profits
Let us first analyze the effects of thecomplementary alliance. We consider an equilibrium
that arises when the non-aligned carrier (i.e., firm I) and the aligned partners (i.e., firms






where O = _.4e, QJa, Q._ for i = 1, 2. For convenience of notation, superscript 2 +3 is
replaced by 2. Assume that there exists a "stable" Cournot-Nash equilibrium (Q t(y), O 2(y))
which satisfies the following first-order conditions for maximization of (6) and (7): to
9 The Coumot assumption is not crucial in the duopoly market. Brander and Zhang (1990) and Oum, Zhang
and Zhang (1993), using conjectural variations, find .rome evidence that airline, in duopoly markets behave likeCouraot competitors.
to This stability asm_mpfion is important. If an equilibrium is not stable, then a slight deviation by one
player doe, not came the equilibrium to tttum to that point. The stability of Coumot-Na._h equilibrium has been
studied by, among others, Seade (1980), Dixit (1986), Slade (1994), and
partic_ar, Zhang and Zhang (1996) extends sint, le-market ,.....4:.:_ .. _.Zh.ang and Zhang (1996). In
m multima_ket conditions ° ,.,,_,umuns for _.aomty of Coumot-Nash equilibria
ic I
11_(Q (y), Q :(y)), o
I_(Q 'CY),Q 2(y);y) = o
(8)
(O)
Assume that the second-order conditions
matrices are negative definite for i = 1, 2:
are also satisfied, i.e., the following Hessian
"ff_u,n., 1-(_H_e,
R:
With the present specifications, it can be shown that as compared to the pre-alliance situation,
finn 1 (the partners, respectively) produces less (more, respectively) output not only in the
market where the complementary alliance occurs, but also in the other markets.-
Proposition 3-1. Under the complementary alliance conditions, firm 1 produces less output
in markets AH, BH and AB, but the alliance partners produce more output in both their local
market and the AB market than under the pre-alliance conditions.
Proof. Differentiating (8) and (9) with respect to 3, yields
T.[lcdQ * + .fit, dQ 2 = O,
" d--V":




rr2" =In 0, -I]r. Solving (10) and (11) for (dQt/dy,dQ:ldy), wehave
where "-'_'e- L- '
, r I_,,_-,...,,t.-.2,_-,_:,]"t.,,_-lrr'°lr:'l'lrr_:
dy




Differentiating (8) with respect to Q 2 yields the following 3-by-3 "derivative" matrix of
, (rr'_-_rr''
carrier l's reaction functions: Ru =-aR '_(Q 2)/a_2 2 =W'*i --,2 where R "(Q 2(.)) is carrier
l's reaction function for the aligned partners' outputs. Similarly, a "derivative" matrix of
the partners' reaction functions for firm l's outputs can be defined as
Ic
In what follows, we show that every element of R 2 , R_ matrices is negative: First, it rums
out that both Hessian inverse matrices are negative matrices. /wxcl"
_-nI can be expressed as
T['A'c Frlc rrlc ]-Tlc
U_Aa_altjAa, - -Au,.,8,--'au_a_




_ ]'T 1c TTlC
--Aa,AUz_au_au_ ]'TIc "If Ic rflc ]-flc
By the second-order condition and the network complemen_--ities condition (4), every/_-,,c_-,.
are negative diagonal matrices because of the strategic substitutes condition (5). Thus, both R_ c
and Rl" are negative matrices.
2c
By using R_ c and R_ , (12) and (13) can be rewritten as
(14)
2
2¢ 1¢ 1 2c-I 2c
d7 (15)
#
The stability of Cournot-Nash equilibrium implies that the magnitude of the eigenvalues of
ma_ic__,'_: _d _:_, mustbe_essthanone(Z_.gandZU.g,1_). Hence,bythe
Since R/_Rt is a positive matrix, then _-_R_)" is also a positive matrix.
Therefore.,_'/,V>0 _d ,_'/d_,.:0since_'° i_anegativema_ andn_ isanegative
vector.
Q.E.D.
The intuitiveexplanationsfor Proposition3-I are as follows:Ifthepartnersprovide better
quality of connecting services inmarket AB, inconvenience cost (7) will decrease, which in
turn increases connecting traffic for the partners, that is, dO.,_)/dy < 0. This connecting
traffic increase implies that the partners can feed more traffic to each other. As a result,
" Neumann lemma is that ifR is a real square matrix and the magnitude of eigenvalues of R is less than
one, then (I-R) "_ exists and (l-R)" =2R _. See, for example, Ortega and Rheinboldt (1970, p.45).
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schedule delay cost for local non-stop services will decrease (i.e., service quality for the local
services increases) and average operating costs on the AH and BH routes will decrease due
to economies of traffic density. Consequently, increases in _O_2 lead to decreases the
partners' air fares in the AH and BH markets, which in turn increases AH and BH traffic as
well. Therefore, it is possible that increasing qualities of service and decreasing operating
cost are jointly achievable if the partners collaborate very well.
I
_ _3
On the other hand, increases in _,,8 due to the better coordination decrease Q,(_), resulting
in increased carrier l's unit cost on the AH and BH routes and increased schedule delay cost
for its local services. As a result of the complementary alliance, carrier 1 decreases output
not only in the AB market, but also in the other market.
Although firm I reduces its output in markets AH, BH and AB, it does not necessarily imply
that it decreases its profit, because its profit is affected not only by its output in these
markets, but also by corresponding air fares. Thus, it is worthwhile to investigate whether
each firm's profit increases or decreases due to the complementary alliance.
Proposition 3-2. Under the complementary alliance conditions, firm 1 earns less profit, but
the alliance partners earn more profit, as compared to the pre-alliance conditions.
Proof. Substituting the Cournot-Nash equilibrium (Q 1(y), Q 2(y)) into (6) and (7), and
differentiating these with respect to y, we have
all1° _ ---7 d'C _.A.a_, ,.A. aQk aQ_ d_, ,.,,B aQ_ d_
By the first-order conditions, the first term of the right-hand side of the first equations of (16)
AB 2 Aa dill, 2
= . .+____ _ dr.Q,-Q_, (17)am" _ am" dQ, + _ am• Q,
av ,-A, aQ: dv ,-,,-aQ_ dV dV ,.A, aQ
and (17) disappears. By condition (I), a£P'/av>o and aI_'/ay<o. Q.E.D.
3.2 Effects on Market Outcome and Economic Welfare
According to Proposition 3-1, it is not clear whether total output in each market increases or
decreases due to the complementary alliance since firm 1 decreases output in each market,
while the aligned partners increase. Thus, in this section, we examine the effects of the
alliances on total output and consumer surplus in each market, and total welfare.
In order to examine changes in total output due to the complementary alliance, we further
assume that the aligned partners and non-aligned competitors are symmetric and the partners
can provide connecting services at the same quality as the non-partner's (i.e., "y =0 ).
Proposition 3-3. For the symmetric case, the complementary alliance results in (i) increased
10
total output and (ii) decreased "full" price in markets AH, BH, and AB. Therefore,
consumers in these markets are better off due to the complementary alliance.
Proof Let Q be total output vector and p(Q) be corresponding "full" price vector. By
definition of Q,
d__Q.Q_ dQ I + dQ _
dy dy dv (18)
Rearranging (10) and using R t'- /Trl"l-lrr 1"-_--Ul --z:, we can have
dV dV (19)
Substituting (15) and (19) into (18)yields
R leR le-! 2c -1 2e
dy t (20)
2c -I 2c
By using the symmetric condition and Rio- = -(I_:) II_,, (20) can be rewritten as
2c-1 2e I 2e-1 2e
(21)
Using the result (AB) -t = B "tA -_, we can further simplify (21) as follows:
_yQ [.,-4c .,-,lc_-l,.,leIT-, = -L4: ÷lh_j lqy (22)
2C
Notice that both I_ and ]Z_, matrices are negative definite. Consequently, I_ +I_t is a
negative definite matrix. Its inverse matrix, _I_ + _:c_-t_a] can be expressed as
lU=*ui, l'""-: "-':,r",', "",',1 I
where subscripts A, B and, C represent AH, BH, and AB, respectively. Since every element
of _I_:+ ]Zj_t)-' is strictly negative, the inverse matrix is a negative matrix. Combining it with
I_vector implies, we have aQ/avlT.,<0. Thus, dPCQ)/aVlv.,>0. Consequently,
consumer sui'plus in each market increases due to the complementary alliance. Q.E.D.
In order to analyze changes in total welfare due to the complementary alliance, we assume
a partial equil_rium framework in which consumer demand for air travel in each market is
II




where Z is expenditure on a competitively supplied numeraire good, and aUjaQ/= Ptk.
! I
Recall that pt, is the full price of using carrier i's service in market k, i.e., p,=p, +g_(').
Then consumer surplus in each market can be written as
cs,=u:.', Q:>-pIQ:-gQ:. (23)
and total surplus can be written as
AB
W= _ CSk+(TI' +I_) (24)
k.AH
where W may be interpreted as "World Welfare" if the markets under consideration involves
different countries.
Substitution of (2) and (3) into (24) can yield the following expression for W:
I I I ]"" __,[, , , , ' ' ' ' +p..,,).(.e,, ".Q_,,)w = _ u,(g_, Q_) - _.(Q_-+Q.9"(Q." ÷QA9 +g"(g'"
, .A. ," (25)
_[ ' , ,Q/,> , , ,Q_,>]-_Q,,- C.4.(P._ + C)H(Qa.
Isl . .
where again, for simplicity, superscript 2+3 is replaced by 2.
Proposition 3-4. For the symmetric case, total welfare rises due to the complementary
alliance. . t t t
Pk=Pk +gt,
Proof. Differentiating (25) with respect to ? and using OuJcQt = we can show
,d t
dW __ "" [ ' t' ' _C:_d _7_-,., E _,,-_,'_, +Q',_
J-A= (26)
",-E ({'(Q'÷Q,',>-c''I]'p_"-/Q'""Y--_-y|"
Notice the first and second bracketed terms of (26) are positive by the first-order conditions.
Since dQ_/dy > O and dQ_/dy <0 for each market k, the overall effect of the complementary
alliance on total welfare is not clear.
However, under the symmetric condition and y = 0, (26) can be reduced to
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By the first-order conditions and Proposition 3-3, dg'/dy ['t .o < O. Q.E.D.
Proposition 3-4 provides sufficient conditions for the complementary alliance to raise welfare.
However, welfare can increase even for a small positive y. For example, in (26),
dg,'/dy [_.0 < 0 if the partners' markup in each market is greater than firm l's markup and the
y'(dQ:Jdy) term is sufficiently small.
4. EFFECTS OF PARALLEL ALLIANCE
4.1 Effects of No Shut-down Parallel Alliance
Let us rum to the effect of the parallel alliances. We first analyze the effect of the "no shut-
down" parallel alliance where two partners continue to individually provide local services
after their alliance. However, it is hard to directly sign the "overall" effect of the no shut-
down parallel alliance since the effect involves switching from one situation (i.e., individual
profit maximization) to another (i.e., joint profit maximization). Farrel and Shapiro (1990)
use differential techniques in order to avoid similar difficulties faced in the analysis of
horizontal merger effects.
To use the differential techniques, we define 0 as: 0 = I for post-parallel aUiance; O =0 for
pre-alliance. We then treat 0 as continuous in the range 0 a 0 a I, and assume that carrier
i's output in market k, Q_(0), is continuous and differentiable in O in the entire range. By
these assumptions, the overall effect of switching from the pre-alliance to the "no shut-down"
parallel alliance can be calculated as the integral of the infinitesimal effect as follows:
It turns out to be easy to sign the infinitesimal effect, dQt(O)/dO. Consequently, the overall
effect, AQ,t(0), can be determined as well if the sign of the infinitesimal effect remains
unchanged in the range, which can be verified.
Based on the demand and cost specifications in Section 2, each firm's post-alliance profit




maxii:_ i, 2, 3 -II:+O.rI'
Q' (Q g Q ;O)=
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• .)where superscript p stands for parallel alliance; Q '= _ t t i , Q: 2 3 _ 3 .- _m _?ah-QA -"Q_H, Q = QB_,
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We will show that unlike the complementary alliance, parallel alliance partners are more
likely to decrease their total output in market AH after their alliance.
Proposition 4-1. If the non-hub partner (i.e., firm 2) produces the same amount of output
after the "no shut-down" parallel alliance, then the hub partner (i.e., firm 1) produces less
output in all three markets, and the non-partner (i.e., firm 3) produces more output in market
BH than under the pre-alliance.
Proof. Since the non-hub partner does not change its output in the parallel alliance, the first-
order conditions for firms 1 and 3 may be respectively written as
:o,
Assuming that there exists a "stable" equilibrium, (Q t(0), Q )(0)), which satisfies the first-
order conditions for firms I and 3, that ks,
zp ,0) 0]31 (Q'(O), Q'(0)" -
Q,(o))--o
Differentiating (27) and (28) with respect to 0 yields
yflpdQ I + rflpdQ 3 iv
1,'_- _,,-_- +TT'e=o,





where _o-- Q,(_i d:(a/OQ.(,O, 0 the firstelement of which isnegativeby condition(I).
Since both (I_;)-'and II_ are negative matrices, dQ 'ld6 and dQ'ldO have opposite signs
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(see equation (30)).
have Now, we show dQ '/dO <0. Solving (29) and (30) for dQ _/dO, we
dot = -[I-z I,,,_ _p]-I[rrlPl-lrrip
"'5 "'z J _zl/ _ze (31)
where R_' -hr',l"rr', R: p-- 3
- _--Jt/_z_ and 17_ are derivativematricesof firm l's (firm3's,
respectively)reactionfunctionfor firm 3's (fh'm l's,respectively)output. Imposing the
inProposition3-I,every element of at isnegativebecause of thesecond-orderconditions
and the network complementaritiescondition(4). Therefore, dQ Z/de< 0 and dQ _/dO> O.
Next, we show thatthesignsof dQ I/dO< 0 and dQ 3 dO > 0 remain unchanged inthe entire
range of interest.In(3I),the thirdterm, Ill_,remains as negativeinthe range sincethefirst
element of II_ isalways negative regardlessof any value of 0 in the range. By similar
arguments, thesignsof thefirstand second termsremain unchanged intheregion. Q.E.D.
Ip
Notice that the conditionwhich Ilte<0 plays a crucialrole in Proportion 4-I. In fact,
'TIP TT2
_o -=_, thus implying that firm 2's profit decreases as firm I produces more output in
market AH. Thus, the intuition behind Proportion 4-1 is that by forming the "no shut-down"
parallel alliance and maximizing the joint profit, the hub partner chooses Q _ with taking
account of the negative externalities of the hub partner's output on the non-hub partner's
profit. This leads to decreases in the hub parmer's output in market AH. Consequently, the
hub partner decreases its BH and AB traffic due to the network complementarities.
Similarly, we can show
Proposition 4-2. If the hub partner (i.e., firm I) produces the same amount of output after
the parallel alliance, then the non-hub partner (i.e., firm 2) decreases its output, and the non-
partner (i.e., firm 3) produces the same amount of output, as compared to the pre-alliance
situation.
The next question naturally arises: what ffboth Q rand Q: are chosen endogenously? If the
two partners endogenously decides their outputs, they cannot simultaneously increase output
in market AH after the parallel alhance.
Proposition 4-3. dQ t/dO and dQ :/dO cannot both be positive.
Proof. Denoting a "stable" equilibrium by (Q t(0), Q :(0), Q _(0)), and differentiating the
first-order conditions with respect to 0, we have
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i_p dQ t + ]-[2t,dQ :
i-[JpdQ I
31"-_" ÷
I_ = O, (33)
]'l'a3P3dQa =0 (34)
dO
Again, from (34), it can be easily verified that dQ t/dO and dQ'/dOhave opposite signs.
Equations (32) and (33) show that dQ Z/dO and dQ :/dO are interdependent with each other.
Solving (32)-(34) for dQ */dO and dQ 2 dO yields
d_* r,o*,o',]'*:,'r',_"(-',--',d_ _) (35)
"' J '
or
_ -1[ . _2pdQ' IdO
(36)
*p
Since l'l'n<0 and _<0 due to the strategic substitutes condition, both dQtldO and
dQ :/dO cannot be positive in (35) and (36). Q.E.D.
Notice that if dQ 2/dO =0, then (35) reduces to (31) and Proportion 4-1 follows. Similarly,
if dQ ZidO = 0, then (36) can be used to show Proposition 4-2.
Although both dQ t/dO and dQ 21dO cannot simultaneously be positive in (35)-(36), it is
possible that both dQ t/dO and dQ 21dO are negative in (35)-(36). This can be illustrated by
the following numerical example. Assume that demand is linear as follows:
d_CQ',Q_)=_-CQ;+QL),:o;k=a_,B_,,_B.
Assume further that schedule delay cost, gk(" ), is also linear and that operating cost, C,(" ),
is concave:
t 2_' _ for k =AH, BH,AB (38),,
where _t represents the extent of increasing returns to traffic density. Given these
specifications, the explicit expressions of equilibrium output can be obtained for each firm
under the pre-alliance and the "no shut-down" parallel alliance situations. In particular, when
a = 4, 6 = 0.03, 1_ = 0.04, both of the partners decrease their outputs, while the non-
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partner increases its output. More accurately, changes in each firm's output due to the "no
shut-down" alliance are AOt- = (AQJu, AO2 n, AQ_,) = (-0.2142, -0.0009, -0.0119);
= 2AQ _ -AQalt = -0.1404; and AQ _ ---AQn_u = 0.0009, respectively.
To sum up the effects of the "no shut-down" parallel alliance on each firm's output,
the partners' total output is likely to decrease, while the non-partner output may increase (by
Proposition 4-1), remain unchanged (by Proposition 4-2), or decrease (by dQ z/d0>O in
Proposition 4-3). Thus, consumer surplus in market AH is likely to decrease due to this type
of parallel alliance.
4.2 Effects of Shut-dow'a Parallel Alliance
We now analyze the effects of the second style of parallel alliance where the partners
integrate local services in the AH segment in a way that the hub partner continues to provide
the local services, but the non-hub partner stops producing the local services. However, it
is intractable to compare the pre-alliance and shut-down parallel alliance by using general
functions since the number of the first-order conditions for the former is not the same as that
for the latter. For tractability of analysis, we impose more structures on the model. First,
demands and schedule delay costs for all three markets are assumed to be symmetric.
SecondIy, in order to use a common cost function, we assume that the distances between
cities A and H, and between B and H are the same. Thirdly, we use special functions (37)-
(38) for demand, schedule delay cost, and operating cost. _2
Comparing the solution of the pre-alliance situation to that of the "shut-down" parallel
alliance, we first examine the effects of the "shut-down" parallel alliance on each firm's
output.
Proposition 4-4. Under the "shut-down" parallel alliance conditions, the partners produce
less output in market AH, but produce more output in markets BH and AB, and firm 3
produces less output in its local market BH than under the pre-alliance conditions.
The proofs of the "shut-down" parallel alliance are provided in the Appendix. The intuitive
reasons for Proposition 4-4 are as follows: First of all, since the AH market is now serviced
only by the name of the hub partner, this market becomes a monopoly market. The hub-
partner produces more than its pre-alliance output in this market, but less than total pre-
tb _., lp[ .., (, .2X*__ - tb _ 2b
alliance output, i.e., QAu" leAai'-e_u ]-. fdAu+Id,,z. Secondly, the hub partner increases
its BH and AB traffic due to the network complementarities. Thirdly, the non-partner will
decrease its BH traffic since its reaction function to the hub partner's output in market BH
is downward sloping.
Next, the effects on each firm's profit are examined. In general, the post-alliance profit of
the non-hub partner (i.e., firm 2) increases when the size of markets (a) is sufficiently large
for a given economies of traffic density (_). Joining the "shut-down" parallel alliance, the
u The linear demand and concave operating cost functions are also used inBrueckner and Spiller (1991),
Brueckner, Dyer and Spiller (1992), and Nero (1996).
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non-hub partner decreasesrevenuefrom market AH since total output in this market
decreasesdue to the alliance. But, the non-hubpanner becomesmorecost-effectiveby
jointly producing the hub partner'sconnectingserviceson the AH route. If the sizeof
marketsis largeenoughfor thepartnersto produceagreatvolumeof trafficontheAH route,
firm 2's gainsfrom thecost-effectivenessdominateits lossesfrom thedecreasedrevenue.
Proposition 4-5. Under the "shut-down" parallel alliance conditions, the hub panner earns
more profit than under the pre-alliance conditions. Given the economies of traffic density,
the non-hub partner earns more (less, respectively) profit when the size of markets is
sufficiently large (small, respectively) than under the pre-alliance situations. Firm 3 earns
less profit, as compared to the pre-alliance conditions.
We next examine the effects of the "shut-down" parallel alliance on total output and consumer
surplus in each market. According to Proposition 4-4, passengers in market AH are worse
off since total output in this market decreases while the corresponding "full" price increases.
Thus, consumer surplus in market AH decreases due to the parallel alliance. However, it is
not obvious whether or not consumers in market BH are better off due to the alliance.
Proposition 4-6. The "shut-down" parallel alliance results in (i) increased (decreased,
respectively) total output and (ii) decreased (increased, respectively) "full" price in markets
BH and AB (market AH, respectively). Therefore, consumers in these markets (this market,
respectively) are better off (worse off, respectively) due to the parallel alliance.
Although Proposition 4-6 shows increases in consumer surplus in markets BH and AB due
to the parallel alliance, it can be verified that decreases in consumer surplus in market AH
dominate the increases in market BH and AB.
To summarize the effects of the "shut-down" parallel alliance on each firm's output,
the partners' output decreases in market AH and increases in markets BH and A.B, while the
non-partner's output decreases. Like the "no shut-down" parallel alliance, consumer surplus
in market AH decreases due to the "shut-down" parallel alliance.
5. THE EXTENDED MODEL
The Basic Model have analyzed the effects of three types of alliances on the basis of an
assumption that there are no demand shifts due to the alliances. We now extend the Basic
Model by taking into account the potential codesharing effect on demand shift. Under a
codesharing agreement, one airline's designator code is shown on flights operated by its
partner. The codesharing allows the partners to offer a higher frequency service to
consumers should the partners l_int_in or increase their respective frequency. For example,
before the alliance, LH and UA provided one daily non-stop service between
Washin_on,D.C. and Frankfurt, respectively. After the alliance, they were able to offer two
daily non-stop services on the route thanks to the codesharing. It is therefore possible that
demand functions for the partners are shifted up by the codesharing effect.
5.1 Complementary alliance
Assuming that the partners' "full" price demand functions in each market are shifted up due
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where _ is an exogenous demand shift due to the codesharing effect.
The post-alliance profit function (6) and (7) can be rewritten as
II t, =II1,(Q t, Q:)
IP" =I_'(Q ', Q:; y, _).
(39)
(40)
In the Basic Model, _ is set to zero. Assume that there exists a "stable" Cournot-Nash
equilibrium, (Q t(y, _), Q :(y, _)), satisfying the first-order conditions for (39) and (40).
Differentiating the FOCs with respect to _ and solving for c3Q t/d_ and aQ 2/c3_, we have
a 1
Q _ R to _ I t :,-t 2,
(41)
2, le 1 2¢-1 2¢
c3Q: _-Rx R, ]" (]_._,)II_ (42)
where -_[1,X, I]'.Since- <0,then0Q'/a <0and
c3Q:/c3_> 0. This impliesthatthe codesharingeffecton thepartners'demand shiftsdoes not
change the propositionsderived from the Basic Model. In particular,fora given 7, under
the demand shiftsituation,(i)the partners(non-partner,respectively)produce more output
(lessoutput,respectively)in thethreemarkets,and (ii)totaloutputineach market increases
more than under the Basic Model situation.
What if thenon-partner'sdemand functionisalsoshiftedup due to thepartners'codesharing
effect? Ifthe partnerscannot fullycapturedemands createdby the codesharingeffect,some
of the demands may be leftover to thenon-parmer. We shallassume thatthenon-partner's
"full"price demand function is slightlyshiftedup, as compared to the partners'demand
shifts.We also assume thatthe non-partner'spost-alliance(inverse)demand shiftmay be
expressed as
131 I 1 2=al_.,,Q,)+_, o<_<].
Then, itisstraightforward to show that
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. _ it-- :cl-ir/.r.rlc_-l'rrlc _ ld,.rli:_-I.rr:¢l
aQ'_ Is-K2 ] It",,! (43)
(44)
I¢ 1¢
where IIa_---[co, co, co]r. Notice that if II,_ is a zero vector, then (43)-(44) reduce to (41)-
(42), respectively. Notice that the sign of the second bracketed term of the right-hand side
of (43)-(44) is indeterminate. If demand functions for both the partners and non-partner are
simultaneously shifted up, the effects of the complementary alliance on each firm's output and
total output are no longer clear.
However, if we assume that the partners and non-partner are symmetric and the partners can
provide connecting service at the same quality as the non-parmer's, then we have
Proposition 5-1. In case where demand functions for the partners and non-partner are
simultaneously shifted up by the complementary alliance, both competitors can increase
output under the symmetric and ¥ = 0 conditions.
Proof. Under the symmetric conditions, R;= R/< (---R ") and (1[:;)-*--(I_:)-' Thus, (43)-
(44) can be rewritten as
, i l,-i i,+ (45)
_ • 1 I• -1 2• +
t_*_/ _'_1" (46)
According to the stability condition, the magnitude of the eigenvalues of matrix, (R "):, must
be less than one, and so does R •. Thus, eGO:/a_> 0 since the second bracket term of (46)
is negative. It is also possible that eGOt/c3_>0, depending on co. Q.E.D.
5.2 Parallel alliance
We will focus on the analysis of the "no shut-down" ease here since the same results can be
obtained for the "shut-down" ease by the same analysis. Assuming that the partners' "full"
price demand functions in AI-I market are shifted up, the partners' post-alliance (inverse)
demand shifts may be written as
t d t ._t _# .Paiz = attttlan, _aBJ + _; for i, j = I, 2 ; i *j.
Denoting a "stable" equilibrium by (Q t(0, _), Q 2(0, _), Q 3(0, _)), and differentiating the
first-order conditions with respect to _, we have
Eip a17i + flip@172 + ill,@Q 3 ip+rr,<:o, (47)
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i_p dQ l ÷ 8" 8Q 2
_3p aQ _ + rT3paQ
(48)
(49)
_p ]rwhere IIt¢_-[1,O,O and 1_-'1.
From (49), it can be easily verified that 8Q t/c3_ and 8Q 3/8_ have opposite signs.





Notice that the sign of the last term of (50)-(51) can be either positive or negative, depending
on the difference between the positive direct effects of the demand shift on each partner's
marginal profit (i.e., D'_ and I_) and the negative indirect effects due to strategic
substitutes condition (i.e., II_.((3Q2lc3_) and I_.(c3Q1/_)). If the direct effects
Ipsimultaneously dominate the indirect effects in (50)-(51) (i.e., lII_[ > lII_:.(SQ2/a_)I
andl  l > thenaQ'/a >o andaQ'/a >o Therefore,
Proposition 5-2. If the parallel alliance shifts both partners' demand functions upward and
the direct effects of the demand shifts dominate the indirect effects, it is poss_le for both
partners to simultaneously increase output in market AH. It is therefore possible that total
output in market AH increases and thus consumer surplus increases.
6. EMPIRICAL TEST
This section carries on an empirical test for some propositions regarding the effects of the
alliances on each firm's output and total output. Previous sections have shown that
complementary and parallel alliances have different effects on each firm's output and total
output. After the complementary alliance, the partners increase local traffic (see Propositions
3-1 and 5-1). The non-partner can increase (see Proposition 3-1) or decrease (see Proposition
5-1) local traffic, depending on the degree of demand shift. Consequently, total output
increases in the local markets (see Proposition 3-3).
On the other hand, from the analysis of the parallel alliances, the partners are likely to
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decrease local traffic on the AH segment under both the "no shut-down" and "shut-down"
cases (see Propositions 4-1, 4-2, 4--4 and 5-1). Changes in the non-partners' outputs are
uncertain under the "no shut-down" case, but the non-partner decreases local traffic on the
BH segment under the "shut-down" case (see Propositions 4-4). Consequently, total output
on the AH segment is likely to decrease in market AH (see Propositions 4-3 and 4-6).
In order to test those predictions, we selected seventeen trans-Atlantic routes where either
complementary or parallel alliance occurred between US and European carriers. Since major
alliances in the North Atlantic markets were formed in the early 1990's, annual data for two-
ways of the seventeen routes (e.g., Atlanta to Amsterdam, and Amsterdam to Atlanta) were
collected for the 1990-94 period. Observations were collected for alliance partners and their
strongest competitor t3 for each of the seventeen routes. The total numbers of observations
available for the alliance partners and the largest non-aligned carriers are 151 and 97,
respectively.
Data associated with strategic alliances were mainly taken from the Official Airline Guides:
Worldwide Edition. To classify the data into pre-, post-complementary, and post-parallel
alliance situations, we used.a variety of data sources including Airline Business (1994),
GeUman Research Associates (1994), and U.S. General Accounting Office (1995). Thirty-six
observations were classified into the complementary alliance situation, while sixteen were
categorized into the parallel alliance situation. Four cases were classified as a mixture of the
two types (Lufth. ansa/United on Chicago-Frankfurt and Washington, D.C.-Franldurt routes).
The aligned-partners' traffic, non-partners' traffic, and total traffic data on the seventeen
routes were gathered from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) publication,
Traffic By Flight Stage. The mean value for the aligned-partner's passenger volume during
the period is 108,200 people, while the mean value for the total traffic is 247,770 people.
The number of carriers on each route was also obtained from the ICAO publication.
The aligned-partners' traffic, non-partners' traffic, and total traffic, respectively, are treated
as a dependent variable on each set of regression. As explanatory variables, presence of
complementary alliance (CA), presence of parallel alliance (PA), the number of airlines on
each route (NUM), year-specific characteristics (Y'R), and route-specific characteristics are
considered. Route Atlanta-Amsterdam and year 1990 is used as a base route and year in the
regression. For robustness of analysis, we test the hypotheses by using four different
specifications for each set of regression.
Table 1 shows test results. The test results generally confirm the theoretical predictions.
First, as shown in the first column of Table 1, the test result on alliance partners' outputs is
consistent with the corresponding proposkions. As excepted, all coefficients of CA are
estimated as positive, regardless of specifications. More importantly, the coefficients of CA
are estimated as highly significant under the specifications (1) and (2). This result confirms
t3 In order to control a firm size effect, we restrict our attention to the strongest non-aligned firm, the
largest firm other than alliance partners on each of the alliance routes. Not every non-aligned firm on the route
may react to the alliance. Presumably, small firms are not likely to do so.
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that each of complementary alliance partners increases its traffic after the alliance. For
parallel alliance partners' outputs , all coefficients are estimated as negative, implying that
demand shift effects on the partners' outputs are weak. The coefficients of PA under the
specifications (3) and (4) are estimated as negative and significant.
Second, the last column of Table I shows that test result on total output is highly consistent
with the corresponding predictions. The coefficients of CA and PA are estimated as properly
and significantly, regardless of specifications. Following the complementary alliance, total
traffic increases by an average of 11-17 per cent of the average total traffic. In contrast, total
traffic decreases by an average of 11-15 per cent of the average total traffic, due to the
parallel alliance. Notice that total passenger volumes of years 1993 and 1994 are not
significantly different from that of year 1990.
Third, the second column of Table I indicates that the test result on non-partners' outputs is
partly consistent with the corresponding propositions. In general, the signs of the coefficients
are consistent with the propositions, but statistically insignificant. In three out of the four
specifications, the coefficients of CA are estimated as positive. As shown in the Extended
Model, the complementary alliances in the North Atlantic markets may generate new
demands, some of which cannot be served by the alliance partners and can be left over to
non-aligned competitors. The signs of the coefficients of PA are consistent with the theory,
although the coefficients are estimated as insignificant.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study analyzes the effects on market outcome and welfare of two types of alliances:
complementary vs. parallel alliances. To recapitulate major findings of this study,
First, the complementary alliance in a specific market has indirect positive effects on the
partners' outputs in the other markets. Coordination in connecting markets aUo.ws the
partners to increase service quality and decrease average operating costs in local markets.
This is because multiple products are serviced through the same network and thus the alliance
in a specific market has indirect impacts on each firm's output in the other markets within the
same network.
Second, the two types of alliances have different effects on total output and consumer surplus.
Given the symmetry, the complementary alliance increases total output, and decreases "full"
price. Thus, consumer surplus increases as a result of the complementary alliance. On the
other hand, both the "no shut-down" and "shut-down" parallel aUiances are likely to decrease
total output on the alliance route. Consequently, consumer surplus is likely to decrease due
to the parallel alliance.
Third, we find sufficient conditions under which complementary alliance improves total
welfare. Total welfare can rise if the partners and non-partners are symmetric and if the
partners can coordinate to the extent that they are able to provide the same level of connecting
services as firm 1 's.
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Four, the Extended Model finds that demand shifts due to strategic alliances play a crucial
role on changes in firms' outputs under certain conditions. For the complementary alliance
case, it is possible for both alliance partners and non-panner to simultaneously increase their
outputs in cases where there are some created demands being spilled over to the non-partner.
The Extended Model identifies sufficient conditibns under which parallel alliance partners
simultaneously increase their outputs on the alliance route, resulting in increasing total output
in the market.
Finally, the empirical test results generally confirm the theoretical predictions on alliance
partners' outputs and total output. The test results indicate that the parmers' traffic increases
due to the complementary alliance, while the partners' traffic decreases due to the parallel
alliance. The results also show that total traffic increases by an average of 11-17 per cent of
the average total traffic due to the complementary alliance, while total traffic decreases by
an average of 11-15 per cent of the average due to the parallel alliance.
These f'mdings have some important policy implications. Government agents should be very
careful to allow would-be parallel alliance partners to have antitrust immunity. Since the
partners are significant competitors in the same markets, competition may be reduced if they
are able to integrate operation with the protection of antitrust immunity. As a result, the
parallel alliance reduces consumer surplus and is more likely to decrease total welfare.
However, under certain conditions, allowing more complementary alliances may have the
potential of creating a more competitive environment and improving welfare.
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This part provides the proofs of Propositions 4-4, 4-5, and 4-6. Each firm's pre-alliance
profit function can be expressed as
where superscript b stands for before-alliance. Using specifications (37)-(38) and solving the
first-order conditions, we have the following pre-alliance quantities
Q_ ,_ (L_-21 +2)a - 4= Qaly =
2(3 L 2 -7X +3) (A1)
2(3_.2-7_.+3) (A2)
QA:,_: Qa'_: (2- 5x)_ - 4(z- 3_.)
2 (3_.2-7_. +3) (A3)
where _. n 25 */a. It can be shown that the second-order conditions for each firms' profit
maximization problem reduce to _. < 2/3. Since outputs and marginal revenues (costs)
should be positive,ctisconstrainedsuch that6/CX÷3)<-<[60 -_.)]/[_.C5-4_.)]for 0<;I.<2/5.
The shut-down parallel-allianceprofitsfor thefirms can bc expressedas
8/.t
It . AH $ d I 3 3 3-r. :Q-I
where superscript p stands for parallel alliance. Solving the first-order conditions for the
shut-down parallel alliance yields the following parallel alliance solutions:
Q (t.2t. (_.3 -5 _.2 + 11 _. -6)_ +2(3.2 -8 _. +6) (A4),,,IN =
6_. :3-27_. 2 +341-12
Qai#e = ()? - 5 _.2 + 6 _. - 4) ¢z + 2 (X2 _ 2 _. + 4)
6 _.3 -27 _.2 +34 _. - 12
(AS)
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Again, it can be shgwn that the second=order conditions reduce to ). < 2/3. From the
positive outputs and marginal revenues constraints, _ < = < 2 _e_ 16 _.• 12 for _.<_.
_.*3 _.(4_.e-17).+12) 5
Proof of Proposition 4-4. Using (A1)-(A6), we can calculate changes in the partners' output
due to the shut-down parallel alliance:
At')(i-2)p_ t)U .2}p Ib 2b=.(+: =_M - [QA.+QAh,]= -
(). - 1)(5). 2 - 14). +6)[(2 - 5).)c_ + 12). -4]
(6).3-27).2+34). - 12)(3).2-7 ).+3)
(AS)
_- _Q,';=_).(I -).) [(5 ).2_ 17). + 6) = -2(6 ).2-20 ). +6)]
2(6 ).3 _27).2 +34). - 12)(3 ).2 -7 ). +3)
(A9)
3.2(2-).) [(2 -5 3.)a +2(6 ). -2)]
2 (6).3 -27 ).2 +34 ). - 12)(3 ).2 -7 ). +3)
(At0)
Since the denominator of (AS)-(A10) is negative for ). < 2/5, the sign of these equations
depends on the numerator. It can be shown that the numerator of (A8) is negative, while
those of (A9) and (A10) are positive for the feasible = and _. Similarly, we can calculate,
using (A3) and (A7), changes in firm 3's output
AQa3_=_Q:__Qs_= _'2 [(2 - 5 ).) ct +2(6). = 2)]
2(6). 3 -27). 2 +34). -12)(3 ).2 -7). +3)
which is negative for the feasible range. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4-5. Using (A1)-(A7), we can compute changes in the partners' profit
and changes in firm 3's profit
Aiitp = _Ip _ iilb = _ Icd +Jo: +K (All)
4(6). 3 -27). 2 +34 ). - 12)2(3 ).2 -7 ). +3) 2
AI_P ="I_P - I_ b = r. c_2 +Mc_ +N (A12)
8 (6).3 -27 ).2 +34 ). - 12)2(3 ).2 _ 7 ). +3) 2
3O
ATT_P -=TT3P-]3"]* = - "A2(A-2)(12_?-53 A2 +68 _'-24)[(5X-2)cc +2 -6_.] (A13)
g(6_.3-27A 2+34_. - 12)2(3_.2-7_.+3)2
where /= 9oiUo-942 _._*3949A s -804l _7 ÷6312 _._"5352 _? - 16539 _/÷ 15333 A_ -6794 _.2 ÷ 1344 _. -72,
J = - 2(144 _.* * 1302_. s . 4768_v _ 8614_.6 ÷ $640 _.5 ÷ 7522 _.4 _ 19480_? ÷ 17324 _.: - 7176_. * 1152),
K = - 4(324 AM-4302 At* 23 973 _.A 74128 _.** 141439 _K 174420 _._. 140005 _.I _ 70648 _.0.20292 _.- 2520),
L = 180_.eq- 1344_.M. 1592,_.t÷ 14019_.A 63462_].z÷ 120822_.K 124872_. t ÷71946_. 1-20996_.0*2064_. # 144,
M= - 2(2016_.M-22620_.t. 104444_.^_256128_.z ÷357312_.K_2766 i2_ t ÷96936_.I ÷$912_.eo 14160_.-2880),
N • 4(648 _.M-6300 _i.X÷22218 _.^_27160 _.t 30210 _.K÷136392 _.t . 180338 _"! . 119176_.e-39768 _. *$328).
It can be numerically shown that (A11) is positive while (A13) is negative for the feasible o_
and _.. The sign of (A12) varies depending on value of cc and _.. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4-6. From (AS), AP_H > 0. Thus, ACS_H < 0. Similarly, from
(A9), AP_# < 0. Thus, AC$_s > 0. Using (A1), (A3), (AS), and (A7), we can calculate
_ X2(I -_.) [(2 -5 _.) c_ +2(6 _. -2)]--e;.- e.. .,
2(6_? -27_._+34 _.- 12)(3_.2-7A +3)
which is negative for the feasible range. Consequently, AQ_. > 0 and ACS_H > O. Q.E.D.
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Analysis of Airline Schedules Using
Boeing's Decision Window Model
Charles Soncrant




This presentation employs Boeing's Decision Window Path Preference Model to analyze
an airline's schedule or the schedules of a group of airlines. The results of the analysis are
presented as "Coverage" which is defined as the fraction of passengers whose travel
requirements are satisfied by the flights offered by a schedule.
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Agenda
• Background




The agenda for the presentation consists of the following:
First, the background will be presented for an airline system which is to be analyzed as an
example.
Next, there is a brief explanation of Boeing's Decision Window Path Preference model.
This model was presented in more depth at the first meeting of the ATRG on June 27,
1997, in Vancouver. The Decision Window model leads to the concept of Coverage, which
will provide the basis for analyzing the example airline system.
Next, the results of the Coverage analysis will be shown and, finally, some additional types
of analysis for which Coverage can be used will be discussed.
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Delta & Western Domestic Networks: ca. 1987
,m'OEJA¢O o
For our example, let's go back to early 1987. At that time, Delta Airlines announced that it
would be acquiring / merging with Western Airlines. Ima_ne that you are given the task of
analyzing the effect of this combining of two airline systems. Shown above is the
combined route network of Delta and Western as published in the February, 1987
(OAG). For the purposes of our example, we are restricting the schedules to
cities which are in the U.S. For Delta, we have removed flights to Europe, eastern Canada,
and the Caribbean. For Western, we have removed flights to western Canada and Mexico.





This shows only the Delta Airlines system although the cities to which Western Airlines
flew are left on the map. As you can see, Delta had dense service on the East Coast and the
Southeast, with some transcontinental service across the southern U.S.
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This map shows the Western Airline system with the cities which Delta serves left on the
map. From its Salt Lake City hub, Western served the western U.S., with dense service to
southern California. It also served Alaska and Hawaii and there were a few
transcontinental flights to north-central and northeastern U.S.
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Ways To Analyze
• Count non-stop flights in a city pair
• Count all service in a city pair
• Determine Path Preference





In performing our task to analyze this merging of airline schedules, there are many ways to
do it. We could simply count the number of non-stop flights in a city pair or all services
(including through flights and connecting flights) in a city pair. These are characteristics of
the airplane network and are not direct measures of the impact on passengers.
A measure of how well a schedule satisfies the travel requirements of passengers is
Coverage, which will be defined in this presentation.
Another type of analysis would be to determine path preference and, lastly, revenue and
profit. Each of these analyses provides information about the airline schedule. As we
move down the list, however, the amount of data, the number of assumptions, and the
complexity all increase.
For this paper, we will focus on Coverage. The Decision Window Model (DWM) is used to
determine Coverage so, f'n'st, let's briefly review the principles of DWM.
ATRG Dublin Presentation: "Analysis of Airline Systems Using Boeing's Decision Window Model': Soncrant 6
Decision Window Arguments
How passengers pick flights
• Solution to a space/time problem is the reason
passengers get on airplanes.
• Wants to go from city A to city B
• Leave after 8:00 and arrive before 16:00
• Idealize a two-step passenger decision process:
• Identify those options (paths) which satisfy his
requirements
• Pick one option - trading off airlines, stops/connects,
etc.
,_t',at'JA¢O o
The Decision Window Model predicts how passengers pick flights. It rests on the
assumption that the reason passengers get on airplanes is to solve their space / time
problems. The space / time problem can be stated as follows: The passenger wants to go
from city A to city B, leaving after a certain time (for example, 08:00) and arriving prior to
a certain time (for example, 16:00). Solving passengers' space time problems (that is,
meeting their travel requirements) can thus be thought of as the Product that an airline
provides.
In DWM, we idealize a two-step passenger decision process. First, a passenger identifies
those options (paths) which satisfy his requirements. Second, he picks one option, trading
of the perception of airlines, stops / connects, etc.
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Decision Window Arguments
• We idealize a passenger's travel requirements
as a window:
Earliest Departure






Thus, in DWM we idealize a passenger's travel requirements as a window of time,
characterized by an Earliest Departure Time and a Latest Arrival Time. This "decision
window" can then be compared to the available paths offered by the airlines.
For the decision window and paths shown above, we see that Path 1 satisfies this traveler
because it fits within the decision window and departs after the Earliest Departure time and
arrives prior to the Latest Arrival time.
Note: We define "paths" as a flight or combination of flights which takes a passenger from
his origin airport to his destination airport.
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Decision Window Arguments










Path 3 = •
Similarly, Path 2 fits within the decision window and, thus, satisfies the traveler.
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Decision Window Arguments
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However, Path 3 arrives after the Latest Arrival time, so it does not satisfy this passenger's
travel requirements, although it will satisfy other travelers.
A TRG Dublin Presentation: "Analysis of Airline Systems Using Boeing's Decision Window Model': Soncrant 10
De, cision Window Arguments
• Consider some passengers in a market:
ii It tt
• Versu' all oaths ..-_._,::_..__.-_......._:,, ,.,.:..:,;_.___: _:. ,.....,..






• We Characterize passengers by the paths in their windows
If we take a number of decision windows for passengers traveling in a market and compare
them to all of the paths in the market, we see that we can characterize passengers by the
paths in their windows. For the decision window shown in bold, we see that it contains all
paths.




• Consider some passengers in a market:
I II
 !!jli'
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• We Characterize passengers by the paths in their windows
Thisdecisionwindow (shown inbold)contains2 oftheavailablepaths.
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Decision Window uments












• We Characterize passengers by the paths in their windows
_L _I,aTjF.jAV,o •
And this decision window (also shown in bold) contains no paths. This passenger will have
to redefine his travel requirements in order to fred a path that satisfies him.
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Paths Within Window = Coverage
• Path Coverage:
The fraction of passengers whose windows
contain a path
• Airline Coverage
The fraction of passengers whose windows
contain at least one of an airline's paths
• Market, hub, leg, equipment.., coverage
Thus, Coverage can be thought of as occurring when paths fit within passengers' decision
windows. We can determine the fraction of passengers whose decision windows contain a
path or group of paths. Thus, we can define Path Coverage as the fraction of passengers
whose windows contain a specified path. Airline Coverage would then be the fraction of
passengers whose windows contain at least one of an airline's paths. This concept can be
extended to any grouping of paths desired, such as those that serve a particular market,
include a hub airport, include a specified flight leg, or utilize a specified equipment type.
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Airline A, Path 1=




Consider the group of passenger decision windows shown and the two paths by Airline A
and Airline B. The windows shown in bold contain both paths. This is Shared Coverage
since these passengers will be shared between Airline A and Airline B.
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Airline A, Path 1=
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The decision windows shown in bold contain only the path by Airline A. This is called
Unique Coverage for Airline A since Airline A is the only airline producing paths which
meet these passengers' travel requirements.
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Airline A, Path 1=






Similarly, the decision windows shown in bold contain only the path by Airline B. This is
called Unique Coverage for Airline B since Airline B is the only airline producing paths
which meet these passengers' travel requirements.
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Coverage and the Airline Product
• Satisfying travel requirements is the
Airline Product
• Coverage directly measures number of
passengers satisfied
• Coverage is Product Value and thus,
measures revenue potential
I_AP'dT,_rL#Vdp '"
As we noted previously, the reason passengers get on airplanes is to solve their space I time
problems. Thus, satisfying passengers' travel requirements is the Airline Product.
Coverage is a direct measure of the number of passengers satisfied by airline schedules. So
Coverage is Product Value and, thus, measures revenue potential. In general, when an
airline increases Coverage, revenue should increase also, although it is not guaranteed.
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Study Groundrules
° February 1987 OAG schedules for Delta
and Western (domestic)
° Boeing standard values for Decision
Window Model
For the record, the results about to be presented are based on the following:
The schedules analyzed are from the February 1987 OAG for Delta and Western airlines.
The schedules are limited to U.S. domestic cities only.
All values for the Decision window Model are Boeing standard values.




For All Markets, Coverage = 299,640 Passengers










This chart shows the results of the Coverage analysis for Delta and Western. The results
are presented in the form of a Venn diagram. The large circle on the left represents the
number of passengers whose decision windows contain at least one path which involves
only Delta. Similarly, the large circle on the right is the number of passengers whose
decision windows contain at least one path involving only Western.
The large area of overlap (32,846 passengers) represents passengers who have a choice
between a Delta path and a Western path. This is a reasonable amount of overlap for two
merging airlines. There is some overlap when airlines serve the same markets. The worst
situation would be if the Western circle fell completely inside the Delta circle. This would
mean that merging Western with Delta would add no new Coverage, that is, no new
Product.
The small circle at the bottom is Coverage for paths involving an interline connect. It's not
surprising that this area is small given the separateness of the two airlines networks. The
small wedge marked "New Service" represents the increased Product which would be
created by simply combining the two networks. The challenge for Schedule Planners
would be to coordinate the new merged airline to generate more new Coverage and to
reduce duplicate paths which are inefficient.
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Coverage Thru Hubs
Connecting thru Alanta or Salt Lake City: Coverage = 163,615 Passengers
Delta Connects thru Western Connects thru
Atlanta Salt Lake City
110,162 passengers 68.476 passengers
Connect thru Atlanta on Delta or
Connect thru Salt Lake City on Western
15.023 passengers
This chart is an example of how Coverage can be used to study a subset of an airline
system. It shows Coverage for passengers connecting through the Atlanta hub or the Salt
Lake City hub. The wedge in the middle is those passengers who could connect through
either the Atlanta hub or Salt Lake City hub. This type of analysis can be used to determine
the effectiveness of multiple hubs and the extent to which they compete with each other.
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Other Types of Studies
• Evolution of combined airlines




Requires World O&D estimates
_. ,dFd_',LrJ,AI#'O°
In this presentation, we have shown a couple of ways that Coverage can be used to study
airline networks. Numerous other types of studies can be performed.
In our case of Delta and Western, it would be interesting to observe the Coverage changes a
year or two after the merger to see how successful the Schedule Planners had been at
integrating operations of the two airlines.
Adding paths by other airlines would illustrate effect of competition. The Decision
Window Model allows the determination of "Competitive Density" which is the average
number of competitors whose paths fit within passengers' decision windows who also have
Delta paths in their windows.
Revenue weighting would place increased importance on long range markets or higher-fare
markets. In the Delta-Westem example, we weighted all passengers the same.
Changes in Coverage can be used to improve coordination of schedules, either within an
airline or between airlines (in the case of an alliance).
This study focused on domestic U.S. schedules. A natural extension would include
international destinations. One difficulty in doing that would be the estimation of market
demand in international markets. Boeing is currently working on methodologies to
estimate World O&D demand.
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The pros and cons of multi-hub structures
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Abstract
Inthispaper,we investigatethe costarisingforalternativenetwork
structuresofa monopoly airline.We includeairportoperation,which
issubjectto diseconomiesof scale,as wellas the costof transport
which issubjectto economies of densities.We findthatin most cir-
cumstances,the monopoly airlinewillfindprofitabletooperateeither
a point-to-pointnetwork or a centralhub, the "bang-bang" solution.
Itisonly inthe presenceofdifferentcostfunctionsforhubs and spoke
airportsthat network featuringmulti-hub willbe profitable.
JEL :L52,L93.
Keywords : Airline,Airport,Economies of Densities,Hub-and-
Spoke, Network. ... ,.:_ =_ ..
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PROS AND CONS OF MULTI-HUBBING
1 Introduction
A major change in the airlineindustry has been the deregulation process
started in the late70% on the North American continent. Deregulation,by
removing restrictionson the need for a route certificate,allowed carriersto
expand and rationalisetheir route structure. It is often argued that the
development ofhub-and-spoke system has been a consequence of thisliber-
alisation.Such a configurationallowed airlinesto reach economies ofscale
for flightoperations in a largenetwork and to benefitfrom economies ofden-
sity(e.g. Bailey and Panzar (1981),Heeler (1972), and Caves, Christensen
and Thretheway (1984)). The lattertype of economy occurs when the cost
per passenger on a route declineswith the number of travellersfl._g on
that route. They arise in part because of a concentration of passenger
on single aircraftrather than a scattering over several segments. Thus,
the airlineuses larger,more efficientaircraftand operates thisequipment
more intensively (at higher load factors).As the hub-and-spoke network
possesses higher trafficdensitiesthan a point-to-point network with more
direct connections, carriersbenefitsfrom such economies.
The major inconveniences of hubbing are the longer traveltimes and
the increase in airport trai_c. In order to deal with both problems, two
solutions exist. On one hand, airport operation, subject to diseconomies
of scale,can be intensifiedto manage such increases. On the other hand,
direct route servicesbetween city-pairmay be implemented, thus leading
to a fallin hub transittraffic.However, such a policy affectsthe benefitsof
economies of density and dramatically extends the number of routes.Based
on these arguments, large carriersdecided to build up muki-hub _'stems.
The firstaspect of thisresearch determines the optimal network for an
airline. Its second objective is to explain how the trade-off between on
one side, the economies of density and scale that hub-and-spoke network
provides, and on the other side,the diseconomies of scale ensued by the
airport operation costs affectthe carrierin her network structure choice.
To analyse such questions,we develop a model for an airlineoperatingin
a monopoly context. One firm isgiven the exclusive right to satisfya finite
demand for air travelon differentcity-pairmarkets. Her main ot)jectlveLS
the minimisation of totalnetwork cost. This cost is an ag_egation of the
costs supported on various routes and airports. To optimise her problem.
the monopolist selectsan appropriate network structure through her hul_
and route numbers.
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The main results of our analyis are the following. We find that in most
circumstances, the monopoly airline will find profitable to operate either
a point-to-point network or a central hub, the "bang-bang" solution. It is
only in the presence of different cost functions for hubs and spoke airports
that network featuring multi-hubs will be profitable.
Many studies describe the advantages, and thus the emergence, of hub-
and-spoke network. These studies are split into three different categories.
The first explains the domiflant prevalence of a hub-and-spoke network rel-
ative to demand conditions, mainly passenger preferences relative to price
and flight frequencies (Barrett (1990), Morisson and Winston (1986)). The
second type provides an explanation of hubbing through the strategic ad-
vantages, that it confers to the airline (Oum, Zhang and Zhang, (1995);
Berechman, Poddar and Shy, (1996)). Even if hubbing raises total cost it
might be pursued by an airline, either because it is a dominant strategy in
an oligopolistic setting or because it will be useful in deterring entry. In
contrast, in this paper, we adopt a cost minimisation approach where the
benefits of the hub-and-spoke network arise from the economies of scale
and density. This approach has been followed by Starr and Stinchcombe
(1992) and Hendricks et al. (1995) who have omitted airport operation
costs. However, our entire motivation and contribution is developed below.
The paper is organised as follows : Section 2contains a short litera-
ture review. The model is introduced in the third section. Section 4 is
devoted to the characterisation of the monopolist optimal solution under
various assumptions on cost functions. Extensions are presented in section
5. Concluding remarks follow. Formal proofs of our results are presented
in appendix.
2 Related literature
Hendricks et al. (1995) were also interested in identifying conditions under
which hubbing is optimal for a monopolist. In their complex environment,
the carrier is given the freedom to select the network structure, the pas-
senger flows on connections and prices. They also foc_ on the:effe_:t of
economies of scale and density. Their main proposition is that, if there are
economies of density in the number of individuals travelling between two
directly connected cities, the optimal network is either a hub-and-spoke or a
point-to-point network. Nevertheless, our study differs from their research
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on many aspects.
First,a much more intuitiveapproach is adopted over this study. It
extends previous authors' resultsand allows the reader to get a much more
comprehensive knowledge of this problem. Second, earlierresearches ne-
glect hub-capacity constraints,and thus investment costs for development
projects. Third, trafficis an exogenous variable in their model. The mo-
nopolist has the power to direct passengers through the differentpaths
of her network. Thus, passengers with the same origin-destinationcity-
pairs do not necessary have the same itinerary.However, in our research,
assumptions on individual preferencesinduce endogenous passenger move-
ments. Indeed, tragic volumes on routes are indirectly influenced by the
monopolist network configuration choice. The lastdivergence laysin prices.
Hendrick et al.'scarriermust not charge differentprices for differentpaths
of travelbetween two cities.In thismodel, price aspects are not consid-
ered. Consequently, our monopolist objectiveisa cost minimisation rather
than a profitmaximisation problem. In spite of allthese divergences,this
paper confirms and extends the conclusion the three authors have drawn
in a completely differentframework.
3 The model
In thissection,we formalise the monopolist's behaviour. Our model consists
in basic elements: the network components, the demand and the network
flows. In the firststep, these elements are introduced. In the second step,
cost features incurred for passenger movements using the various network
components are transcribed into a cost function. Finally,the totalnetwork
cost isdefined as the sum of previously defined costs.
3.1 Network structure
There is a set, N, of n distinct cities, where N = {1, 2, ..., n}, n _< 2. Each
city is served by an airport. Their interconnections is the network. Its
stucture is based on links and nodes. For the. air!':ne:.these _e. on the
one hand, the inter-hub and spoke segments, and on the other hand, the
hub and spoke airports. Various structures, ranging from a hub-and-spoke
to a point-to-point (linear) system, are combinations of these four classes
of components. Under the former configuration, passengers in and out








Figure 1: lVlultiple network structures for n = 6.
of a spoke airport are funneled through a major hub. Under the latter,
the monopolist establishes a direct connection between all city-pairs. An
intermediate solution is a multi-hub structure, where several airports are
operated as hubs. These hubs belong to the set H C_ N, of h cities. In this
environment, the linear system is a polar case of such a system.
A major comparison between all those systems is the total number of
connections. When the carrier operates a single hub, all peripheric airports
are linked to this hub through spoke connections. If the network operates
several hubs, all hub-pairs exist, by the way of inter-hub segments, and a
symmetry assumption is made on the number of terminal nodes (spokes)
directly linked to each of them. Indeed, each of the transit nodes (hubs) is
served by an identical number of spoke aiports, such that each of the latter
is directly linked to only and only one of the former. The set of peripheric
airports, _ - 1, deserved by an hub is a region. The following graph is
helpful to understand the previous statements. It illustrates the possible
¢2
network structure for a given size of the network -,_here _° -- ,J.
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Formally this is given by :
Definition 1 A network is a mapping : NxN ---, {0, 1}such that
{ 6_j=l, ifiEHandjEH
5i_ = 0, if i _ H and j ¢ H
Vj ¢ H, 3!i E H s.t _ = 1.
6ij = 1 indicates the existence of a route between a city-pair (i,j),
otherwise 6ij - 0. Symmetric route 1 structure is assumed, there exists
a direct connection between i and j if and only if there exists a direct
connection between j and i.
Definition 2 A region is a subset, Ai = Biu i where BBi C N s.t. 6_j = 1,
for each i 6 H, V j _ H; and for which, Dim(Ai) - _, for each i.
A symmetrical assumption is made on the size of each region. Thus'.
the set of airports arround a hub, the periphery, denoted by Bi, is of size
(_- I).
Definition 3 A multi-hub network is a network where h > 1.
The multi-hub structure is a set of regions interconnected through inter-
hub segments. Given the region-size symmetry, the number of feasible hubs
for a network, h, issuchthathe{xeN:_ •N}.
After the statement of these definitions, the total spoke connections are
= h)
ieH jCH
and the requisite inter-regional lines are
2
iEH jEH
The total routes, l, are
l(h,n) h(h- 1)= +(n-h).
2
1%Ve call a route, the two-way connection between city i and j.
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Definition 4 A linear or point-to-point network is a multi-hub net-
work for which each region is a singleton, Ai = (i} , equivalently h = n.
In a linear system, it takes
n(n- 1)
l(h, n) - 2
connections to directly link n distinct points in both directions. As we
already underlined, this configuration is the furthest advanced multi-hub
system for which h = n. Given n, the network structure only depends on
the operational hub variable, h.
3.2 Demand
In the model, city population is normalised to unity without loss of general-
ity. Individuals preferences for air travel are as follows. Passengers plan to
travel one way and care to reach their destination point through the short-
est way. However, through this way, they are indifferent to stop-overs and
segments used. A more substantive assumption is that demand is identical
for each city-pair market. This is equivalent to assuming that no economic
pole of attraction exists on the network. Thus, any individual flies to any
city with a _ probability. This seems a restrictive assumption but it
may be generalised to a city population of (n - 1) identical groups, each of
them willing to fly to a different destination.
Such a specification of demand abstracts from reality in several ways.
Demand in each city-pair market is independent of prices. However, it does
not affect the cost minimisation objective of the monopolist.
3.3 Traffic
While population and demand for city-pair market are only dependent on
n, aircraft and passenger movements vary with respect to the structure. In
this section, our attention is focused on these two parts of traffic, and their
variations. Given the _umptions on network and demand, we determine
the passenger flows and the carrier presences at network-component level
in function of h. In fact, there exists an equality in traffic volume within
the same class.
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3.3.1 Routes
The first element of traffic is passenger movements. There is an unique path
connecting a spoke city to its hub. Consequently, everyone travelling from
or to this spoke airport flies through this route. For a connected spoke-hub
pair (j, r) within a specific region, Ar ,Vr E H and V j E B_ , outflow
traffic is city j population. Airport j inflow traffic is a proportion, _-1, of
(n - 1)-city populations. The two-way traffic on a spoke-city denoted by
mrj is independent of the network structure or size:
According to the symmetrical assumptions on population and structure,
volumes of travellers on spoke routes are equal such that :
m 0 - m,_, Vr, s E H and Vj E B,, k E Bs.
In a multi-hub environment, inter-regional travellers fly through inter-
hub lines. One-way passenger traffic on such a route consists of the outflow
of an area, At, bounding to another region, As, Vr _ s E H . Indeed,
this flow is a proportion, 1 ,,_'_-1, of the origin-region population, _ , willing
to fly to the _ cities of the destination area, As. Given the symmetrical
assumptions, the two-way flows on an inter-hub line, denoted by rn_,, is
given by :
2 n 2
n) = (n- ,Vh> 1. (2)
Polar cases occur for values of h = 1 and h - n. The first value is the
single-region or central hub-and-spoke network, for which no inter-regional
traffic exists, m_ = 0. The second is the linear case, for which rn_s = (,_1-"'_"
The second component of traffic on a route is aircraft movement, or
carrier presence on the route. In this research, it is assumed unitary. Each
connection is served,by one and only one aS_lane. Thus, to satisfy demand
for city-market, the carrier selects an appropriate aircraft size. This crucial
assumption is needed for cost additivity which is used later.
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3.3.2 Airports
Airports are the nodes of the network. They gather passenger and aircraft
movements. Both movements for spoke and hub airports, depends on a
number of hypothesis. Nevertheless, for our assumptions, traffic movements
are equal within a node class.
Passenger volume for a spoke airport, denoted mj, has already been
computed. Indeed, it corresponds to the traveller flow for a spoke connec-
tion given in equation (1),
mj(h,n) =m,j(h,n) = 2,Vj _ H, Vr e H. (3)
rnj is independent of the region. For all of them, it is a constant. We
already mentioned the fact that it is independent of the size and the struc-
ture.
Traveller movements for a hub is a compound. On the one hand, it
depends on the population of its region, h" On the other hand, it consists
in the traveller inflow from the existing inter-hub routes connected to this
airport. Total inflow is the sum of all one-way passengers for these routes,
(h - 1) 2m_-_. The aggregate of these two parts results into the volume of
passengers for a hub denoted by m_ :
n CA- 1) .
m Ch,n) = ,w e H-
(4)
Aircraft-movement variable is an indicator of the airport activity. It
gives the number of aircraft servicing an airport or the carrier presence.
Given, the previous assumption on aircraft movement on a route, the value
of this indicator is equal to unity for spoke airports. However, at hub level,
it depends on the network size and structure. If this indicator is denoted
by a_, the value of this indicator is given by, :
3.4
n
a_(h, n) = -_ + h - 2, Vr E H.
Network costs
(5)
Network management costs involved a series of costs in establishing con-
nections and operating airports. For each route and airport, these costs are
influenced by the components of traffic, passengers and aircraft. However,
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traffic at the network component level is itself a function of the structure.
Thus, for the network, total cost depends directly and indirectly on the size
and the structure. This section focus on the development of a cost function
specification. It argues on the general economic features beyond the relatedassumptions.
3.4.1 Connection Costs
Establishing a direct connection between two cities induced some costs due
to passenger volume and aircraft movement. Part of these costs are more
or less independent of the total volume of traffic on a particular connec-
tion. We represent such costs by F. The remaining costs are influenced
by the size of aircraft required to satisfy demand in either direction on the
route. Variable costs for a direct connection between two cities can then
be expressed as V(m).
Thretheway (1991) argues on the existence of substantial economies
of scale in aircraft size. This kind of economies arises from at least two
sources : labour costs and aircraft equipment costs. In fact, while the crew
requirements on large aircraft are somewhat greater than on smaller types,
the relationship is less than proportional. Therefore, one can expect to
impart some economies with respect to increasing aircraft size.
This argument suggests that the first and second derivatives of the vari-
able cost V(rn) for a direct connection are respectively positive and nega-
tive, such that Vim ) is a concave function. Cost of a connection, denoted
by C,(m), is the sum of fixed and variable costs :
co(m,F)= F + V(m(h,n)). (6)
Such a cost function exhibits economies of density if, for F # 0 and
V(rn) _. 0, the following definition is satisfied:
Definition 5 A connection exhibits economies of density if Co(Sin) < 8Cc(rn)
.for all 8 > 1 and for all m # O.
• . .... :. -.:. :£. ......
Such a definition is equivalent to the condition that average cost, at
a direct connection level, decreases with proportionate increases in traffic
on that connection. It is straightforward to show that concavity of V(m)
implies economies of density.
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An usefulassumption on the variablecost function V(m), isthe constant
return to scale hypothesiQ. Thus, we may substitute the value of V(m) by
m, such that variable cost islinearto the volume of trafficforthe specific
type of segments. Therefore, connection cost for a spoke route,denoted by
C,.j, is given by:
C,j(F,j) = F,_+ 2,W e H and Vj e B,,
where F,j are the fixed costs supported on a spoke connection.
Inter-hub connection cost is given, by substituting the value of m,, given
in (2) into (6). Connection cost, for this class of routes, C,_ is:
2 n 2
C,.,(h, n, F,.,) = F,, + ----_(_) ,Vr e H, and Vs E H,(n-
where F,, are the fixed costs supported on a spoke connection.
After cost specification at each segment level, it is straightforward to
compute the total cost of route operations for the monopolist's network.
For _ inter-hub and (n - h) spoke routes, total connection cost, Co, is
the entire sum:
h(h- 1) C,, + (n- h)C,.jC,,(h,,-,,c,,,c,.A - 2
or by substituting the volume of traffic in the adequate equations :
C_(h,n,F,.,,F,,) ._ +2 (h)_)h(h 2 1)(Fr, (n--l)
+(n - h)(F,j + 2).
(7)
3.4.2 Airport operation costs
Airport traffic, explained by" aircraft and passenger movements, generates
airport operation cost. Consequently, this cost at the airport level depend
on the nuzr._.cr sf aircrz,_ _er_Jcing this destination (or the airport activity)
and the flow of passenger.
For each ground operation, part of the cost is independent of passenger
traffic, it is the fixed cost of handling, denoted by G. It may also be
2This is relaxed later.
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considered as a constant marginal cost foraircraftlandings. Thus, for the
carrier,cost at the airport levelisinfluenced by itspresence s.
Ground operation cost is also explained by the passenger movement
of the airport. A realisticmodelisation of the variable cost, W(m), for
airport operations can be expressed as an increasing function exhibiting
diseconomies of scale:
co(_, m, a) = _,a + W(m(h,n)),
such that W'(m) > 0, W"(m) > 0.
A specific airport operation cost function for hub and spoke airport
assume that variable cost is also linear in m, and thus also exhibits constant
return to scale. This is transcribed by substituting m by its respectives
values given in equations (4) and (3).
For a spoke airport,the cost of airport operation, C,j :
C=_(G_) = G_ + 2,Vj _ H.
where Gj the fixed cost of an aircrafthandling operation at a spoke
airport.
For a hub, the cost of aircraftmovement and passenger flow isdenoted
byC_,:
n) n (h- 1) n 2
C,_(h,n, Gr)= h-2+_ Gr+_+(n__(_ ),Vr6H
where Gr is the fixed cost of an aircraft handling operation at a hub.
Costs for the different node classes have been defined. On the network,
implanted costs of airport operations are supported on h hubs and (n - h)
spokes. Total cost of airport operations is denoted by C,t, and given by the
following equation:
C,_,(h,n, C,,,., Caj) = hC,,,. + (n - h)C,_j.
In term of variables h and n, it is given by the following equation :
C_,(h,n,G_) = h h-2+_ G,+_+(n_l------_( )2
+(n-h)(G#+2).
3An indicator of this presence is given by equation (5).
(s)
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3.4.3 Total network cost
Total network cost is defined as the summation of airport operation and
connection costs
C,_,(h, n) = C,,(h, n) + Ccz(h, n).
This cost mainly depends on the size of the network, n, and the structure,
h. This results in the sum of equations (7) and (8).
4 Optimisation problem
In this section, we study the objective of the monopolist. Given the ab-
sence of prices, it consists in choosing the appropriate number of hubs, h
(or Dim(H)), such that the total network costs are minimised4,given the
network size n,
h(h -





The first two inequalities are the physical constraints. The optimal solu-
tion is bounded by the two polar cases, the hub-and-spoke network and the
point-to-point system. The third restriction follows from the symmetrical
assumptions set on the network structure.
This minimisation problem is analysed under various assumptions on
costs. The first two studies are benchmarks. For the first, cost of a pas-
senger is assumed negligible, whereas cost functions are mainly determined
by connection number. For the second, costs per passenger are taken as a
constant, while, this time, fixed costs are nul. Both benchmarks are hell>
ful to understand the mechanism of the model. The third case deals with
x._-_'ing marginal cost per passenger at the component level.
An heuristic approach is carried out along the following sections. The
general minimisation problem in (9) is analysed piecewisely. Thus, the min-
imisation problem is applied separately to its two elements, the total airport
4Our objective is not to determine which cities should be operated as hub airports.
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and connections costs. Such an approach permits a deep examination of
the effectsof a structure modification on costs.
4.1 Case 1 : A zero marginal cost of passenger
The first benchmark assumes independency between costs and volume of
passengers. Costs of airport operations and connections are only function of
the fixed costs encountered by the monopolist on her routes and handling
services, cost per passenger is negligible. Thus, determinant of the cost
functions is the number of routes.
4.1.1 Connection costs
Along this section, the variable costs for a route are held to a zero level,
V(rn) = 0. For each aircraft movement, the monopolist only sustains a fixed
cost. The total connection costs follows:
Ca(h,n) = h(h 2 1) Frs + (n - h)F,j.
The minimisation problem for route optimisation under this context is
now stated, as follows, under the constraints specified in (9):




The first order condition of the unconstrained problem leads to the
following solution :
h'(F,j,F,_) = _ + _F__.
h" denotes the optimal solution of this problem. We call the ratio,
E_. the route coefficient. This coefficient is unitary when values of fixedFrj '
costs for both classes of connections are equal. In such an occurrence,
the optimal network consists in a structure based on a central or two-step
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hubs, resp. h" = 1 or h" = 2. For both configuration, the total number
of routes are equal. Consequently, the total connection costs induced are
identical. This solution confirms Hendricks et al. (1995) results under
similar assumptions s. If this ratio is lower than unity, the carrier does not
have any incentive to set up a two--step-hub design, and the only feasible
structure is based on the central-hub architecture. If the ratio is greater
than one, the monopolist seek to operate a multi-hub network, with h" > 2.
For a high level of this ratio, the polar linear solution occurs.
4.1.2 Airport operation costs
Here, variable costs for ground operation at the airport level are assumed
negligible, W(m) = 0. The fixed costs of an aircraft handling are deter-
minants. We already mentioned that these costs may be considered as a
constant marginal cost for the airport activity indicator. The minimisation
problem is now written as :





Under a continuous assumption on the size of the H set the solution to
the first order condition is given by:
G_
h"(Gr,Gj) = I + _-_/
The ratio, _ is called the airport, coe_cient. Its role is analogue to
2Gr
the route coefficient previously studied. If aircraft operations incur identical
fLxed costs for any class of node, then the optimal network structure includes
either one or two hubs, h'" = 1, h "° = 2. in these cases, the total number
of handling operations carried out by the carrier are the same. Therefore,
the justification for a central hub fails to e.,dst. However, this justifi..cat]on
exists for values of G_ > G_. Moreover, a multi-hub solution, with/G'" _> 2,
may occur for high value of airport coefficient, then G_ < G_.
SThe three authors prooved a similar result when variable costs for passenger traffic
are nul. This fails to justify the single hub network, however a multiple hub is a feasible
solution.
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4.1.3 Optimal structure
The genera/minimisation problem (9) is solved under the assumption of a
negligible marginal cost of passenger. Both minimisation problems, exam-
ined in the previous sections, induce an identical network architecture. The
cost functions modelised for airport operations and connections are both
minimised at h'" = h °. Consequently, the constrained problem given in (9)
admits a solution where h -- 1 or h -- 2. This benchmark leads us to the
following proposition.
Proposition 1 When marginal costs of a passenger are negligible, V(m) =
W(m) = O, the carrier's incentives to operate a point-to-point network are
inezistent when values of route coefficient and ai rt coe
tively oiven bv _ ....a _ __ , , . rpo . 'fficient, respec-
.... __,.. . _. F,.:~"'*- 2c., _,re _resp.j equal to 1 and _ Moreover +l,,,
,,,unopoasr _ maiJyerent in operating either a unique hub a'rchitecture, 'o;'a
two-step hub structure.
It is that simple, hub-and-spoke airline route structures economise on
the number of segments needed to link a large number of origin-destination
pairs. When routes is a significant determinant of costs, central hub or
two-step hub systems are the best configuration poliicy.
4.2 Case 2 : A non-zero and constant marginal cost
of passenger
The second benchmark examines the monopolist's behaviour in her struc-
ture choice under the assumption of a constant marginal cost of passenger.
Thus, cost functions at network component level are linearly dependent on
the volume of tra_c. Moreover, fixed costs incurred by the monopolist on
her routes and handling services are assumed negiglible.
4.2.1 Connection costs
m'-'z_mportation costs of passengers on routes are highlighted in thls sec_tion:-
Over the entire section, each passenger on any class of connection is assumed
to be as costly as another. An assumption on fixed costs is needed to carry
on such analysis, such that fixed cost for a connection are held to a zero
level, F,_ = F, = O.
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With such assumptions, connection cost for a route exhibits constant
return to scale in term of passenger movements. At the network level, these
total costs are equal to the total route traffic. Equation (7) can now be
stated as follows after straightforward simplification:




The minimising problem for total connection costs is still specified un-
der the same constraints of problem (9). The minimum of this function is
reached at h ° = n. This seems to be a strong and amazing result. Expla-
nation of such a solution follows.
For a network structure such that h = 1,the network is a set of in - 1)
spoke segments. The passenger flow for each route is equal to m,j = 2.
Consequently, the total volume of traffic is 2(n - 1). The establishment of
a new hub, h = 2, has two effects. First, the network is now characterised
by the presence of a connection between the two hubs, an inter-hub line.
rt 2
The volume of passenger travelling on this route is rn_, - 2 _ 1 6. Second,(-)
through the adjuction of a new hub, the spoke segments are reduced. Thus,
the total of passenger flying spoke connections decreases. Noteworthy, both
effects on total passenger volume are divergent. However, the former domi-
"_ 2>0.
nates the latter, therefore network traffic raise is evaluated at 2(_-1)
With the existence of additional hubs, h > 3, a third effect can be
depicted. For h - 3, the structure is composed of three inter-hub lines.
Thus, inter-regional traffic is diverted through them. In fact, there exists
a negative marginal variation on the volume of travellers at an individual
inter-hub route level. Although, traffic on each of these segment is lower
to rn_(2, n), total inter-regional passenger traffic increases. Moreover, for
low value of h, the sum of the negative effects-the second and the third-
is not sufficient to completely alleviate the raise in traffic ensued by the
expansion of direct connections. Therefore, the network ._.ntal par, zcn_r
volume increases. However, a maximum of this volume is reached at the
" _. It occurs when the marginal variation for total
critical value h = _/_,_-i)
6This volume of passenger, m.,, is greater than mj,, for all rt > 2.
7This occurs for a continous appoximation of the function.
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inter-regionaltrafficflow isequal to the marginal decrease in spoke traffics"
Formally, thismeans that
k h(n- z)) = 2.
For values of h, above the critical value, the total network traffic de-
creases. It reached is minimum value in h - n.
Proposition 2 The point-to-point network, characterised by a structure
where h ° -- n, is the system that generates the lowest movement of passen-
gers. Therefore, under the assumption of a constant cost per passenger, it
is the cost minimising solution for the monopolist.
Proof. The proof of thisstatement requirestwo steps. We startto assume,
without lossofgenerality,thatequation (10)istwice differentiableinthe interval
II,n], thus C,_(h,n) E C 2,Vh E [i,n]. Straightforward computation leads to
as-_2Cct(h, n) < O, V h E [1, nJ ,with F,j --- Fr, -- 0. Thus, the function is strictly
concave in this interval. Consequently, the value of the minimum is reached at one
of the bound of the interval, either for h = 1 or h -- n.
Next we show that the level of cost is the lowest for h --- n. In fact, substituting
the valueofh at the bounds, inthecostfunctionCa(h, n) issuchthatCot(l,n) >C.(n,n).[]
Two remarks are underlined about the approximated continuous func-
tion. First,the levelof cost in h -- 1 is identicalto the one in h -- . ,,2...
This value is greater than _, the last feasible multi-hub architectwhich Ce-f ra
regional area is not a singleton - the point-to-point network. For
n large enough, lira ,_2 ,_
.-_ _ = 3" For wide network, the monopolist incurs
a cost for a unique hub structure equivalent to a network design based on
hubs. Second, for a value _7_-1, traffic flow on all classes of routes areequal,
m_s -- rnri= 2.
However, the total cost of connections is higher, since the number of
routes isgreater than (n - i),the singlehub network value.
8This marginal decrease is equal to m.;. The trafficvolume on a spoke connection
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This result confirms Starr and Stinchcombe's (1992) results. Such a
solution is easily explained, as long as the carrier does not benefit from
any economies of density. Thus, the monopolist does not face an incentive
to operate a single-hub network. Her optimum is to operate the lowest
traffic on each connection and thus the lowest passenger movement on the
network.
4.2.2 Airport operation costs
In this section, the cost for a passenger contracted by a monopolist at
her airport operation level is also a constant. Thus, an airport operating
cost exhibits constant return to scale in term of passenger volume. Such
a specification also requires an assumption on the airport operation cost
function: the fixed cost for an airport operation are nul, thus Gr = G# = 0.
Equation (8) can now be written
h(h- 1) h= + 1) ( )2+ (n- h) 2
(11)
This equation is the sum of total connection cost, given by(ll), and
the size of the network, n. Consequently, the constrained minimisation
problem with respect to the decision variable, h, has a similar result than
the previous section, h'" = n. The optimal structure policy is to install
n hubs. This ensure the monopolist to operate her network at the lowest
costs. Capacity needed for each airport is minimal, and equal to the one
required for a spoke airport. The absence of a hub city prevents the increase
in cost due to the possibility of traffic accumulation at this hub. The point-
to-point network is therefore, the optimal policy in this case.
4.2.3 Optimal structure
The solution to the general minimisation problem is the point-to-point
structure. Of course, if this is the solution to the two individual cases.
it must also be the solution to the aggegate problem. Therel0re thc fol-
lowing proposition is forwarded,
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Proposition 3 If the following conditions are respected, such that:
1. Airport operating and connection costs are characterised by nul fixed
costs, resp. G = 0 and F = O, and
2. Variable costs, V(m) and W(rn) exhibits constant return to scale.
Then the optimal network structure is a linear network where h = n.
Proof. Given the concavity of both cost functions, solutions of connection and
airport optimisation problem are respectively h ° - n and h "° = n. Therefore, the
general optimum for problem (9) is given by h -- n. M
4.3 Case 3 • Fixed cost and marginal costs.
In this section we consider cost functions for which network costs of con-
nections and airport operations vary directly with passenger volume and
aircraft movement (segment number). This corresponds to an aggregation
of the first and second benchmarks. Thanks to the existence of fixed costs,
this leads to a varying cost per passenger at the individual component level.
Over this case, an additional assumption on the value of fixed costs, F and
G is carried out. These are assumed to be constant within a class of routes
or for any aircraft handling operations wherever it is operated.
4.3.1 Connection costs
Here, total connection cost directly vary with the number of routes and the
traveller volume. Given, the existence of fixed costs and the assumptions
on the variable cost for direct connections, for which a = 1, the network
is characterised by economies of density on its segments. Such economies
arise from spreading fixed costs over a larger volume of passengers. The
total cost function is now stated as follows,
• "h(n - 1) + 2(n - h) + + (n - h) F. (12a)
• . • . -°., °.
- j
The optimal solution to the restricted minimisation problem of this
function depends on the value of F. However, given the value of F, the
oI_ real solution is characterised by a "bang-bang" solution. The following
pn position is relevant in this case,
D
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Proposition 4 Suppose V(m) is proportional to passenger volume and a
_ed cost, F, is incurred on routes. Then there exists a level of fixed costs,
F such that:
1. For F > if, the hub-and-spoke network is the optimal solution, and
h*=l.
2. For F < if', the point-to-point network is the optimal configuration,
and h" = n.
3. No interior solution, with h* E ]1, n[, is cost minimising.
Proof. See Appendix •
Indeed, for a level of fixed costs on connections, F, higher than the
value if, the central hub-and-spoke system, for which h* = 1, is always the
optimal policy structure. For such a value of fixed costs, the latter and
the point-to-point systems are equally profitable. The economic features
beyond this proposition are straightforward. Total cost per total passenger
movements at network level, defined as the ratio of total connection costs
and total traffic movement, increases with respect to fixed cost level on
a connection. Moreover, this average cost increases at a higher rate for
the linear than the single-hub achitecture, see Figure (2). This reflects the
importance of economies of densities for low value of h. Consequently, for
a value of F > F, the cost per passenger for the point-to-point system is
too high to benefits from the advantages it brings. Noteworthy, although
economies of density are higher on inter-hub segments, for h > _-1, multi-
hubbing with h* E ]1, n[ is not a first best.
Similar results were obtained by Hendricks et al. (1995). Although,
their model differs from ours in many perspectives, conclusions observed
are similar in this case study. Their study also revealed a value of fixed
cost on routes for which they suggested a similar theorem to Proposition 4.
4.3.2 Airport operations costs
Total cost for airport operations has been defined as the sum of the in-
dividual airport costs. Now, in this case study, individual airport cost is
dependent on passengers and aircraft movements. Specially, we assumed








Figure 2: Cost per passengerat network level
that the marginal cost of an handling operation isapproximately equal in
hub and spoke airports.Thus, totalairport costs are equal to
C_(h,n)--n+(h-1) n_ (h(h I) )"h(n-1) +2(n-h)+ 2 +(n-h) 2G.(13)
This equation is approximately similar to the one previously defined for
total connections costs. In fact the total number of handling operations
at the network level is simply twice the number of routes. Of course, each
aircraft has to be handle at origin and destination for a given connection.
Thus the extension of routes increases proportionally the number of han-
dling operations. The cost minimisation solution is also the "bang-bang"
solution and depends on the level of fixed cost in aircraft handfing opera-
tion. The following proposition can be issued.
Proposition 5 Suppose W(m) is proportional to passenger volume and a
fixed cost, G, is incurred on handling operation. Then there exists a level
of fixed costs, G such that:
1. For G > G, the hub-and-spoke network is the optimal solution, and
h** = 1.
2. For G < G, the point-to-point netwo÷k ts the opt_maZ c_n]_guration,
and h*" = n.
3. No interior solution, with h'" E _1, hi, is cost minimising.
Proof. A similar proof to Proposition 4 can be developed •
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n°l
Figure 3: Optimal airport structure in function of F and G.
4.3.3 Optimal structure
The total network cost is the sum of equation (12a) and (13). Although the
previous studies are insufficient to determine the optimal cost minimising
solution for the general problem, this one depends on the value of the
fixed costs F and G. The following table summaries our results under the





F < ff ! h" = h °° = n undertemined I
F > F [ undertemined h'= h'*--1 t
The best structure policy can not be predicted when the solutions of
airport and connection optimisation problems are divergent. Moreover, if
an interior solution exists, it could not be found by first and second order
conditions.
However, Figure (3) gives the optimal structure policy for different com-
binations of fixed costs for connections and handling operations. Indeed for
any point (F,G), such that (F,G) e {(x,y}.._ _. _--- ,-1 _}, ttAal net-
work cost is minimised at h = n and h = 1. The monopolist is indifferent
between the point-to-point and the linear network. For any increase (resp.
decrease) in F, and/or G, such that (F, G) is above (resp. below) this line,
the raise (resp. fall) in total network cost is more intensive for high value
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of h, and more specifically for h = n. Therefore, the central hub (resp. the
point-to-point) network is the best feasible structure.
Proposition 6 Suppose F, G > 0 and V(m), W(m) proportional to pas-
senger volume. Then the following conditions are satisfied for the general
minimisation problem (9).
1. The central hub-and-spoke is optimal, V (F, G) E {(x, y) E R_+ : y > _- .-7 - i}.
e. The point-to-point network is optimal, Y (F, G) E {(x,y) E R2+: y < _ _ i}
3. No interior solution could ever occurs.
Proof. See Appendix []
5 Extensions
In the the previous section, an interior solution for which h E ]1, n[ has
been proven not to be the best optimal structure in any cases. Which
assumptions on the model should be relaxed such that a multi-hub structure
is chosen by the monopolist to satisfy her cost minimisation objective ? Of
course, the answer depends the constant return to scale assumption on the
variable costs.
If variable costs are such that V(m, a) and W(m, 17), where _ E [0, 1] and
E [1, oo) are convexity parameters, an interior solution occurs. The do-
main of this parameters depends on the second order condition on variable
costs. The different cost functions of our model are now written as follows.
Connection cost for a spoke route, denoted by Cr#, is given by:
Crj (c_, F) = F + 2", Vr E H and Vj E Br,
where F are the fixed costs supported on connections,
c_ is a concavity parameter such that a E [0, 1].
A similar cost function for an inter-reg;.nnal line is. d.;fi ..... ,. C,_nnection
cost, for this class of routes, Cr, is:
/..___2 n l\ °
C,,(h,n,a,F) = F+ t(n- 1)(h ) ) ,Vr e H, and Vs E H.
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For values of a s.t. 1 > a > 0, variable cost of passenger traffic, V(m),
for a connection exhibits economies of scale. Therefore, economies of den-
sity on a route occurs not only from spreading fixed costs on a higher traffic
flows, but also from decreasing variable costs of passenger. Indeed, the costs
per passenger under a central hub architecture are even smaller than under
a point-to-point system, because of the economies of density. Introducing
economies of scale in variable costs reduces the incentive to operate linear
network.
For a spoke airport, the cost of airport operation, Coj :
Coi($,G) = G + 2Z,Vj _ H.
where $ is a convexity parameter such that/_ 6 [1, oo).
and G the fixed cost of an aircraft handling operation.
For a hub, the cost of aircraft movement and passenger flow is denoted
by Car :
Ca_(h,n,Z,G)= h-2+_ G+ + (n 1) ( )_ ,Vreg
For values of _ > 1, diseconomies of scale occurs in production plan of
airport operations. Therefore, cost per passenger is high for airport with
important traffic volume. It may occurs that this cost per passenger is
high enough and induce the monopolist to operate a multi-hub structure.
However, the importance of fixed costs on handling operations deter the
carrier to operate a point-to-point system.
An example for which h E ]1, n[ is given below. Given the total network
cost minimisation problem in equation (9), we illustrate an example for
which the size of the network is a set of 60 cities. The level of the fixed costs
F = 30, G = 35, and the convexity parameters, _ and _ are respectively
equal to .9 and 2 The minimum of this cost reached at h = 6.
6 Conclusions
In this paper a very simple model was investigated and tried to explain the
optimal network structure of a monopolist. Her network is a combination
of routes and airports. To benefit of economies of density on her routes and
airports, the carrier funnels the traffic through a central hub. However, this
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leads to important airport operations, subject to diseconomies of scale, and
longer travel time for passengers. To avoid such externalities, the airline is
willing to optimise her network structure. She can reach such an objective,
by increasing the number of hubs, and implementing additional city-pair
segments. Such a strategy leads to the loss of benefits arising from the
economies of density on transportation costs. Various circumstances are
examined, for which different assumptions on cost specification are carried
out. First, if routes are the only significant determinants of total network
costs, then the optimal network solution is either a central hub structure
or a two-step hub network. The number of segments and airport opera-
tions for both architecture are equal. Second, if cost functions for direct
connections or for airport operations are linear in traffic movements, the
optimal structure is the point-to-point architecture, for which each airport
is a hub platform. This follo_-s from the fact that linear network generates
the lowest traffic movements. Third, when cost functions are an aggregate
of the first two benchmarks, and consequently economies of density emanate
from spreading fixed costs over a larger number of travellers, then the cost
minimising solution is either the central hub network or the point-to-point
system. This characterises a "_bang-bang" solution for which interior solu-
tions, multi-hub structures, do not minimise the total network cost. Fourth,
the last case study illustrates an example, for which the interior solution
occurs in presence of different cost functions for hubs and spoke. This pos-
sibility is feasible when the variable costs on a route and those for airport
operations respectively exhibit economies of scale and decreasing return toscale.
7 References
Bailey E. and J. Panzar (1981), "The Contestability of Airline Markets
during the Transition to Deregulation", Law and Contemporary Prob-
lem, 44, pp. 125-145.
Bercheman J., S. Poddar and 0. Shy (19,qa_. "Nptwnrl¢ Structure and En-
try, in the Deregulated Airline In_iuStry", mimeo, CORE, Universityof Louvain.
Caves D., L. Christensen and M. Thretheway (1984), "E conomles of Den-
sity vs. Economies of Scale : Why trunk and local service airlines
PROS AND CONS OF MULTI-HUBBING 26
costs differ", Rand Journal of Economics, 15,4, pp. 471-489.
Hendricks K., M. Piccione and G. Tan (1995), "The Economics of Hubs:
The Case of Monopoly", Review of Economics Studies, 62, pp. 83-99.
Morrison S. and C. Winston (1990), "The Dynamics of Airline Pricing
and Competition", American Economic Review, 80, pp. 389-393.
Oum T., A. Zhang and Y. Zhang. (1995), "Airline Network Rivalry",
Canadian Journal of Economics, 28(4), pp. 837-857.
Thretheway M. (1991), "The Characteristics of Modern Post-Deregulation
Air Transport" (UBC Transportation and Logistics).
Start R. and M. Stinchcombe (1992), "Efficient Transportation Routing
and Natural Monopoly in the Airline Industry", DiscussionPaper,
92-25, University of San Diego.
DRAFT 28 June, 1998
Productivity, Prices and Profitability Trends in




Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration
The University of British Columbia
Abstract
This paper tracks indices of prices paid for airline inputs relative to the prices received for airline
outputs (labelled "total price performance," TPP) in comparison with trends in total factor productivity
TFP (ratio of output and input quantity indices). Comparing TFP and TPP reveals the sharing of
productivity gains between a company and its customers, and hence the change in the firms' profitability.
This is a variation of a model associated with the American Productivity Center (1981) used by a number
of authors. This is an update of the paper presented at the ATRG conference a year ago.
Data are from Oum and Yu (1997). Data are for 22 of the world's major air carriers. The output
quantity index incorporates five output categories: revenue passenger kilometres from scheduled services,
freight tonne-kilometres, non-scheduled passenger and freight services, mail service, and incidental
revenues. There are five input categories: labour, fuel, flight equipment, ground property and equipment,
and "materials and other inputs." The input and output price indices are dual to the respective input and
output quantity indices: total revenues from all services divided by the output index provides the output
price index; total costs (including full costs of capital) divided by the input quantity index produces in
input price index. The profitability measure is the ratio of total revenues to total economic costs. The
multilateral indices enable direct absolute comparions among airlines of output and input levels,
productivity, prices and price performance and profitability.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This study tracks the link between productivity gains and changes in economic profitability of the
world's major airlines over the period 1986-1995. There is reason to expect some correlation between
productivity and financial performance, but th.e relationship often seems inexact. Stated simply,
productivity compares quantities of outputs relative to quantities of inputs. Financial performance depends
on the revenues from outputs compared to the expenditures on inputs. A firm can be very efficient in
terms of outputs per input, but it could be highly unprofitable if the revenues received are low compared
to what it pays for inputs. Conversely, a firm with market power might be inefficient in input use but
compensate financially by high prices. Nonetheless, it is possible to establish a direct link between total
factor productivity (TFP) changes and financial performance. This is shown in part 2. The framework
used here turns out to be a variation of the American Productivity Center (APC) (1981) model used to
decompose changes in profitability to changes in productivity and output/input price changes. This paper
links two separate streams of the productivity literature, that found in management journals and related
applications, and that of the mainstream economics literature on productivity measurement and index
numbers.
Part 3 summarizes the data on international airlines in Oum and Yu (1997). Part 4 compares output
and input quantity indices and trends along with the input and output price indices and trends. Next, Part
5 monitors productivity CI'FP) and input/output price ratios over time. This reveals how productivity gains
are shared between the company and the customer, and thus how the firm's revenue/cost relationship is
changed. The patterns are compared and contrasted for the 22 major airlines. Part 6 introduces a multi-
quadrant diagram which portrays simultaneously the time path of outputs, inputs, productivity, output and
input prices, revenues and costs. This enables a concise visual summary of the productivity and financial
patterns of firms over time. The conclusion in part 7 summarizes the usefulness of making these
price/productivity comparisons and what it reveals about the airline industry generally and differences
among specific carriers.
2. PRODUCTIVITY, PRICES AND PROFITABILITY
Productivity compares outputs with inputs, more specifically, the change in outputs compared with
thechange in inputs. One can compare one or more output categories with one or more input categories.
However, such partial measures of productivity, although popular, are often misleading because they do
not allow for other changes iwvutputs and inputs. For this reason economists advocate comprehensive
productivity measures, called multi-factor productivity (MNP) or total factor productivity (TFP). The
index number approach to TF'P measurement compares the growth rate of a quantity index of all outputs
with the growth rate of an input quantity index.'
As noted in the introduction, productivity and financial performance do not measure the same thing.
Nonetheless, there is a direct connection betweeen them. This is revealed by examining changes in-prices
received for outputs and prices paid for inputs along with the productivity changes. To illustrate the links,
use some simple algebra for two time periods, 0 and 1. One can think of a single product firm employing
only one input, or index numbers to represent multiple output and input prices and quantifies. Note that
for index numbers, the respective price and quantity indices must be dual to one another so that there is
computational consistency)
Po and P_ are output prices (indexes);
Y0 and YI are output quantities (indexes);
Wo and Wl are input price indexes;
Xo and X_ are input quantity indexes;
hence
R revenue = P x Y
Ccosts =WxX
Costs include capital costs, i.e., these are total economic costs.
no and n I are measure of economic profit; for analytical convenience defined as the ratio of revenues
to costs rather than the difference.
i An alternative approach to TFP measurement is to measure the shift in an econometric production or cost
function. The interpretation of TFP is not identical in the two approaches (see Oum, Trethewayand Waters,
1992, for an explanation, or Diewert, 1992 for a more rigorous exposition). Because we wish to make
comparisons of prices with quantity changes, it is appropriate to usz the index number approach to TFP
_remen[.
2 The price and quantity indices must satisfy the "product test," i.e., the ratio of price indices over two
periods times the ratio of quantity indices should equal the ratio of corresponding expenditure indices.
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Note that there is no requirement that economic profits be zero.







(The second expression is the ratio of a TFP index for each period).
It is desirable to link productivity measurement with financial performance. This is straight-
forward, but note that because TFP data includes capital inputs and their service price in calculating
productivity, it is economic and not accounting profits which are to be compared with TFP. As noted,
for analytical convenience, we work with economic profit n as a ratio of revenues to costs rather than the
difference.
Any change in profitability between the periods is indicated by the change in revenue/cost ratios:
1_t/Ito ----
Rt/Ct PtYt / WtXt
or
P,JCo PoYo / WoXo
(2)
which is rewritten:
Yt 1 Pt 1
_t/,to m X X _ X
Yo X,/Xo Po Wt/wo
\_ ./ \ .I
TFP I/TPP
O)
3 For simplicity, the index is written is simple ratio form. For calculations we use the Tomqvist or translog
form of an index number, which would take the naturallog of these expressions rather tlum leave them in
arithmetic form. For example, the Tomqvist expression for equation (1) would be written: (,_ tn(P,S, +RS_) In
(Yn I y_ - (_j I/2(C.Sp+CS_ In (xjt I x_) where RS and CS refer to revenue and cost shares, respectively, for
output category i and input category j in time periods 0 and I.
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Any change in the financial condition of the firm/industry (economic profit) reflects the change in
productivity and any change in relative prices of inputs and outputs. The first two expressions on the
right-hand side of (3) is TFP: The second half of the right-hand expressions is the growth in output prices
relative to the growth in input prices. This is labelled 'price recovery' or 'price.cost recovery' in the
management literature on profitability and productivity (American Productivity Center1981; Brayton 1985;
Landel 1983; Miller 1984; Miller and Rao 1989; Aboganda 1994), or sometimes 'price performance' (Sink,
Turtle and DcVries, 1984). It can also be thought of as a _rms of trade' (TOT) concept, i.e., the price (index)
the firm gets relative to what it must pay for inputs. In the economics literature on productivity, it is the ratio
of input to output price indices which is used as a performance measure. We label this 'total price performance'
(TPP) (Trethcway, Waters and Fok 1994; Waters and Tretheway 1997), i.e., 'price-cost recovery' is the
reciprocal ofTPp. ( By tracking TPP along with TFP, we can directly monitor any change in the firm's
financial status along with its productivity changes.
Note that financial performance is monitored relative to the base period. If Re/Co is not equal to
unity, then the firm is not in long run competitive equilibrium. If R < C and the firm is making a loss,
it is necessary/desirable that the financial condition improve. It would be quite different if the firm started
in a substantial monopoly position. Here public policy would be looking for a decline in the financial
position. In brief, one must pay attention to the conditions in the base period Re/Co in assessing the
desired link between productivity and financial changes in the firm.
If competitive conditions do prevail, the firm is a price taker for both outputs and inputs and
economic profits are zero hence R/C - 1 and TFP -- TPP, i.e., all productivity gains (Y/X) are passed
on in the form of lower prices for outputs relative to prices paid for inputs. In fact what we call TPP is
occasionally used as a measure of TFP because they should be identical under competitive conditions.
One need not assume perfectly competitive conditions; the same relationship holds if there is no
change in the market power position of the firm. If competitive conditions change, equation (3) is all the
more interesting and useful because we can monitor changes from the initial market power position. For
example, suppose a firm is gaining increased market power. It will not pass all productivity gains on to
customers, and this will be shown by tracking TFP relative to TPP. IfTFP is greater than TPP, the firm
has retained part of the productivity gains as increased revenues rather than pass the full productivity gains
through to its customers. In particular, the ratio of TPP to TFP indicates the extent to mUch productivity
gains are shared with customers.
4 The concept of using input and output prices to measure productivity ratherthan use input and output
quantifies has been recognised for some time in the productivity literature in econon_ics but it is rarely calculated
or examined, e.g., Jorgenson and Oriliches 1967 (who cite Siegel 1952, 1961) and Diewert 1992. In contrast, the
link between TFP and profitability has long been recognized in the management literature (cited above), where it is
the ratio of output to input prices which are examined, the inverse of what economists would measure. Similar
formula to equation (3) can be found in Kurosawa (1975), Gaxrigosa and Tatje (1992) and Haa and Hughes (1997).
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Before continuing, we comment further on the treatment of the links between productivity, prices
and profitability in the literature. The management literature relevant to productivity measurement
(American Productivity Center, 1981 and related references cited elsewhere) focus on determinants of fu'm
profitability. They decompose a profit change into the two components of productivity and price-cost
recovery? We approach this issue from the economics literature on productivity. The economics
literature emphasizes competitive markets, in which case economic profitability is expected to be zero,
hence there is little interest in profitability decomposition. In the economics literature on productivity
measurement, the index number approach emphasizes input and output quantity indices. But it has been
noted (cites above) that the ratio of an input price index to an output price index is dual to productivity
measured by output and input quantity indices for competitive industries. We note fl_atthis duality holds
whether there is perfect competition or not, and any difference OVP vs. TPP) indicates a change in
economic profitability? Thus we arrive at the same expression as the APC model although we emphasize
the inverse of the price relationship, i.e., TPP is the inverse of the price-cost recovery measure which is
used in the APC model. The TPP version facilitates a very simple graph to show the link between
productivity, prices and profitability, shown later.
3.0 INTERNATIONAL AIRLINE DATA
The data for this study are described in Oum and Yu's (1995 and 1997) study of productivity
comparisons among airlines. Only a brief summary is provided here.
The data are a careful and systematic compilation of data on major world airlines, limited to those
for which all data categories could be obtained in like fashion. The time period covers 1986 through 1995;
22 airlines are included (one airline, Cathay Pacific, has data only from 1988).
Five categories of output are compiled: (1) revenue passenger kilometres (RPK) of scheduled air
service; (2) revenue tonne kilometres (RTK) of scheduled freight service; (3) mail service (measured in
RTK); (4) non-scheduled (charter) passenger and freight services, measured as RTK; and incidental
services (measured in revenues and deflated by the GDP deflator for the home country; see Oum and Yu,
1992, pp. 183-4 for details). The incidental services include a wide variety of services including catering,
services supplied to other airlines, and consulting services. The airlines differ substantially in the
importance of different output categories. The output index is constructed using revenue shares as
_veights. The Tornqvist or translog index formula is used.
s Some versions of the APC model make further decompositions, e.g., Banker, Chang and Majumdar
(1993, 1996) distinguish fixed and variable inputs and heace incorporate changes in utilisation of fixed factors;
Hart and Hughes (1997) distinguish productivity (output per input) changes from changes in the level of output.
6 Han and Hughes (1997) also derive a similar expression starting from the economics literature on
productivity.
There are five categories of inputs: (1) labour measured as number of employees; (2) fuel measured
in gallons; (3) flight equipment capital is measured by an index incorporating different aircraft types; (4)
ground property and equipment capital constructed using the Christensen4orgenson (1969) perpetual
inventory method (see Oum and Yu, 1995, p.184); and (5) "materials and other" which is a residual or
"catch-all" category for all other expenditures by the airline companies. The materials and other category
is estimated by subtracting labour, fuel and capital input costs from ICAO's reported total operating costs.
Deflating the residual expenditures by an input price index produces and input quantity index for this
category.
The output and input categories are combined into multilateral indexes following the procedures
recommended by Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982). Multilateral indices enable one to compare both
absolute productivity differences across firms as well as growth rates over time. The quantity indices are
normalized around a particular carrier and year, specifically Oum and Yu use American Airlines in 1990
as the base. That is, the output quantity index and input quantity index are both set at unity for American
Airlines in 1990, and all output, input and TFP indices are expressed relative to this base. This is
modified shortly.
Oum and Yu (1995, 1997) calculate the total economic cost for each airline, i.e., including a
capital service price for capital inputs. Dividing the total economic costs by the input quantity index
produces the dual input price index. Similarly, dividing total revenues for each airline by its output
quantity index produces the dual output price index. Note that the output and input price indices for the
base year and carrier will not equal unity unless revenues and total economic costs are equal in that year.
This is the long run expectation in a perfectly competitive industry, but a revenue/cost (R/C) ratio of
exactly unity will be rare. The first year (1986) ratio of input to output price indices (TPP) for any airline
is determined by the R/C for that airline in that year and the TFP index (which is relative to the American
Airlines' base). To illustrate further:
Y = output quantity index
X = input quantity index
R - total revenues
C = total economic costs
Then:
TFP = Y/X
TPP -- (C/X) / (R/Y)
or TPP = [I/R/C] TFP
(4)
Given TFP, if R>C in that year then TPP<TFP; ifR/C were unity in 1986, TPP would equal TFP in
that year. Expression (4) applies to subsequent years as well. Divergence between TFP and TPP from
one year to another will determine the change in R/C. If ATFP > ATPP, then R/C improves because the
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firm has been able to retain part of the productivity gain ATFP. Conversely, if a firm faces rising input
prices and is unable to offset this by productivity gains, then ATPP > ATFP and the firm deteriorates
financially. -
A further adjustment of the base firm and year is desirable. For the base of American Airlines
in 1990, the R/C is 0.924 hence the ratio of input to output price indices (TPP) for that year and carrier
is 1.082. Because all indices are measured relative to the base year and carrier, it would be more
convenient to use a base where the revenue/economic-cost ratio was near unity. For that reason, in this
paper "the indices are rebased to American Airlines 1988. The R/C was 1.01 in that year, hence setting
the output price index at unity is accompanied by an input price index of 0.993. All carriers' (and years')
values for output and input quantities, output and input prices, and hence TFP and TPP are measured
relative to American Airlines 1988.
Note the interpretation of this "total" price index. Just as the output quantity index reflects the
combination of all outputs (weighted by their relative importance as indicated by revenue shares), the dual
output price index represents the combined effe_-'ton the firm's output prices taking the multiple outputs
into account. More typically, most discussion of airline price trends focus only on passenger yields. The
total price index is a more comprehensive measure of price.
4.0 OUTPUT AND INPUT, QUANTITY AND PRICE INDICES
The results are presented in three sets of graphs; each set has 22 figures or graphs, presented in


























The input and output quantity indices are plotted for each airline, along with their respective input
and output price indices in Set I, Figures 1-22. Note that these are multilateral indices, so one can
compare levels of outputs, inputs and respective prices relative to one another, all based relative to
American Airlines in 1988. Comparing output relative to input quantity indices indicate productivity, i.e.,
any growth in output relative to inputs indicates a productivity gain. Comparing input to output price
indices compares movements in the "total" prices paid to inputs (i.e., weighted average of prices paid to
all inputs) relative to "total" output price index. The link between these graphs and changes in profitability
are shown in a subsequent set of graphs in the next section. For the moment, we contrast the levels and
trends in these four indices for the 22 airlines.
The indices are based on American Airlines in 1988. Most airlines produce lower output levels
(and consume fewer inputs) than American so this is why most airline output and input indices are less
than unity. There are examples of higher priced airline services (e.g., Japanese carriers, ANA and JAL),
who also face higher input prices than other world airlines. The low input price carriers are the other
Asian carriers, notably Thai Airlines. 7 In general, for each airline the input and output quantity indices
will be relatively close to one another, as will be the input and output price indices. But the levels and
growth trends can differ considerably across airlines.
For many airlines, the respective input and output quantity indices track closely to one another,
any divergence of output exceeding input growth indicates productivity gains. For most airlines, input
and output prices tend to exhibit a less stable relationship than for the quantity indices. All carriers show
input prices rising fairly steadily over the period, and many carriers show input prices rising faster than
output prices. Only a few carriers (Thai, ANA, SAS) have been able to sustain output prices noticeably
higher than the input prices paid (some other European airlines exhibited this pattern until recently).
The growth of output quantities relative to input quantities indicate productivity growth TFP; the
relationship between input prices and output prices CI'PP) indicate the sharing of productivity gains, or
Note that one must distinguish between "low cost" and "low input price" carriers; "low cost" is the
product of input quantities and the input prices paid divided by output supplied.
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alternatively, the size of the productivity gains needed to prevent erosion of the revenue/cost ratio.
is described in the next section.
This
S.0 PRODUCTIVITY AND PRICE TRENDS:
THE SHARING OF PRODUCTIVITY GAINS
Figures 1 through 22 o1' Set II plot the productivity measure TFP along with the ratio of input
to output price indices TPP for each airline, for 1986 through 1995. The TFP figures are "raW" or
"gross" productivity measures. They do not adjust for endogenous operating characteristics which make
some airlines inherently more or less efficient. For example, a carrier serving high density long haul
routes will appear highly productive in terms of outputs to inputs. Conversely, a carrier serving lower
density shorter haul traffic will require more inputs per RPK. Oum and Yu (1995 and 1997) "decompose"
the TFP values to distinguish productivity differences which may be attributed to managerial efficiency
rather than to endogenous influences on productive efficiency. For this present study, the source of
productivity differences is not important; our interest is in the relationship between productivity and price
changes, and for this sources of productivity do not matter. The graphs reveal the productivity changes
CFFP) and how prices paid for inputs compare with the prices received for outputs, i.e., the extent to
which productivity gains are passed through to customers CITP). TFP and TPP together will show the
revenue to economic cost ratio and how it changes over time. For this reason, revenue/economic cost
(R/C) is not plotted in most figures. It is included for one airline (Qantas) in Figure 1 as an illustratio n-s
Figure 1 of Set II for Qantas is described in some detail; the reader can interpret the remaining
figures. In Figure 1, the initial (1986) TFP index value is 0.85, indicating a productivity level 85 percent
of the productivity level of American Airlines in 1988 (the base of the multilateral index series). The
revenue/cost ratio was calculated to be .90. As a result, TPP for that first year is .94 indicating that the
prices paid for inputs (on average) are a few percent below the prices received for outputs (remember that
these price indexes are dual to the output and input quantity indexes). These three points for 1986 can be
seen in Figure 1 of Set II.
In 1987, Qantas shows a modest productivity gain (greater output relative to input quantities), and
a decline in the prices paid for inputs relative to prices received for the outputs. The result is a sharp
improvement in the ratio of revenues to total economic costs (1.10). The next two years show modest
productivity gains and slightly faster growth in the input/output price ratio; the result is the revenue/cost
ratio remains greater than one but declining.
1990 shows a decline in productivity and a sharp rise in prices paid to inputs relative to prices
s Oum and Yu (1998) also present a graphical comparison of airline profitability, productivity and prices,
but they look only at the trend from 1986 for each airline, i.e., they do not retain the multilateral properties and
the data and thus cannot make absolute comparisons among airlines as is done here.
receivedforoutputs.Thisresultsina sharpfallintherevenue/costratio(to0.78).The nextthreeyears
show increasedproductivity,which exceedsthe input/outputpriceratio,hence revenue/costsrecover.
Productivitydipsin 1994 butsodidtheinput/outputpriceratiohencerevenue/costschangedlittle.1995
saw a risein productivitywith almostconstantpricespaid for inputsrelativeto outputs,hence
revenue/costsrise(I.I0).
TFP and TPP areplottedforBritishAirways (BA) and European aircarriersinFigures2 through
8 of SetII.For most ofthesecarriers,TFP and TPP trackfairlyclosely,indicatingthatproductivitygains
arereflectedinoutputpricereductionsrelativetothepricespaidforinputs.For BA, TFP andTPP track
particularlyclosetogetherwhich isindicativeofa fairlycompetitivemarketstructureoverallfacingBA.
Looking over thewhole period,BA's TFP indexstartsofflow relativetotheAmerican Airlines'(hA)
base (0.61)butrisesnoticeablyto0.84. TPP tracks'rFPcloselyindicatingthattheseproductivitygains
have largelybeen passedthroughtocustomersby outputpricesnot risingwithinputprices,exceptfor
1995 where a portion(abouthalf)arenotpassedthroughbut retainedasrevenuesinthatyear.
TFP and TPP lrack closely for Lufthansa and SAS. KLM and Swissair show TFP growing faster
than TPP after 1991 indicating that some of the productivity gains have been retained by these firms.
Iberian airlines has seen little productivity growth but there has been pressure on its input/output price
ratio hence its economic condition deteriorated.
Figures9 through 14ofSetIIshow themajorAmerican carriersand Figures15and 16show Air
Canada and Canadian Airlines,respectively.The dataformost ofthecarriersuggestahighlycompetitive
industry:TFP and TPP trackcloselytogether,and forsome of the carriersTPP isgreaterthanTFP
indicatingweakening financialconditionbecausepressureson pricesarenotbeingoffsetby sufficient
productivitygains. American Airlinesisthebaseor referencecarrierfortheproductivityindex,hence
TFP equalsunityfor 1988. ItsTPP equals0.99inthatyearbecausetherevenue/costratioequals1.01
in1988. For 1990 through1992TPP exceedsTFP indicatingdeterioratingfinancialcondition,withslight
revenue/costrecoveryafterthat.
Despitestartingoutasarelativelyhighproductivitycarrier,Continental'sTFP declineduntil1990
beforereboundingpartway. But itsTPP isconsistentlyhigherindicatingthatthecarrierhasbeenunable
to obtainpricesfor itsoutputswhich keptpace with thepricespaid for inputs.Hence itsfinancial
conditionhas steadilyworsened until1995. Itislessextreme,but since1988 US Air alsohas seen
productivitygrowth not sufficienttooffsetherisingpricesof inputsrelativetothepricesreceivedfor
outputs.
Both of the Canadian carriers show signs of financial deterioration over the full period as
productivity growth has been modest but there has been sharp pressure on prices, i.e., output prices not
keeping pace with rising input prices and productivity gains were not sufficient to offset this. Canadian
airlines' productivity improves noticeably after 1992 but again the productivity gains appear to have been
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largelypassed through as price reductions (or limited price increases) to customers.
For the most part, t_e Asian carries (Figures 17 through 22 of Set II) show a different pattern.
The absolute productivity level varies considerably across the carriers, and only two carriers (Korean and
Thai) show noticeable improvement in productivity. But several of them show high financi.al performance,
i.e., an ability to obtain prices for outputs which are not offset by rising prices of inputs. The gap between
TPP and TFP declines over time for ANA and JAL (Figures 17 and 18, respectively) suggesting rising
competition over the period. Korean Air (Figure 19) shows noticeable productivity improvements with
most of the productivity gains (but not all ) passed through to customers. Cathay, Singapore and Thai
(Figures 20, 21 and 22, respectively) have been able to sustain TFP greater than TPP throughout the
period, i.e., they have maintained strong financial performance regardless of their productivity
performance. For Thai however, it has shown substantial productivity growth (but from a low base) and
a substantial portion of these gains (about two-thirds) has been passed through as lower prices for outputs
relative to prices paid for inputs.
6.0 LINKING QUANTITIES, PRICES, REVENUES AND COSTS
Set HI, Figures 1-22 present a more comprehensive portrait of the time path of the variables over
time. Four quadrant graphs portray productivity (output and input quantity indices) in quadrant 1; total
revenue index (output price and output quantity indices) in quadrant 2; total cost index Cmput price and
input quantity indices) in quadrant 4; and the comparison of input and output price indices in quadrant 3.
The data show the time path of the combinations of variables and thus allow a visual decomposition of the
relative importance of changes in each pair of variables.
The first year's observation (1986) is shown as a ray from the origin to each quadrant. Looking
at Qantas (Figure 1 in Set 1II) in quadrant 1, subsequent years show growth of both outputs and inputs,
but the former growing faster than the latter in most years, thus showing an overall increase in productivity
(a line drawn from the origin to the final year's observation would rotate upward relative to the first year,
i.e., a higher ratio of output to input or increased productivity).
Quadrant 2 tracks a total revenue index (the product of the price and quantity indices for output).
The first year (1986) is indicated by the ray from the origin, showing the output price index of 0.81 (the
minus sign is simply to make the graphing program work) and the output quantity index of 0.22. While
output increases (only one year did it dip), output prices varied, rising and falling but finishing with
increases. Comparing the finishing point with the first year (the ray from the origin), it shows that the
increase in total revenue was more due to output expansion than increases in prices received.
Quadrant 4 tracks the total cost index (the product of the input price and quantity indices). From
the 1986 combination, input prices rose while input quantities did not change much until the last two years,
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the latter corresponding to the jump in output levels shown in quadrant 1 (and 2). A line from the origin
to the final year observation (not drawn) would show that the rise in total costs was explained slightly
more by increases in inputs used that by increased prices (which is an unusual result; most airlines show
the increases in input prices was more important than increases in input quantities in explaining the
increases in total costs).
Quadrant 3 plots the combinations of output and input price indices. From the first year, at first
output prices rose faster than input prices, but then output prices tended to fall whUe input prices continued
to increase, until the last three years when output prices were rising along with input prices. Comparing
the final year point with the first year, it shows that input prices rose slightly more than output prices.
This tends to reduce the R/C or profitability ratio, although it depends on the size of productivity gains.
Since the scales are numerically the same in these figures, drawing a line from the final year productivity
figure in quadrant 1 through the origin into quadrant3 will reveal the net change in overall profitability.
Such a line would pass just below the final figure for the input-output price combination in quadrant 3,
indicating that productivity gains outstripped the rise in input prices relative to output prices hence the
firms financial condition improved.
Space does not permit analysing each of the 22 figures in Set HI, but the reader can observe the
time pattern of outputs and inputs hence productivity, along with revenue and cost trends and the overall
profitability result indicated by comparison of productivity (upward rotation of the rays from the origin
in quadrant I) with the downward rotation of the ray from the origin to the input-output price indices in
quadrant 3. For the firm to improve its economic profitability, productivity must outstrip the rise in input
prices relative to output prices. For almost all airlines, the financial results deteriorate over the period
although an improvement in 1994--1995 helped many of them.
7. CONCLUSIONS
Thispapercompares productivitytrendsof22 majorworld airlines(1986-1995)withchangesin
inputpricespaidrelativetooutputpricescharged.These revealwhetherproductivitygainsbeen passed
on to customersor retainedby therespectiveairlinestherebyimproving theirfinancialcondition.The
analysisisdone by constructingthedualinputand outputpriceindiceswhich correspondtotheinputand
outputquantityindicesusedtocalculatetotalfactorproductivity(TFP). Thispriceratioislabelled"total
priceperformance"(TPP) reflectingthefactthatthesepriceindicestakealloutputand inputcategories
intoaccountasdo theTFP quantityindices.The framework isa variationof thepriceand productivity
model firstoutlinedby theAmerican ProductivityCenter098 I).In competitiveindustries,one expects
thegrowth of inputpricesrelativetooutputpricestoequalproductivitygains,i.e.,productivityenables
thefirm to raiseoutputpricesby lessthantheriseininputprices,and competitionwillforcethe full
productivitygainstobe passedon tocustomers.
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The datashow bothsimilaritiesand differencesacrossthecarriers.Absoluteproductivitylevels
as wellas ratesof growth differsubstantially.Nearlyallcarriershow atleastsome productivitygains
and, in most cases,most of the productivitygainswere passedon to customersas indicatedby TPP
trackingclosetoTFP. For severalcarriersTPP exceedsTFP, i.e.,inputpriceshave risenfasterthan
outputpricesand productivitywas notsufficienttooffsethis,hence theseairlines'financialconditionhas
deteriorated.For themost part,theAsiancarriershave been abletoretainsome oftheproductivitygains
as improved financialperformance,whereas North American and European carriershave been less
successful.That istosay,thedatasuggestgreatercompetitiveforcesatwork intheseothermarkets.This
isparticularlyso forNorth America where overthesampleperiodeverycarriershows inputpricespaid
exceedingthe outputpricesobtainedand thesepricedifferencesarenotoffsetby sufficientproductivity
gains.Thispatternischanged onlyfortwo carriersand forthemost recentyears.Thatis,thefinancial
conditionof North American carriershasdeteriorateddespitewhat productivitygainstheyhavebeenable
toachieve.The European storyisinbetween:TFP and TPP trackfairlyclosetogetherbutsome carriers
have been abletoretainatleastsome oftheproductivitygainstoimprovetheirfinancialcondition,notably
KLM and Swissair.
It should be noted that the data to make this comparison of prices and productivity sharing are
implicit in the data already compiled to make productivity comparisons. But most researchers have not
been making use of the duality relationship between productivity and price changes. Apart from the
specific results for airlines, this paper shows how existing data for total factor productivity measurement
can be used to also reveal productivity sharing and the changes in overall financial performance. In
addition, four quadrant graphs are used to portray the links between output and input quantity indices,
indices of total revenues and costs, and input and output price indices. These make it possible to have a
single graphical portrait of the trends and changes in these variables over time.
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Abstract
Enhancing competitiveness in the global airline industry is at the forefront of attention with
airlines, government, and the flying public. The seemingly unchecked growth of major airline
alliances is heralded as an enhancement to global competition. However, like many mega-
conglomerates, mega-alrlines will face complications driven by size regardless of the many
recitations of enhanced efficiency. Outlined herein is a conceptual model to serve as a decision
tool for policy-makers, managers, and consumers of airline services. This model is developed
using public data for the United States (U.S.) major airline industry available from the U.S.
Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, the National Transportation Safety Board, and other public and private
sector sources. Data points include number of accidents, pilot deviations, operational
performance indicators, flight problems, and other factors. Data from these sources provide
opportunity to develop a model based on a complex dot product equation of two vectors. A
row vector is weighted for importance by a key informant panel of government, industry, and
consumer experts, while a column vector is established with the factor value. The resulting
equation is the dot product of two vectors, C the row vector, and V the column vector. The
equation, known as the national Airline Quality Rating (AQR), where Q is quality, C is weight,
and V is the value of the variables, is stated Q = C[il-19] x V[il-19]. Looking at historical
patterns of AQR results provides the basis for establishment of an industry benchmark for the
purpose of enhancing airline operational performance. A 7 year average of overall operational
performance provides the resulting benchmark indicator. Applications from this example can be
applied to the many competitive environments of the global industry and assist policy-makers
faced with rapidly changing regulatory challenges.
EnhancingGlobalComl_etitiveness:BenchmarkingAirline OperationalPerformance
in Highly RegulatedEnvironments
Looking athistoricalpatternsof theAirline QualityRating(AQR) mayprovidethe
basisfor establishmentof anindustrybenchmarkfor thepurposeof enhancingairline
operationalperformance.Benchmarkingis aprocessthathelpscompaniesto find high
performancelevelsin otherorganizationsandto learnenoughabouthowtheyareachieving
thoselevelssothepracticeproducingthehighperformancecanbeappliedto one'sown
company(Keehley,Medlin,MacBride& Longmire,1997). Enhancingcompetitivenessin the
globalairline industryis at theforefrontof attentionwith airlines,government,andtheflying
public. Theseeminglyuncheckedgrowthof majorairlinealliancesis heraldedasan
enhancementto globalcompetition.However,like manymega-conglomerates,mega-airlines
will facecomplicationsdrivenby sizeregardlessof themanyrecitationsof enhanced
efficiency.
Outlined herein is a conceptual model to serve as a decision-tool for policy makers,
managers, and consumers of airline services. The AQR can serve as a model for other
organizations on how to use data as a benchmark to help an organization or industry improve its
performance. The AQR is a summary of month-by-month quality ratings for the major U.S.
airlines during a one-year period. The AQR uses 19 data points such as pilot deviations, load
factors and the number of accidents. (See Table 1). The AQR model uses publicly available
data from the Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, National Transportation Safety Board, as well as other
sources. Applications from the AQR can be applied to the many competitive environments of
our global industry and assist policy-makers faced with rapidly changing regulatory challenges.
Defining Performance Measurement: The Airline Quality Rating
The majority of quality ratings available rely on subjective surveys of consumer opinion
which are completed infrequently. This subjective approach yields a quality rating that is
essentially non-comparable from survey to survey for any specific airline. Timeliness of survey
based results can be problematic as well in the fast changing airline industry. Before the Airline
Quality Rating, there was effectively no consistent method for monitoring the quality of airlines
on a timely, objective, and comparable basis. With the introduction of the AQR, a multi-factor,
weighted average approach became available. This approach had not been used before in the
airline industry. The method relies on taking published, publicly available data that
characterizes airline performance on critical quality factors important to consumers and
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combinestheminto a rating system. The final result is a rating for individual airlines with ratio
scale properties comparable _icross airlines and across time.
The Airline Quality Rating is a weighted average of 19 factors that have important to
consumers when judging the quality of airline services. Factors included in the rating scale
were taken from an initial list of over 80 potential factors. Factors were screened to meet two
basic criteria; 1) a factor must be obtainable from published data sources for each airline; and 2)
a factor must have relevance to consumer concerns regarding airline quality. Data used in
calculating ratings represent performance aspects (i.e. safety, on-time performance, financial
stability, lost baggage, denied boardings) of airlines that are important to consumers. Many of
the factors used are part of the Air Travel Consumer Report prepared by the U.S. Department of
Transportation.
Final factors and weights were established by surveying airline industry experts,
consumers, and public agency personnel regarding their opinion as to what consumers would
rate as important in judging _irline quality. Also, each weight and factor were assigned a plus
or minus sign to reflect the nature of impact for that factor on a consumer's perception of
quality. For instance, the factor that includes on-time performance is included as a positive
factor because it is reported in terms of on-time successes, suggesting that a higher number is
favorable to consumers. The weight for this factor is high due to the importance most
consumers place on this aspect of airline service. Conversely, the factor that includes accidents
is included as a negative factor because it is reported in terms of accidents relative to the
industry experience, suggesting that a higher number is unfavorable to consumers. Because
safety is important to most consumers the weight for this factor is also high. Weights and
positive/negative signs are independent of each other. Weights reflect importance of the factor
in consumer decision making, while signs reflect the direction of impact that the factor should
have on the consumer's rating of airline quality. When all factors, weights, and impacts are
combined for an airline and averaged, a single continuously scaled value is obtained. This
value is comparable across airlines and across time periods.
The equation, known as the national Airline Quality Rating (AQR), where Q is quality,
C is weight, and V is the value of the variables, is stated Q = C[il-19] x V[il-19]. Figure 1
presents the formula as a weighted average which results in ratio scale numbers.
Figure 1
Weighted Average Formula _'or the AQR





Airline Quality Rating Factors, Weights and Impact
FACTOR WEIGHT IMPACT (+/-)
1 Average Age of Fleet 5.85
2 Number of Aircraft 4.54 +
3 On-Time 8.63 +
4 Load Factor 6.98 .
5 Pilot Deviations 8.03 .
6 Number of Accidents 8.38 _
7 Frequent Flier Awards 7.35 .
8 Flight Problems" 8.05
9 Denied Boardings" 8.03
10 Mishandled Baggage" 7.92 .
11 Fares" 7.60 _
12 Customer Service" 7.20 .
13 Refunds" 7.32 _
14 Ticketing/Boarding" 7.08
15 Advertising a 6.82
16 Credit" 5.94
17 Other _ 7.34 .
18 Financial Stability 6.52 +
19 Average Seat-Mile Cost 4.49 _
"Data for these factors is drawn from the Department of Transportation's
monthly Air Travel Consumer Report.
The AQR Benchmark: Results in Action
The Airline Quality Rating was developed and first announced in early 1991 as an
objective method of comparing airline performance on combined multiple factors important to
consumers. Over a span of seven years the Airline Quality Rating has provided a summary of
month-by-month quality ratings for the ten major U.S. airlines operating during this period.
Using the AQR system and monthly performance data for each airline for the multi-year period
provides comparative data for a longer term view of quality in the industry. Since the Airline
Quality Rating is comparable across airlines and across time, monthly rating results can be
examinedboth individually andcollectively.A compositeindustryaveragethat combinesthe
tenmajorairlineswhich aremonitoredeachmonthon 19criteriaoverthesevenyearspanis
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t= 3.675with 6 degreesof freedom
Thetwo-tailedP valueis 0.0106,consideredsignificant
Continuingatrendstartedin 1994,theAQR industryaveragescoresshowanindustry
that is improvingin quality. 1997showsthelargestchangefor industryaverageAQR scoresof
anyof thepastsevenyears.For 1997theoverallindustryaverageAQR scorewasthehighestof
anyof the sevenyearsrated. TheAQR scoreimprovementwasthemostof anyyear-to-year
scorechangessince1991. While factorsof on-timeperformance,involuntarydeniedboardings,
andmishandledbaggagearebetter,a 20%increasein thenumberof complaintsfiled with the
Departmentof Transportationrunscounterto arecoveredindustry. Financialperformancehas
certainlyturnedthecorneral,_ngwith someindicatorsof qualityperformance.Increased
consumerdissatisfactionexpressedby an increasedvolumeof complaintsseemsto indicatethat
howthingsaredoneis just asimportantaswhatgetsdone.
The AQR was originally developed for the eventual purpose of benchmarking the U.S.
major airline industry, which]s highly competitive and highly regulated. Regulatory officials,
consumers, financial analysts, and others are interested in monitoring overall industry
performance and the resulting effects of situational environment changes. Airlines must
monitor operational performance to maintain competitiveness. Each airline must monitor
performance to industry standard and previous case history for that air carder. Thus each
airline will have to know the effect of each operational performance indicator and act to effect
change.
Applications for the Benchmark Standard
In order for benchmarking to be successful, lasting performance improvements must be
made. Sustaining the momentum is crucial to overcoming old practices and implementing new
ones. New processes in organizations require constant attention and continual practice. Old
practices must be unlearned. Three types of issues arise: ensuring the successful
implementation and operation of best practice in organization, institutionalizing benchmarking
as the way to search for best practices throughout the agency, and clearly defining the future of
benchmarking for best practices as a means for bringing better service to customers (Keehley et
al., 1997).
The major airlines are realizing that it is important to attract and retain customers.
"Companies are learning that it is important to monitor customers' needs and wants and then
strive to meet those needs and wants. If an airline fails to provide quality/satisfaction in its
services (i.e. passenger satisfaction), it will lose its customers to its competitors" (Bowen &
Headley, 1997, p. 61). "It is essential for all business organizations to retain existing customers
and attract new ones. Since the signs from the service provider (emitter) are interpreted by the
customer they can either strengthen or weaken the persuasive influence of the company and
thereby affect its image and the customer response. It would be interesting to research what
these signs are in the area of service provision and their impact on the loss or gain of trade"
(Malver, 1988, p. 223). Studies may indicate signs, whether they are positive or negative, and
the impact on the customer. These. impacts determine whether the customer will remain or
leave. You can perform research to detect signs that have "a common international
interpretation and the same impact irrespective of the nationality of the passenger" (Malver,
1988, p. 223). Findings from this study may help the "company to improve the delivery of
service and to contribute the development of the discipline itself" (Malver, 1988, p. 224). The
results from the AQR could most certainly help the major airlines to improve their delivery of
service. Alaska Airlines could improve the number of mishandled bags and involuntary denied
boardings and American could improve its on-time performance. All of the major airlines can
use the results to see how they compare against the competition and improve their respective
services. Applications may be modified to fit other highly competitive environments in the
global arena.
Benchmarkingis not asolutionto all of theproblemsanagencyfacesbut "apowerful
weaponin theperformanceimprovementarsenal"(Keehleyet al., 1997,p. 207).




increase,theneedfor demonstrableresultswill grow" (Keehelyetal., 1997,p. 206). Theuse
of theAQR asanindustrybenchmarkcanenhanceaidineoperationalperformance.
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In this paper ! use annual data on 50 international scheduled airlines over the period 1982-1995 to estimate
the appro._mate magnitude of the dead-weight-loss (DWL) in panicular markets resulting from the restrictions on
international trade in air transport sen'ices imposed b.v the terms of current Air Sen'ices Agreements (ASAs). and
attcmpl !o examine the various determinants of carrier efficiency.
After estimating each carrier's "residual" total-factor-productivi_. (TFP) index (TFP adjusted for factors
deemed to be beyond managerial control such as average stage length) using a simple Cobb-Douglas production
funclion. I estimate a total variable cost function equation both including and excluding the estimated -residual" TFP
index, and. using six simple assumptions, calculate the approximate DWL in 1995 associated ssith Japan Air Lines
(JAL) providing output, both assuming that the carrier with "'average" TFP faces Japanese factor prices and
alternatively that factors are freely tradable internationally. I then use the adjusted coefficients technique to estimate
the frontier total variable cost equation and use this to estimate the DWL associated with JAL providing its output in
1995. assuming again that the carrier ssith the highest TFP faces Japanese factor prices, and (alternatively) that factorsare freely tradable internationally.
By inspecting the signifilcance (and sign) of the "residual" TF'P index in the equations in which it is included.
I a!so anal_-se whether or not we can assume that this index fully ca tures th
wen as tecnnoxogxcal progress) and hence determine '-..... ", -- p .e effects of carrier technical efficiency (as
troun tae re£ame magmtude of the effects of TF'P on carrier totalvariable costs and (from the frontier total variable cost
allocativeh- efficient over the time period considered, equation output) whether or not the carriers in my sample were
" I conclude firstly that my analysis of the markets served
by JAL in 1995 supports the assertion that the gains from liberalisation would be greater the greater the ement to
which current restrictions arc relaxed (allowing more carriers to serve markets at minimum cost) and the greater the
ement to which factors of production are freely tradable internationally, and secondly, that for the carriers in mv
sample over the time period considered, a one percent increase in TFP lowered carrier total variable costs bi'
approximately 0.06% on average and that none of the carriers were allocativelv efficient.1. Introduction
The past few decades has seen a grm_Jng trend to_ards deregulation and liberalisation of civil aviation
markets across the globe. The deregulation of US domestic aviation markets in 1979 under the Carter Administration t
and the privatisation of British Airways under the Thatcher Government in 1986 led to a ,aJdespread relaxation of
restrictions on domestic a_-iation markets-" and moves to_ards privatisation 3 of, and a reduction in direct financial
assistance "_ given to, international "flag-carriers". In many countries these measures have been accompanied by
government moves to open up international routes to competition, such that markets prc_Jouslv monopolised by
national flag..carriers -_are now served by at least two airlines 6. At the regional level, the US has been negotiating
z the market access rights granted under deregulation were and remain only available to US carriers- foreign carriers
are not permitted to provide cabotage services in the US except in certain cases where the cabotage senice is an
emension of a service to the US. Other countries which have since deregulated, either partially or fully, have also
tended to only"extend deregulation privileges to their own carriers.2
some countries (such as Australia) followed the US's example and full), deregulated their domestic aviation markets
(with the caveat described in footnote 1). while others (such as Japan) adopted a less-extensive package of reforms
which some_vhat relaxed existing restrictions on the pro,_Jsion of domestic aviation services (for example, by reducing
the annual passenger threshold above which multiple designation is permitted).3 - °
nn some countries (such as Australia and Japan) flag-carriers have been full)- privatised, while in others governments
have si ._cantly reduced the amount of shares the. hold in national carriers (see Table 3.1 in Forsyth (1997) for a
companson of equiw holdings of governments of Asia-Pacific carriers in 1985 and 1995).4
over the period 1984 to 1993 direct subsidies to the world's airlines fell from $US 235 million to $US 150 million
(Findlay. Hufoauer and Jaggi (1996): 18).
5 flag-carriers "'monopolised" these markets in the sense that the).' were the only carrier from a particular country
permitted to serve them. Obvioush- a carrier from the countn- at the other end of the route also had market access
rights: ho_vever, given the prevalence oP revenue pooling and capaciP,'-sharing agreements
setting of inflates _ the Internatmnal Air Transport Association (IATA) it seems unlikeh, and the regtflation of the
intense on these routes, that competition was
6.
m Australia and the Republic of Korea, for example, two carriers from each count_., now have rights to serve
international routes: in Australia. privately-owned domestic carrier Ansett Australia began international operations in
September 1993. while in South Korea a new privately-o_vned carrier Asiana Airlines began services in 1988. Because
"'open-skies'" agrccmcnts 7. the European Union (EU) has established a Common Aviation Market R.and attempts havc
been made to establish a single aviation mark_:t across thc Tasman".
Despite these measures, a substantial proportion of global trade in air [ransport services remains tightl_
reguhtcd. Trade in international sen'ices remains governed by the terms of approximately 2000 ASAs involving 160
countrics _'_.which typically grant particular carriers from each of the bilateral panner countries market access rights.
and then stipulate which cities in the two countries the" may serve and the xseekly frequent3' and aircraft size with
which they may serve these cities _. These restrictions not only prevent camers with market access rights from
maximising economies of traffic densiD" and hence lowering their per-unit operating costs r'. but also prevent other
loxvcr-cost (given the restrictions on their operations imposed _ the terms of the bilateral agreements to which the
country in which they are based in is signatory to) carriers _3(either from the panner countries or third countries) from
serving these markets. These r_vofactors, in turn. prevent passengers and users of air-freight and mail services from
exploiting the maximum possible gains inherent in the consumption of these services, either in the form of lower
average aiffares (through reductions in existing fares, an increase in the level of discount on existing discounted fares.
or the availability of a larger number of t)pes of discounted tickets) or greater quaiiv,. of service (more seats available
per week through more flight frequencies per week per route or the use of larger aircraft and a greater number of
ASAs (which govern the terms of trade in international air transport see'ices between country-pairs) operate on the
basis of bilateral reciprocity, the granting of international market access rights to a second carrier from a particular
country is usually only agreed to in negotiations if equivalent rights are allocated to a second carrier from the partner
country. Given this. the abolishment of revenue-pooling and capacity-sharing agreements over the past decade or so,
and the reduction of IATA's status to a mainly fare-monitoring body. carriers based in countries which adopt a
multiple designation polio" are (usually) effectively faced with competition from at least three other international
carriers.
7 the term "'open-skies" is misleading, as it implies unrestricted trade in air transport services, whereas in reality these
agreements are strictly bilateral in nature, exclude cabotage rights, and retain existing restrictions on the level of
foreign o_mership of a country's careers permitted. This means that although the US has thus far established
(separate) open-skies agreements _Jth Canada. ten European nations and six countries in the Asia-Pacific region, the
rights granted by the partner country are not automatically granted to all the other countries that the US has such
agreements x_Jth. At this stage, however, it seems that the US is granting rights to each additional country it
establishes an open-skies agreement with of a roughly equivalent form and quantig.'to those it has granted to countries
with whom it has already established such agreements (comments made by Dr Christopher Findlay of the University of
Adelaide at the Civil Aviation Roundtable. 3 April 1997).
g the Third (and final) Package of reforms were due to be fully implemented by April 1997. The Common Aviation
Market allows carriers from Member States to fly within the EU without restriction: carriers are permitted to provide
cabotage services without capacity constraints, as well as Sixth and Seventh Freedom services (flights which originate
in a count' other than the carrier's country of registration and terminate in a second such count', with and without a
through-stop in the home count respectively). It is thus a regional multilateral agreement.
9 The single aviation market envisaged would essentially be a bilateral agreement between Australia and New Zealand
permits carriers from one country to provide cabotage services in the other but retains (at least initially) restrictions on
the provision of Fifth Freedom ("beyond") services (flights from the partner count to a third country which are an
extension of a carrier's flight originating in the count in which it is registered). See Findlay and Kissling (1997) for
a discussion of the factors which have thus far hindered the implementation of the a_'eement.
10 .
Fmdlay. Forsyth and Bora (1996): 128-129
t I even though for each carrier registered in an EU Member-State trade in air transport services with other
Member-States is governed by the terms of the Common Aviation Market agreement, trade with non-Members is still
subject to the terms of ASAs (which each Member has negotiated (individually) with them).
t2 econometric studies generally conclude that while economies of scale are negligible in the provision of air transport
services, there are considerable economies of traffic density: carriers can achieve cost-sa_Jngs by expanding their route
net_vork (hence increasing the number of cities they serve), increasing the average load factor (that is. the ratio of
passengers, freight and mail to capaciD' available) per flight, consolidating passengers onto larger aircraft (provided of
course that the average load factor on flights using these aircraft is relatively high), or increasing the weekly frequency
with which e.,dsting routes are flox_.
13assuming, of course, that those careers with market access rights are not the global loxvest-cost carriers
destinations served increases consumer choice and reduces time between flight connections, creating a moreconvenienl.-scamlcss'"service)w4.
Rccent studies have attempted to measure thc relative competitiveness of international airlines Oum and Yu
(1997). for example, using 1986-1993 data on 23 airlines from 16 countries, mcasure relative "residual" TIP and unit
cost indices for eacln carrier, adjusted for factors bc?,'ond airline management control (such as average stage length _-_)
The?,..show that while US carriers (with the exception of US Airways) tend to be highly productively efficient, East
Asian carriers (excluding Japanese carriers) and Qantas Ai_vays have much lower input prices n6`and hence that over
the sample period, on average, (non-Japanese) East Asian carriers had lower overall unit costs. These results suggest
that in many cip,.-pair markets consumer surplus was not being maximised as the lowest-cost carriers (given the
restrictions on their operations imposed bv the terms of the bilateral agreements the coun T. the).- are based in is a
signatory to) were prevented from providing sers_ices. The authors do not attempt to estimate the magnitude of this
DWL. The authors also do not attempt to measure the DWL arising from the fact that bilateral agreements prevent
these lower-cost carriers from minimising their costs by restricting their abilit)- to exploit maximum economies oftraffic densi_.-.
In this paper I emend Oum and Yu's (1997) analysis by estimating the approximate magnitude of these two
DWLs in a particular market, using data on a greater number of carriers over a longer (and more recent) time period
tlhan the _vo authors. The first DWL is calculated using a standard (short-run) total variable cost equation. A frontier
variable cost function is then estimated using the adjusted coefficients method, in order to calculate the second DWL. I
consider only DWLs. given that this is a net gain (the other effect of a fall in price is simpl.v a tedistr_ution of surplus
which existed prior to the price change among producers and consumers, according to the position and slope of the
supply curve and the extent to which consumers of air transport services are also holders of carrier equity).
Contrary to contempora D. cost frontier estimation practices, hos'._'er, I include an index of TF'P adjusted for
average stage length as an ex'planatol3," variable on the right-hand-side of my (','affable)cost equation. Funhermwe_rlea_examine svhether or not it can be asserted that it fulls- captures the effects of technical inefficiency (as
technological progress) and hence that the residuals contain the effects of relative carrier allocative efficiency,as the usual disturbance terms, as well
Section 2 discusses the total variable cost equation and DWL estimation methodology. Section 3 describes the
data and variables used in these estimations, and presents the Production function estimation results used to calculate
the "'residual- TF'P index. Section 4 compares the total s'ariable cost equation estimation results obtained when the
calculated "residual" TFP index is included as an exogenous variable on the right-hand-side with those obtained when
this index is excluded, and uses the "best" equation to estimate the approximate DWL associated with ]AL providing
its output in 1995. both under the assumption that the carrier with "average" _ is subject to Japanese factor prices
and under the alternative assumption that factors are (reels- internationally tradable. The frontier total variable cost
equation estimation results obtained when the "residual': TF'P index is included and excluded respectively are
presented in Section 5. and used to compare the minimum DWL associated with JAL providing its output had ASKs
been abolished and hence not only had the lowest-cost carrier been able to provide JAL's output, but also it had been
able to fuIl.v exploit economies of traffic density inherent in the pro'_'ision of such sere'ices and hence operate at its
minimum cost. again under the alternate assumptions that it is subject to JAL factor prices and that factors are freely
internationally tradable. Section 6 discusses the implications of my results for the liberalisation debate, and briefl i,
discusses (complementary) issues which would need to be addressed shou
ensure that the ains from t in _; ......... ld further liberalisation take place in order to
g rude ...... t, olt_t,vrt servicesare maximised in more 1.1.__, ....
• ,llt._f/d[ll_O markets.
2. Total Variable Cost Estimation Metbodolog 3.
14
studies have shoss_ that passengers prefer larger, jet aircraft, further increase the contribution of using largeraircraft on average to service qualitv.
15
average stage length refers to the average kilometre-distance of a carrier's flights. Studies have shown that. ceteris
paribus, the longer a carrier's average stage length, the lower its per-unit costs tend to be; however, stage length is
determined by the geographical location and population dispersion of the country the carrier is based in (thus
European careers, for example, tend to have relatively short average stage lengtlls), as well as the terms of ASKS
which the base countr) is signator, to. Oum and Yu thus conclude that it is a factor largely beyond the control ofairline management.
x6
lo_,ser than all US careers in the sample except Continental Airlines: Thai Air,rays International. Korean Air and
Singapore Airhnes large cost advantages over all US sample carriers due to their significantly lox_er labour costs
Given that the flight services portion of airline output is relatively fixed (at least in the short-term) duc to
regulation of domestic aviation markets in many countries and the terms of ASAs. it seems reasonable to assume thai
carrier capital stocks will not always be in equilibrium. Aviation literature which attempts to measure relative carrier
costs thus tends to estimate total variable cost functions, as these implicitly assume that tile time-frame under
coustdcration is the "'short-run", and hence that airline capital stocks may not be in equilibrium. Total variable cost
functions also avoid the extrem_'ly difficult task of estimating the price of capital, given that capital stocks are fixed in
the shah-run. The (disequilibrium) stock of capital is simply included as an independent variable on the
right-hand-side of the equation.
The cost functions estimated (for panel data) are thus generally" of the following form:
TVCa--xa'b+(LIa+Va) i=l ..... N:t =1 ..... T
where:
TVC a is the (logarithm of the) variable cost of production of the i-th firm in time
period t
x. is a k x T matrix of the (logarithms of the) output, "characteristic variables",
capital stock and input prices of the i-th firm in time period t
b is a vector of unknown parameters
U a are non-negative random variables which are assumed to account for the cost
of inefficiencs." in production and be iid IN(0, o. 2)I. and
V _ are random variables which are assumed to be iid N(0, c_v:) and independent
oftheO
The flight services component of total airline output is typically measured in either tonne-kilometres
performed (TKP) _7 or revenue-tonne-kilometres (RTKs) ts, such that these highly differentiated sen'ices can be
aggregated _9. Studies on the aviation industry have generally concluded, however, that producing relatively large
amounts of services with particular characteristics has a non-negligible effect on costs. Gi_en that flight characteristics
are not captured by"the output variable, "characteristic variables" are typically included in the variable cost equation.
The price of capital is not included as an input price s_riable given that the time-frame considered is the short-run.
Oum and Yu (1997) include a index of "residual" TF'P in their total variable cost equation, and then
decompose the difference in unit costs across careers into their potential sources (differences in factors beyond
managerial control, input prices and "residual" TFP) in order to estimate the relative contribution of each source to the
observed unit cost differences. They then use this to construct an index of relative airline cost competitiveness adjusted
for uncontrollable 0ay airline management) factors
Total satiable cost function estimation, however, also has another extremely useful application not considered
by"the authors: it enables us to estimate the DWL associated with the restrictions on trade in international air transport
ser_Jces imposed by the terms of ASAs in given markets, given several simple assumptions about the nature of trade in
particular city-pair markets. These (seven) assumptions are:
1) carriers price their services in such a way that the average price of carrier output is equal to the average variable
cost (AVC) of producing that output:
2) there are approximately constant returns to scale (CRTS) in the supply" of airline output (at least over small quanti_
changes):
3) consumers of air transport services have quasi-linear preferences such that the compensated and uncompensated
demand function are equal:
4) the demand for axiation services can be approximately represented by' a linear demand function:
17TKP for each carrier are calculated as the number of tonnes carried per flight (the weight of passengers, freight and
mail. where passenger weight is calculated by multiplying the number of passengers carried by 90 kilograms (which
allows for the weight of passengers, their baggage, and any excess baggage)), multiplied by the number of kilometres
flown per flight, sununed over all flights.
Is RTKs for each carrier are calculated as the revenue earned per flight from aiffares, cargo and mail multiplied by the
total weight carried per flight, multiplied by the number of kilometres flown, summed over all flights.
19 flight services can differ by kilometre-length, the size of aircraft, the type of cargo carried (passengers. freight or
mail), the number of seats in an aircraft of a particular size. the number of seats (and hence amount of leg-room) in
first-class, business-class, and economy-class respectively, the time of day and day of the week the flight is operated
etc.
5) the price clastici_" value a carrier faces is approximately the same across all the markets it serves: and
6) there is a perfectly elastic supply of all factors of production, such that any amount of any factor demanded is
available at a given factor price, and these factors are homogeneous across countries.
The first assumption implicitly assumes P.vo factors: firstly, that carriers price according to average (rather
than marginal) cost. and secondly, that it is variable (rather than total) costs that they are most concerned with. This is
possible given the huge fixed costs inherent in the pro'dsion of flight serxices and the fact that (by estimating total
variable cost equations) our analysis is limited to the short-run (recall that in the short-run carrier capital stocks are
fixed). In really, it is likely that carriers price above AVC, both in markets governed by the terms of ASAs but ghere
competition betsveen carriers xsith rights to provide services is high and in markets not under the jurisdiction of ASAs,
given that factors such as different average se_ice levels and safety records give carriers a certain amount of market
power. By using assumption 1). then. we are effectively estimating the lower bound of the DWL. The second
assumption is made given that many studies have concluded that there are negligible returns to scale inherent in the
provision of air transport services :'_. The third, fourth, and sixth assumptions are made to simplify the calculations: by
making these we can ignore income effects, avoid integrating, and avoid calculating the rise in factor price associated
ssith a rise in the demand for a particular factor (and assume that all countries _ill source their inputs from the
countries which are the cheapest suppliers of those inputs). The fifth assumption is made given the limited asailability
of information on the relative magnitude of 1) price elasticities of flight and non-flight output, 2) airfare elasticities
across ci_-pair markets, 3) airfare elasticities of business and leisure travelers, and 4) total TKP provided in each
market.
Given that Oum and Yu "s (1997) study showed that over the time period considered Japanese carriers had
relatively low TFP indices (after adjusting for factors beyond managerial control) and high factor input prices. I
decided to use markets served by JAL in my analysis -'1. I also decided to consider the year 1995, as this _as the most
recent year which aviation data was available for. The (Australian) Bureau of Transport and Communications
Economics (BTCE) (1995) estimated that the airfare elastici_ for leisure travel on mutes from Australia to Japan is
approximately -1.16. in the following analysis I invoke assumption 4). and use -1.16 as the price elasticity of demand
for JAL output"-'.
The (standard) total variable cost equation enables us to measure the DWL arising from the fact that ASAs
prevent lower-cost carriers registered in countries not signatory to a particular agreement from serving markets
betxveen the two partner countries. Given that the coefficients of this equation are calculated over all carriers in the
sample over the time period under consideration, substituting the values of the exogenous variables of a particular
carrier in a particular year (here JAL in 1995) into the estimated equation enables us to compare the actual operating
variable costs of that carrier with the costs of the "average" carrier in that year. Given assumptions 1) and 2) we can
then calculate the (average) prices of (the same le_'el of) output Qjal produced by the carrier under consideration and
the average carrier. These are labeled in Figure 1 as Pjal and Pay. respectively.
Given the (assumed) value of the elastici_ of airfares rl,_, Qjal. Pjal and assumptions 3) and 5), we can calculate




.-o Oum and Yu (1997) conclude that there are diseconomies of scale inherent in the prmision of such services: under
flUS assumption the (carrier output) supply curve would be upxvard sloping (rather than horizontal), and output-price
combinations would be determined by the intersection of the demand and supply curves.
2 t JAL was chosen rather than the other two Japanese careers in my sample given that data for JAL is reported in all
time periods for all the series used in my analysis.
22 the BTCE (1995) only reports airfare elasticities on mutes to and from Australia. It also does not report individual
carrier elasticities on these routes, price elasticities of carriers" incidental output, or (in the case of Japan) the relative
atrfare elasticities of business travel and leisure travel, respectively. From the values reported for mutes to and from
other countries and Australia. the airfare elasticip,' of business travel is much lower (in absolute terms) than for leisure
travel: hence using the leisure travel value for Japan s_ill tend to over-estimate the welfare loss (offsetting to some
extent its underestixnation under the assumption that carriers pri_ at average variable cost).
dQ Qjal.rlA
We can then calculale Qav. given assumption 2). Given assumption 4) the DWL associated with the carder under
consideration rather than the average carrier providing services in these markets is then calculated from the formula
for the area of a triangle.
Our total ,,'affable coslequation also enables us to take our analysis a step further and measure the magnitude
of the DWL if factors of production were also full)' (and costlessl_, _) tradable. Under this additional assumption. _e
would expect that all carders serxing these markets would source their inputs from the lowest-cost producers of these
inputs, and hence (given assumption 6)) by substituting in the lowest input prices out of all the carders in our sample
into the total variable cost equation, we can calculate Pav,ftf. Qav.fff. and hence the DWL ADE in Figure 1.
Frontier total variable cost equations enable us to take our analysis a step further still. Given the flight
characteristics and capital stocks of the carriers in our sample and the input prices the" faced, such equations allow us
to estimate the potential minimum variable cost at which the output of carriers could have been produced over the time
period under consideration. In Section 5 I estimate an adjusted coefficient frontier total variable cost equation which
takes into consideration carder-specific production behaviour (that is, carriers use different application methods such
that given technology, airlines can produce different levels of outputs gJth the same levels of inputs) in the estimation
of the frontier coefficients _-'_,and then use this to estimate the minimum satiable cost at which the level of output
provided by JAL in 1995 could have been produced, given JAL's capital stock, output characteristics and factor prices.
The DWL associated g-ith the fact that ASAs prevent lower-cost carriers from serving particular markets at minimum
cost. AFG. is then calculated. I then assume that factors are freely tradable internationally, and estimate the DWL AHI
by substituting JAL factor prices with the lowest observed factor prices in our sample and doing the necessary
calculations.
Programs which estimate frontier cost equations typically calculate predictions of individual firm cost
efficiency relative to the cost frontier in each time period, according to the following formula:
EFF,,= E(C,*/U_,. Xi,I
E(C_,*AJ_=0. X,,)
where C,,* is the cost of the i-th firm in time period t. which viii be equal to C, when the dependent variable is in
original units and exp(C,0 when the dependent variable is logged.
The cost efficiency measures gill thus take a value between one and infinity, where the closer is the measure to one.
the higher is its cost efficiency (or equivalently, the lower is its inefficiency) in time t.
Cost efficiency measures, however, are the sum of two elements: allocative efficiency (that is, how effective a
firm is at putting its inputs to their most productive uses) and technical efficiency (hog' effective a firm is at exploiting
the maximum potential out of its inputs). Given that the relative magnitudes of these two efficiency measures are not
directly measurable, their individual contributions to firm efficiency cannot be determined a priori. The literature thus
typically assumes that firms are allocatively efficient, and hence that all measured cost efficiency is in fact technical
efficiencv.
"However. although allocative and technical efficiency are not individually measurable, the sum of the latter
pins technology., which is commonly know as TFP, is measurable via a production function: it is the (exponent of the)
constant term 2_
iefrom Ya=x.'b+(a+V.) i=l ..... N:t =1 ..... T
where Y ,t is the (logarithm of the) output of the i-th firm in
time period t
x ,t is a k x T matrix of the (logarithms of the) capital stock, labour, and (in the
the airline industD), fuel and "'other" inputs of the i-th firm in time period t
b is a vector of unknog_a parameters
a is a constant term. and
case of
23 such that there were no cost involved in transporting these factors from one cotmtry to another etc.
24 the estimated variable cost frontier is thus a non-neutral shift from the actual variable cost function.
When cost frontiers are estimated under the assumption that firm behaviour can be proxied by an unknown random
variable with certain distributional assumptions, the coefficients for the frontier are all the same as those for the
conventional cost function except for the intercept term. and hence this shift is neutral.
2._obviously the TiP measure estimated in this way will also contain the effects of the random disturbance terms.
V, arc random variables which arc assumed to be lid N(0. r_z)
TFP, = a + V,
hence TFP,t_ a
Thus if we assume that the TJ:'Pmeasure full), captures technical efficiency (as well as technological progress) and put
it in the right-hand-side of our total variable cost equation (as do Oum and Yu (1997) in their (non-frontier) total
_3riable cost equation in order to decompose observed unit cost differentials among carriers into their sources) g+ecan
estimate the relative contribution of TFP to carrier variable costs in the case of the usual total variable cost equation.
and the maximum possible contribution of TFP to carrier variable costs when airlines are following the best practice
techniques of the given technology in the case of the frontier total variable cost equation. Obviously including a, TFP
index as an independent variable may lead to multcollinearity in the model, ff either this index does not fully capture
carrier technical efficienc)- and hence some of its effects are also inherent in the residual term. or ff it does fulh
capture technical efficiency effects but there is a strong correlation berwoen carrier TFP and allocative efficient. /f
muhicollinearit), is present, we would expect (at least) the coefficient of the TFP index to not be individuallystatistically significant from zero•
Even ff muitcollinearity is not present in our model, unfortunately we will still be unable to analyse the
effects of technical efficiency" alone on carrier variable costs, given that TIP measures also capture the effects of
technological progress. However. the efficiency measures reported in frontier cost function estimation programs will
now reflect allocative, rather than cost, efficiency, and hence carrier allocative efficiency can be tested (rather than
simply assumed). Hence in my total variable cost equation estmmtions a TFP index is included as an exogenous
variable and the results obtaine_! are compared with those obtained when this index is omitted.
3. Data and Variable Construction
My analysis uses annual data on 50 carriers from 27 countries over the period 1982-1995 (inclusive)_. It
includes more US. UK. mainland European and East Asian carriers than Oum and Yu (1997), and (unlike the authors)
also includes airlines from South Asia, Central and South America. and parts of Africa. The data is obtained mainly
from International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) (annual) Digest of Statistics, Commercial Air Carriers..Traffic, Financial Data. and Fleet-Personnel.
Total variable cost was calculated by deflating total operating expenses for each fiscal yeat270y the
manufacturing price index (MPI; 1990=100) for that year 28. Total airline output can be divided into two broad
categories: flight sea'ices and incidental (non-flight) services -'9. As already mentioned, flight services ate typica/h.
measured in either tonne-kilometres performed O'I(P) or revenue-tonne-kilometres (RTKs), such that (higld_.
differentiated) flight services can be aggregated. I chose to use the former measure, given the its a_ailability for a
greater number of carriers than the latter. Given the heterogeneous nature of incidental services, I measure the quantity
of this q,pe of airline output by dividing total incidental revenues _. the average price level of investment goods and
services in the countD.- in which the carrier is based J°. This price index is calculated as the purchasing-power-paris,
(PPP) index for GDP divided by the exchange rate of a particular country relative to the $US, and hence measures the
26 during this period Cathay Pacific Airwavs's operations were goverued by the terms of ASAS the IIK had negotiated
• . • " . , . . • , • "
E::th _hi:3 C:a_._e_-vanend _ :_aS.os_dash_vB?at_ _naarn_: in ICA? statlstlcal yearbooks; however, here I class it as an
v _,man tactor prices and had the flight operatingcharacteristics Asian carrier. Scandinavian Airlines System SAS i " "
(each country o_tlns ,i7 2/7 a-,4 ",,', -,, ...... " ( ) s jointly owned by Sweden De,.,,._ ---, _,-
• . • - - - ,,u ,_/_ ullo(al eOUlP,"recru,_t;,,.,_l..,'._'--.L:_L ," ... " • .,.,,,,.u_,aalUlNOl'way
l:)n,_ateinvestors of that country)) here I have',--,:,,_'r-;"-"-"_ :: tvA._,ucn nauzs o_lned by the government and half by
,, - • ,. -,.,,_u _moJnavta as a country. -
o
note that the beginmng and end dates of fiscal years vary some_vhat across countries28.
m the calculation of variables, all "_,'ahies"(total revenues, costsetc) were deflated by the MPI except labour costs.
which were deflated by the consumer price index (CPI). It will be assumed that the reader is a_re of t_s. and hence
hereafter statements about deflating _ill be omitted in descriptions of the construction of variables wluch use "values".
29such as activities undertaken for other carriers (eg aircraft maintenance, ground handling, catering and
reservations), sales of technology, consulting services and hotel business.
._oOum and Yu (1997) use the average price of consumption goods and services in their construction of an incidental
se_'ices quantit)-index: however, given the nature of these t_pesof serYices, it seems more reasonable to me to use theaverage price of imestment goods and services
price of non-tradable investment goods across countries relative to tile US _3:. Total airline output is then calculated as
the revenue-share weighted sum of flight seniccs and incidental sen,ices.
Oum and Yu (1997) include four "'characteristicvariables" in their total variable cost equation: average stage
length, tile share of revenue attributable to incidental sen'ices, and the shares of total _ of non-scheduled and
freight and mail TKP. respectiv¢l.v. For the carriers in their sample and the time period considered in their analysis.
the conclude that there was a significant negative relationship benveen career variable costs and average stage
length _. the proportion of total TKP which is non-scheduled ", and the share of revenue attributable to incidental
senices respectively, and a significant positive relationship between costs and the ratio of freight and mail TKP to total
TKP_5. Findlay and For_'th (1984) (as _ell as average stage length and the share of total TKP which is non-scheduled
TKP) include two additional such variables: average load factor and average aircraft size36.They conclude that in 1980
for the carriers in their sample there was a significant negative relationship between both of tbese variables and (total)
cost. respectivel._ 3_. I decided to analyse all of these six variables, as ,aell as a variable measuring the ratio of
international TKP to TKP3_. Average stage length was calculated by dividing total kilometres flown by total number of
depanures. Average load factor is the ratio of TKP to toune-kilometres available (TKA_9). Average aircraft size was
calculated by dividing TKA by total kilometres flown. The revenue share of incidental sen'ices _ calculated by
dividing incidental r_'enues by total revenues, and the shares of total TKP of non-scheduled TKP, freight and mail
TKP, and international TK_Pwere calculated by dividing non-scheduled TKP, total freight and mail TKP, and total
international TKP by total TKP, respectively.
Unfortunately. however, for the carriers in my sample over the time period under consideration, simple plots
r_'ealed no strong correlation (either positive or negative) between either the revenue share of incidental services or
the share of total TKP of international TKP and total variable cost. respectively. Also, whether or not a relationship
existed between the shares of total TKP of non-scheduled TKP and freight and mail TKP and total variable cost.
respectively, was indeterminate given that the carriers in my sample tended to provide either almost all non-scheduled
TKP or almost no non-scheduled TKP, and similarly for freight and mail TK.P, over the time period considered. The
relationship between average aircraft size and total variable cost appeared positive over some average aircraft size
values, and negative over others: nevertheless I included it in my initial total variable cost equation estimations, but its
coefficient was never individually statistically significant at even the 10% level 4°. Hence in the final results presented
in Section 4 and 5 only two "characteristic variables" are in my total variable cost equations: average stage length and
average load factor.
Total airline capital stock can be dixJded into two broad categories: flight equipment, and ground property
and equipment. Flight equipment consists not only of aircraft purchased outright, but also aircraft leased from other
3] in the case of consumption goods, this index is commonly referred to as the "'BigMac" index, as it compares the
SUS dollar price of non-tradable homogeneous goods (such as Big Macs) across countries.
32 using this as a pro.'9"for the price of incidental services implicitly assumes that each carrier based in a particular
countD' charges the same average price for these services, which in turn assumes that the markets for such services are
relatively competitive.
33see footnote 15 for a discussion of the relationship between average stage length and cartier costs.
34 given that the vast majority of non-scheduled services provided tend to be charter flights which often fly out of
seconda_ airports at non-peak times, ceteris paribus we would expect total variable costs to decrease as the proportion
of total TKP which is non-scheduled TKP increases.
35 this last result is somewhat surprising given that the more freight and mail (and less passengers) carried, the lower
the number of cabin attendants required by an airline, the lower the total expenditure on in-flight services etc.
36 see footnote 12 for definitions of these txvovariables.
37 see footnote 12 for a discussion of the effects of average load factors and aircraft size, respectively, on carrier
variable costs.
3s literature on carrier costs also generally concludes, as mentioned in footnote 12. that the greater the number of cities
sen'ed (and hence the more routes a carrier operates) and the greater weekly frequent' _th which existing routes are
sen'ed, the lower a carrier's costs will be on average. Unfortunately figures on number of routes operated and number
of flights operated per week are not reported.
39TKA measures (in tonnes) the total carrying capacity available per flight multiplied by the kilometre-length of the
flight, summed over all flights.
4o the results of these estimations are not presented in this paper, but are available upon request
airlines and capacity purchases on other carriers' flights throu,,h block -ur ....... 41__
which makes i1 extremely difficult to eslimnlP _n - .... t5 .- "e _-_"_g or code-sharing agreements_-',
........... aggregate quanul?,."of flight equipment for each carrier. Using the
number of aircraft a carrier operates accounts for those planes it leases to or from other airlines, but not the capac_D a
carricr may offer on other carders' flights. It also does not take into account the fact that aircraft ,,.and great/? in
capacity "u.Oum and Yu (1997Lcalculate the total (real) value of each carrier's flee! by mnltiplying the number of each
_.pe of aircraft it operates b.v the lease price of that aircraft type and summing over all aircraft .types, and then divide
this by the aircraft price index specified in Oum and Yu (1997"o) to obtain a flight equipment quantity index: although
this allows for differences in aircraft capaci_- across carriers, it still does not include capacity offered through
block-purchasing and code-sharing agreements and hence underestimates total carrier flight equipment. This approach
also uses approximate lease prices obtained from The A vmark Aviation Economist. Such lease prices are only available
from 1987 omvards and are not reported for all types of aircraft operated _. the carriers in mv sample (in particular.
for aircraft built in the former USSR, the Concordes operated by British Airways and Air France, and aircraft with
capacity for less than 50 seats): hence the lease prices would need to be ex.zral_)olated bac_vards and estimated for
particular carriers 4a. Using the total number of seats of a carrier includes those offered on other carriers" flights, but
again does not take into account average aircraft size differences across airlines a-_.Given that my estimate of capital
stock must also be used in a production function to calculate a TF'P index which is extremely sensitive to the
measurement of the stock of capital, I decided against using an), of these measures as a proxT for the stock of capital.
The ICAO statistical yearbooks report the depreciated (asset) vahie of flight equipment (purchased outright or
under a lease considered to be the whole life of the aircraft) and annual exTenditure on flight equipment rental
(expenses incurred for rental of aircraft under short-term lease agreements or for chartering purposes, and payments
for the purchase of capacity on aircraft operated by other carriers), which together account for the total flight
equipment operated by carriers. Given the difficulty in aggregating these two series (as the former is an asset value and
the latter measured in annual expenditure terms) and given that ground properD.- and equipment is also reported as an
asset. I included two _xiables to account for the total capital operated by carriers: -capital stock", calculated as the
sum of the depreciated asset values of flight equipment and ground property and equipment 46, and "working capital".
the annual expenditure on flight equipment rental 4_aa.
Carrier inputs are commonly separated into four categories: capital, labour, fuel and "other "49. Given that
capital stock is fixed in the short-run, the prices of only three of the four inputs need to be estimated. Oum and Yu41
under these WPe of a_m'eements, an airline "purchases" a certain number of seats on a flight operated by another
carrier, and then sells them according to demand.
42
under this type of agreement, an airline can sell seats on a flight operated by another carrier under its own two-letter
designator code. according to demand (it does not have to purchase seats outright m advance).43
two carriers may operate the same number of aircraft, but one may operate mainly jet aircraft, while the other uses
mainly smaller aircraft. Differences in average aircraft size may also be due to relative service quality: a carrier may
operate services on jet aircraft with relatively fewer seats to pro_'ide passengers with greater leg-room
44 this is not easy- even the assumption that these aircraft would have approximately the same lease prices as aircraft
Dpes for which the lease price is reported with similar number of seats is not without problems, given that the
former-USSR built aircraft in service tend to be older on average (which affects lease prices), Concordes have only 100
seats on average but are ve_., expensive to operate (but yield high profit margins per passenger, given that these seats
are all first- or business-class), and lease prices are not reported at all for aircraft _ith capacity for less than 50 seats
4._The exact number of seats provided by a carrier is also often difficult to calculate, given that carriers may use the
same type of aircraft with different seating configurations (the, may operate aircraft with relatively less seats in order
to provide more first- or business-class seats, or greater cargo-carD-ing capacity, on particular flights). In these cases.
carrier report a range for the number of seats pro_'ided on each aircraft Dpe.
46 UK carriers include the asset value of land in their estimates of the asset value of ground properD" and equipment:
hence to be consistent I added land asset values to ground properv,- and equipment values for all the other carriers inmy sample.
47 including the two m_es of capital stock in quanti_., terms would have again involved the exaremelv difficult task
of measuring the price of _pital. Even if I had have been able to measure this price, however, it is likely" that the stock
of capital measured in dollar terms would better represent the economic value of the capital stock than a quantity term.
given that capital used by carriers is highly differentiated.
48 . .
obwously nn including t_vo variables measuring total capital stock in mv equations I will need to check my results
for muhicollineariD. - .
49
all other inputs used in the provision of air transport services, such as airport fees. sales commissions, passenger
(1997) calculate tile average price of labour for each airline by dividing total remuneration of all employees by the total
number of workers employed by the airline in some countries where carriers are majori_' government owned or
" in this
¢i_jcontrolled . however, airlines tend to be used to "'absorb" excess labour, and hence the price of labour measured
_vav will be distorted. 1 decided to calculate tile average labour price by dividing total cabin crew remuneration by the
o
average price of consumption ,goods in the country in which the carrier is based _ and the total number of cabin
attendants employed at (financial)-.vear end. given that it seems reasonable to assume that even majority
government-owned carriers _ill not employ "excess" cabin staff due to space limitations inside aircraft, and because
country-specific labour laws and union bodies limit carriers' abilit)" to source their cabin staff globally 5_3_.
ICAO statistical yearbooks do not report the average price paid for. or quantity of, aviation fuel consumed by
each carrier, only total expenditure. I thus decided to use the wholesale mid-month average jet fuel prices reported for
north-west Europe. the Mediterranean and the US in The Avmark Aviation Economist in US cents per gallon, and
assume that carriers on average face the price of jet fuel of the region that the country the)" are based in is part of _55657.
The average price of investment goods and services in the country in which a carrier is based gas used as the price of
"'other".
Estimating "residual" TFP
The TFP index used in my analysis was calculated using a production function of Cobb-Douglas form ss. Total
• _,9annual remuneratmn , rather than total number of workers, was used as an estimate of labour input because it better
captures the level of skills a carriers' employees possess given that wages are usually linked to productivity 6_. The
meals, employee travel, consulting serxices and non-labour repair and maintenance expenses, stationery etc.
5o governments can own less than 50*/0 of total carder equity but be the largest share-holder and hence effectively
control the actions of the carrier.
51 as in the case of the average price of investment goods and services, this is calculated as the PPP divided by the
exchange rate. and adjust the total wage bill for cross-count" differences in the average price of homogeneous,
non-traded goods and services. The average price of consumption (rather than investment) goods and services is used
given that wages are D'pically linked to the CPI.
52 pilots and aircraft maintenance engineers are (at least to a certain extent) sourced globally, and hence it can be
expected that there will be relatively lower variation in their salaries across carriers.
53 many thanks to Professor Peter Fors)l.h of the Department of Economics. Faculty of Business and Economics at
Monash UniversitT for this suggestion.
54 for the all-cargo carders in my sample (Hunting Cargo Airlines 0J'K) and Federal Express (US)) the price of labour
was calculated using the same method as in Oum and Yu (1997).
_5 prices were also reported for Singapore for the years 1982-1984. Given that in these years fuel prices were very close
those in the Mediterranean. I assumed that East and South Asian carriers and Qantas Ainvays faced Mediterranean jet
fuel prices in m.v analysis.
56 although this assumes that the nominal jet fuel price faced by carriers based in countries in a particular region is the
same. the real jet fuel price will vary across countries due to differences in the WPI. Obviously. however, this still
assumes that carriers based in the same counU3. face the same average jet fuel price, ,_-hich will depend on how similar
the international route networks of these careers are (as carders will re-fuel for the return leg of international routes in
the foreign countD" where the average price of fuel may be different from that in the home country), and that this price
is similar to the regional average.
57 Oum and Yu (1997) estimate the price of fuel by regressing total carrier expenditure on jet fuel on a constant and
several variables (TKA. total kilometres flown, average load factor, aircraft hours, total number of departures, aircraft
t?,'pe and year effects) which they assume determine the quanti_" of fuel used.
Given that total expenditure = price x quantity, the price of jet fuel is then the (exponent ot) the constant term.
Obviously under this method the price of fuel also contains the effects of random disturbance terms.
I spent several weeks estimating similar regressions, but could not even get fairly consistent relationships between the
quantity variables and total expenditure on jet fuel across the carders in my sample. 1 thus decided the use figures
reported in The ,-h.mark.qviation Economisr
58 experimenting with other functional forms is an area for future research.
59 again, di,,ided by the average price of consumption goods in the country in which the carrier is based.
60 among the various categories of airline employees ther'e are vast differences in skill levels; using the total number of
total quantity of fuel was calculated by dividing total fuel expenditure !:9. its price":. Total expenditure on "other"
inputs was calculated by subtracting depreciation of flight equipment and ground propem- and equipment and rental of
flight equipment costs, total remuneration and total expenditure on jet fuel. and then. given the (heterogeneous) nature
of these inputs, this was divided b v the average price of investment goods and services to obtain an "other" input
qua,ti_ index.
M.v fiual production function estimation results are shown in Table 1 below. All variables (both independent
and dependent) are logged and divided _" average stage length in order to obtain a "'residual" TFP index (that is, TFP
net of factors beyond managerial control), as in Oum and Yu (1997) _'3.
Table 1 shows that the coefficients of all variables are individually statistically significant at the 5% level. The
coefficients of all variables except the capital stock variable have the expected sign: the negative coefficient may be due
to the fact that over the time period under consideration many carriers ssere in the process of fleet-rationalisation and
hence still had excess capaci_- accumulated over the years when the?,"were government owned. In this case a further
increase in carrier capital stock would have re-allocated resources away from more productive uses, lowering total
output_. The sum of the coefficients of the input variables (0.80154) is relatively low: it suggests that there were
significant diseconomies of scale for the carriers in my sample. Nevertheless the conclusion that there were negligible
or negative (as in Oum and Yu (1997)) returns to scale in the provision of air transport services can still be drawn
from these results.
Table 1
Production Function Estimation Results
Dependent Variable: output/average stage length
coefficient
constant
capital stock / average stage length
working capital / average stage length
labour / average stage length
fuel / average stage length
other / average stage length




-2.014 0.16277 -12.373 0.0030
-0.021818 0.010648 -2.049 0.0408
0.009964 0.004817 2.0685 0.0390
0.051754 0.010518 4.9207 0.0030
0.65226 0.018277 35.688 0.0000




workers, however assumes that each worker provides the same marginal contribution to output, and hence ceteris
paribus carriers with a relativel.v small number of highly-skilled employees appear to have lower output-producing
capabilities than carriers with large numbers of unskilled workers (such as government-owned, excess
labour-absorbing carriers). Using the total number of hours worked (if such figures were reported) would similarly not
capture the skill levels of employees.
6]
measuring labour inputs in this way also means that its units of measurement are the same as those of the capital
stock.
62
quantities of fuel and "'other"inputs (rather than expenditure on. or values of. these inputs) are included given that
these inputs are used up in the production process in each time period (whereas. in the case of capital and labour, it is
the services of these inputs that are used).
63Oum and Yu (1997) adjust for other factors such as output mix (the proportion of total revenue attributable to
incidental services, and the proportions of total TKP attributable to non-scheduled TKP and freight and mail TKP,
respectively), however, given that for the carriers in my sample over the time period under consideration there was no
discernible relationship bet_seen these variables and variable cost. I only adjusted for average stage length.
64 the low standard error and (hence) high t-ratio and p-value of even the capital stock variable do not suggest
multicollineari_ problems in the model.
4. Total Variable Cost Equation Estimation Results
Tables 2a and 2b showy file total variable cost equation estimation results when the calculated "residual" TFP
index is omitted and included, respectively 6s.
Table 2a
Total Variable Cost Function Estimation Results:
"Residual" TFP Index Omitted













coefficient standard error t-ratio (691df) p-value
4.3001 0.27977 15.37 0.0000
0.58265 0.019785 29.449 0.0000
-0.15248 0.027124 -5.6216 0.0000
-0.30277 0.067184 -4.5066 0.0000
0.23872 0.012643 18.882 0.0000
0.067547 0.0062272 10.847 0.0000
0.048969 0.011551 4.2393 0.0000
0.25284 0.017071 14.811 0.0000




65 usually the total variable cost equation is estimated together ssith the associated factor cost share equations m order
to improve efficiency'.
In the Cobb-Douglas case.
In total variable cost = [_k
In price input k
but we know the LHS = c_ total variable cost. price of input k . which in equilibrium___
price input k total variable cost
= quantity input k. price input k
total variable cost
---cost share of input k:
hence sve restrict the coefficients of the (logged) factor price variables to be equal to their factor cost shares
(these are equations 2.3. and 4 (although capital stock is fixed in the short-run, careers still make rental payments on
flight equipment and incur capital stock depreciation costs, however this cost-share equation is dropped to avoid
singularm of the variance-covariance matrix)).
Given that in the frontier cost equation estimation packages that the author is aware of system estimation is not
possible, only the single equation estimation results are reported in this paper to facilitate comparison (system
estimation results are available, however, upon request).
Table 2b
Total Variable Cost Function Estimation Results:
"Residual" TFP Index Included















standard error t-ratio (690 dr) p-value
4.3161 0.23895 18.062 0.0000
0.70732 0.01702 41.558 0.0000
-0,19985 0.020723 -9.644 0.0000
-0.24722 0.062888 -3.9311 0.0001
0.17692 0.010491 16.863 0.0000
0.067553 0.0058236 11.6 0.0000
0.040325 0.011023 3.6582 0.0003
0.32888 0.016774 19.607 0.0000
0.25957 0.026592 9.7612 0.0000




The tables show that in both equations the coefficients of all variables have their expected sign, including the
"'characteristic variables" average stage length and average load factor, and the coefficients of the variables are all
individually statistically significant at even the 1% level _6. The fact that the coefficient of the "residual" TF'P index is
higldy significant suggests that there is little relationship between this variable and the error term and hence that
multicollinearit), is not a problem in this model. The coefficient of the "residual" '/'FP index indicates that, ceteris
paribus, a one percent increase in the value of this index (either due to technological progress or an increase in
technical efficiency (or both)) would have decreased carrier total variable cost by approximately 0.04760% on averagefor the carriers in my sample over the time period considered.
The main quantitative difference between the two estimated equations is perhaps the magnitude of the
coefficient of the output variable. In Table 2a this is estimated to be appro.,dmately 0.5827, suggesting, contrary to
literature on the aviation industry, that there are huge economies of scale inherent in the provision of air transport
services. When the -residual" TI_ index is included in the total variable cost equation, however, this coefficient is
estimated to be approximately 0.7073, which, although still lower than expected, is significantly higher than when thisindex is omitted.
These results suggest that the inclusion of the "residual" TFP index may have improved the equation. Given
the (indixidual) statistical significance of the coefficient of this index, at the very least this has not detracted from the
equation. I thus decided to use the results in Table 2b in my initial DWL calculations.
In 1995. IAL supplied 8 894 946 650 units of output67,and its total variable costs were SUS 11 631 449 0246_e9 Given assumption 1).
Pja/= 11 631 449 024
66 of COUrse given that we are estimating the total variable cost equation without the associated factor cost share
equations, the coefficients of the (logged) factor price variables do not reflect their actual share of total variable costs:
for the careers in my sample over the time period under consideration, the actual average shares of labour fuel and
"'other" inputs were approximately 22.7%. 17.6% and 48% respectively.67 -
given that flight output is measured in TKP and the quantity of incidental services produced is proxied by a quantityindex, total airline output must be measured in "'units"68
69 given that all "'values" are measured in $US. "'US" _ill be omitted from here on.
all values are measured in $1990. given that the base years of the WPI and CPI indices is 1990. $1995 values can be
obtained by multiplying the calculated valnes by the 1995 values of the WPl and CPI
8 894 946 650
= $1.3076"I"; that is. the average price at _hich JAL provided its services was $1.3076 per unit of output.
In 1995 the average value of the TF'P index among the 50 carriers in my sample was 1.7923. higher than thc
value for JAL (1.6702). Substituting this into the estimated equation:
In total variable cost -- 4.3161 + 0.7073 1n(8894946.6498) -0.1999 1n(2325.6111)
-0.2472 1n(0.6518) + 0.1770 In(10122524.9458) + 0.06755 1n(873459.8698)
+ 0.04033 In( 102711.2027) + 0.3289 In(0.0005141) + 0.2596 In( 1.4055)
-0.04760 In(1.6703)
= 16.003745
.'.total variable cost = 8 919 451.7992
= $ 8 919 451 799
Thus if an average carrier (with average TFP) had proxided JAL's output in 1995 given JAL's output characteristics,
xxith JAL's capital stock and faced JAL factor prices, its total variable cost would have only been $ $ 919 451 799,
approximately 76.68% of JAL's total variable costs.
Given assumption 2),
Pay = 8 919 451 799
8 894 946 650
= $1.002755
The average carrier would have provided its output at only $1.002755 per unit, which is approximately 76.69% of
JAL's price. At this price, however, it would have been able to sell more output than JAL.
Using the formula tl^ = dO. P.
_q
our assumed value of the price elasticity of demand for all air transport services provided by JAL (-1.16), and
assumptions 3) and 4),
dO = -1.16 (8 894 946 650)
dP (1.3076)
= -7 g90 897 915
.-. dP = -1.2673E-10. which is the slope of the demand curve for JAL output.
dQ
Hence dQ = (1.002755-1.3076)
-1.2673E-10
= 2 405 500 774. given assumption 2).
.'.Qav = 8 894 946 650 + 2 405 500 774
= 11 300 447 424
7o for consistency, all prices are reported to four decimal places.
Hence the carrier ,.vith average TFP would have provided 11 300 447 424 units of output at Pay. 2 405 400 774 more
than JAL: that is. output would increase by approximately 27,04%. Given assumption 4), wc can then calculate the
DWL ABC from the formula of a triangle:
area triangle ABC = 1 (l I 300 447 424 - 8 894 946 650). (1.3076 - 1.002755)
2
= 366 652 442
Hence the DWL to consumers of JAL output in 1995 from having JAL providing this output rather than a carrier ssith
average TFP was appro.,dmately $ 366 652 442.
If factors were also freely tradable in 1995. and given assumption 6), m.v sample indicates that the carrier sdth
average TFP would have sourced all of its labour and fuel from Egypt, and all of its "'other" inputs from Malaysia.
Substituting the prices of these inputs into the total variable cost equation:
in total variable cost = 4.3161 + 0.7073 1n(8894946.6498) -0.1999 1n(2325.6111)
-0.2472 1n(0.6518) + O.1770 1n(10122524.9458) + 0.06755 !n(873459.8698)
+ 0.04033 1n(1255.1106) + 0.3289 1n(0.0001570) + 0.2596 1n(0.3884)
-0.04760 In(1.6703)
= 15.1022
.'.total satiable cost = 3 620 610.9365
= $ 3 620 610 937
Thus if the "'average" carrier had provided JAL's output in 1995 given JAL's output characteristics and with JAL's
capital stock but could source all of its inputs globally, its total variable cost would have been $ 3 620 610 937, which
is only approximately 31.13% of the total variable cost of JAL.
Hence Pav,fff = 3 620 610 937
8 894 946 650
= I; 0.4070
It would have supplied its output at only $ 0.4070 per umt: hence consumers of air transport services would have saved
on average 0.9006 cents per unit of output.
dQ= 
-1.2673E-10
= 7 106606 275
.'.Qav. ftf = 8 894 946 650 + 7 106 606 275
= 16001 552 925
At this price, it would have produced 16 001 552 925 units of output.
7 106 606 275 units more than JAL.
area triangle ADE = 1 (16 001 552 925 - 8 894 946 650). (1.3076 - 0.4070)
2
= 3 200 104 806
Hence the DWL from having J.M, preside its output level at JAL factor prices rather than a carrier aJth average TFP
which sources its factors globally providing its output level at its per unit average price was approximately $ 3 200 104806.
5.FrontierTotalVariable Cost Equation Estimation Results
Tables 3a and 3b show the frontier total variable con equation estimation results calculated using the adjusted
coefficients method when the "'residual" TFP index is omitted and included, respectively v_.
In both equations the coefficients of all variables have their expected sign. and the coefficients of the variables are all
individually statistically significant at even the 1% level _'_3. Once again the "'residual" TF'P index is highly significant.
suggesting that there is no multicollineatity problem in this model, and hence that there is little relationship between
the TFP index and the error tenn. The coefficient of the TFP index indicates that, ceteris paribus, a one percent
increase in TF'P would have decreased carrier total variable cost by approximately 0.07996% on average for the
carriers in my sample over the time period considered. As for the standard total variable cost equation, the coefficient
of the output variable increases in magnitude when the "'residual" TFP index is included in the equation (but is still
lower than expected). Given these results, I decided to again use the equation which includes the "residual" TFP index
in my DWL calculations.
Table 3a
Frontier Total Variable Cost Function Estimation Results:
"Residual" TFP Index Omitted























Frontier Total Variable Cost Function Estimation Results:
"Residual" TFP Index Included
7t the results presented in this section were calculated using Coelli's FRONTIER Program (Version 4.1).
72
except for the coefficient of the average stage length variable in the first equation, which is significant at the 5%
level.
73
note that the coefficients of the variables in Tables 3a and 3b are different from those in Tables 2a and 2b
respectively+
Dependent Variable: total variable cost
coefficient standard error t-ralJo
constant °
3.8474956 0.38975751 9.8715112
output 0.6709345 0.02411864 27.818089
average stage length -0.114269 0.037783136 -3.0243339
average load factor -0.383421 0.097034123 -3.9514018
capital stock 0.2235981 0.015836613 14.119061
working capital 0.0870781 0.008625211 9.8669749
price of labour 0.0988533 0.017277536 5.7214911
price of fuel 0.549247 0.020301733 27.054194
price of other 0.2425803 0.046278661 5.2417307
"residual" TFP -0.079955 0.014452031 -5.5324526
Number of Observations: 7OO
If ASAs were abolished and hence there were no restrictions on international carrier operations, not on/)"
would the carrier with the highest "residual" TFP index be able to operate in city-pair markets served by JAL, it would
also be able to serve these markets at its minimum cost as it would be able to achieve the maximum cost-savings
available to it by being able to fully exploit the economies of tral_c density inherent in the provision of its services TM
My sample indicates that in 1995 the carrier with the highest TIP index was British Airways (3.7539).
Substituting this into the frontier variable cost equation:
In total variable cost = 3.8475 + 0.6709 1n(8894946.6498) -0.1143 1n(2325.6111)
-0.3834 1n(0.6518) + 0.2236 1n(10122524.9458) + 0.08708 1n(873459.8698)
+ 0.09885 1n(102711.2027) + 0.5492 1n(0.0005141) + 0.2426 1n(1.4055)
-0.07996 1n(3.7539)
= 15.6174
.'.total variable cost = 6 061 286.2297
= $ 6 061 286 230
Thus if British Airways had protided JAL's output in 1995 given ]AL's output characteristics with JAL's capital stock
and faced JAL factor prices, its total variable cost would have been $ 6 061 286 230, which is approximately haft(52.11%) the total variable cost of JAL.
Hence Pm = 6 061 286 230
8 894 946 650
= $ 0.68143
British Air_avs would have provided output at an average price of only $ 0.68143
per unit of output. This is lower than the price at which the average carrier subject to ]AL factor prices would have
supplied this output level, but higher than the price at which the average carrier would have pro_'ided it given that
factors of production are freely tradable.
dO=
-1.2673E-10
74 obviously its abilit). to full)- exploit economies of traffic density and hence achieve the maximum cost-sa_ings
possible will depend also on airport infrastructure, international competition policy, foreign ozrnership rules, the level
of government financial assistance to carriers, and airline access to a dispute settlement mechanism. This point isdiscussed further in Section 6.
= 4 940 976 880
.'.Qm = 8 894 946 650 + 4 940 976 880
= 13 835 923 530 ,
Hence the minimum cost carrier would have provided 13 835 923 530 units of output, more than the carrier with
average TFP when it is subject to JAL factor prices, but less than this carrier when factors are fully tradable.
area triangle AFG = 1 (13 835 923 530 - 8 894 946 650). (1.3076 - 0.68143)
2
= 1 546 945 746
Hence the DWL from haxing JAL rather than British Airways proxjding JAL's output in 1995 was approximately $1
546 945 746.
If we again make the assumption that factors of production are freely tradable, using our frontier total variable
cost equation:
In total x_ariable cost = 3.8475 + 0.6709 1n(8894946.6498) -0. 1143 in(2325.6111)
-0.3834 1n(0.6518) + 0.2236 1n(10122524.9458) + 0.08708 !n(873459.8698)
+ 0.09885 1n(1255.1106) + 0.5492 1n(0.0001570) + 0.2426 1n(0.3884)
-0.07996 1n(3.7539)
= 14.2185
.'.total variable cost = l 496 322.2509
= $ l 496 322 251
Thus if British Airways had provided JAL's output in 1995 given JAL's output characteristics, and _ith JAL's capital
stock but could source all of its inputs globally, its total _'iable cost would have only been approximately $1 496 322
25 l, which is only approximately 12.86% of the total variable costs of JAL.
Pm, ftf = l 496 322 25 l
8 894 946 650
= $ 0.1682
Hence British Airways would have provided output at an average price of $ 0.1682,
which is lower than even the price at which the average carrier given free trade in factors of production would have
supplied it.
Thus dQ = L0.1682-1.3076)
-1.2673E-10
= 8 990 594 177
.'.Qm, ftf = 8 894 946 650 + 8 990 594 177
= 17 885 540 827
Hence the minimum cost carrier would have supplied 17 885 540 827 units of output, more than double that supplied
b.v JAL and more than that supplied by the average carrier also given free trade in factors.
area triangle AHI = _l (17 885 540 827 - 8 894 946 650). (1.3076 - 0.1682)
2
---5 121941 5()3
Hence the DWL to consumers of JAL output in 1995 from having JAL provide this output at JAL factor prices ralher
than the carrier with the highest TFP in that year _hich sources its factors globalh-svas approximately $ 5 121 941
503.
Table 4 sho_vs the cost efficiency indices of the carriers in my sample over the period 1982-1995, which,
given our assumption that the TFP index fulls captures the effects of carrier technical efficiency (as well as
technological progress), are actually indices of relative allocative efficiency. The table shows that over this period none
of thc carriers svere allocatively efficient (as all the values are significantly greater than one). and hence the common
assumption that the" are is misleading. The table indicates that on average Asian and Australasian carriers tended to
have (relatively) the highest levels of allocative efficiency, particularly non-Japanese East Asian carriers and Qantas
Airwa.vs (South Asian carriers tended to be somewhat less allocatively efficient). North American carriers also tended
to have high levels of allocative efficiency, particularly careers based in Canada. It is difficult to conclusively
determine the relative allocative efficiency of Central and South American and African carriers given that there are
onh three airlines of each type in my sample, and the values vary significantly across these carriers. UK and Western
European carriers, however, seem to have much lower levels of allocative efficiency" on average than either their Asian
and Australasian or North American counterparts. As in the case of the other groups, values saD. significantly across
the carriers in this group. Perhaps the most interesting thing to notice about Table 4, however, is the fact that the
indices increase over time for all carriers, suggesting that either carriers are becoming less allocatively efficient over
time. or, more plausibly, that the cost frontier is shifting down over time. The exact determinants of the rise in these
indices over time is a topic for further investigation,
Table 4
Estimated (AIIocative) Efficiency Indices















1.48 1.58 1.70 1.86 2.13 1.76
1.22 1.26 1.31 1.37 1.47 1.33
1.47 1.57 1.68 1.83 2.10 1.74
1.50 1.61 1.73 1.90 2.19 1.79
1.87 2.07 2.32 2.67 3.32 2.46
1.39 1.47 1.56 1.68 1.89 1,61
1.36 1.44 1.52 1.63 1.82 1.56
1.57 1.68 1.83 2.02 2.37 1,90
1.64 1.78 1.95 2.18 2.59 2.03
1.57 1.69 1.84 2.04 2.39 1,91
1.53 1.64 1.78 1.95 2.27 1.84
1.36 1.42 1.51 1.61 1.80 1,55
1.40 1.48 1.58 1.70 1.91 1,62
UK and Western Europe
Britannia Airways 1.48 1.58 1.70 1.85 2.13 1.75
British Airways 1.45 1.54 1.65 1.79 2.04 1.70
British Euro Airways 1.86 2.05 2.31 2.65 3.29 2.44
British Midland Airways 2.04 2.30 2.63 3.08 3.96 2.81
Hunting Cargo Airlines 2.32 2.66 3.12 3.76 5.05 3.39
Monarch Airlines 1.17 1.20 1.24 1.29 1.36 1.25
Virgin Atlantic Airways 1.22 1.26 1.31 1.37 1.48 1,33
KLM uk 2.35 2.70 3.17 3.83 5.17 3.45
Austrian Airlines (AUA) 1.90 2.11 2.38 2.75 3.44 2.53
Finnair 1.38 1.46 1.55 1.67 1.87 1.59
Air France 1.48 1.57 1.69 1.85 2.12 1,75
Lul_hansa 1.62 1.76 1.92 2.14 2.54 2,00
Aiitalia 1.51 1.61 1.74 1.91 2.20 1,80
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines 1.43 1.52 1.63 1.76 2.00 1.67
TAP Air Portugal 1.89 2.09 2.36 2.72 3.40 2.50
Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS) 1.87 2.07 2.33 2.67 3.32 2.46
Aviaco 1.71 1.87 2.07 2.32 2.81 2.16
Iberia Airlines 1.54 1.65 1.79 1.97 2.29 1.85
Swissair 1.72 1.88 2.09 2.36 2.86 2.19
AsiaandAustralasia
AirIndia
154 1.65 1.79 1,96 2.28 1.85
indian Airlines 1.63 1.77 1.94 2.17 2.58 2.03
All Nippon Airways (ANA) - 1.59 1.71 1.87 2.07 2.44 1.94
Japan Air Lines (JAL) 139 1.46 1.55 1.67 1.87 1.59
Japan Asia Airways (JAA) 1.97 2.20 2.51 2.91 3.70 2.67
Malaysian Airlines 1.30 1.35 1.42 1.51 1.65 1.45
Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) 1.68 1.82 2,01 2.25 2,70 2.10
Philippine Air Lines (PAL) 1.42 1.50 1.61 1.74 196 1.65
Singapore Aidines 1.28 1.33 1.39 1.47 1.61 1.42
Thai International Airways 1.36 1.43 1.52 1.63 1.82 1.56
Cathay Pacific Airways 1.14 1.16 1.19 1.23 1.28 1.20
Qantas Airways 1.28 1.33 1.40 1.48 1,61 1.42
Central and South America
Mexicana Airlines 1.32 1.38 1.46 1.55 1.71 1.49
VARIG Brazilian Airlines 1.46 1.55 1.66 1.81 2.06 1.71
LACSA Airlines 1.75 1.91 2.13 2.41 2.93 2.23
Africa
Egypt_r 1.40 1.48 1.58 1.70 1.92 1.62
Air Madagascar 1.82 2.00 2.24
Tunis Air 2.56 3.15 2.36
1.81 2.00 2.23 2.55 3.14 2.35
Year Average 1.57 1.69 1.85 2.06 2.44 1.93
ma.m
6. Summary of Results and Complementary Issues
In summary., the results in Sections 4 and 5 show that, given our seven assumptions, the DWLs arising from
the fact that ASKS prevent not only higher producti,i_.-, lower.cost carriers from providing services in particular
city-pair markets, but also prevent these carriers from fully ex'ploiting the economies of traffic density inherent in the
pro'bision of such services (and hence maximising their cost-savings) are not negligible, particularly when combined
nith current restrictions on international factor flows. This suggests that apart from the usual transfers_'sth e gains to
society (from not incurring the DWLs) from relaxing the current restrictions on trade in air transport services imposed
b?- ASKs would be significant, and would be greater the greater the extent to which both they and current restrictionson international factor flows are relaxed.
Obxiously the magnitude of the calculated gains may change somewhat if we use less restrictive assumptions
in our calculations, but the relative sizes of the gains under partial and full liberalisation will not change, with and
nithout full liberalisation of international factor flows. The magnitude of the gains _ill also be determined, however.by five otherfactors.
The first of these is carrier subsidies. Despite the reduction in direct subsidies over the past decade or so.
governments still provide indirect subsidies to carriers in man). countries TM. These pro,_ide carriers with "soft" budget
constraints, enabling them to provide se_ices in markets _sith relatively low TFP and high unit costs. These cost of
these subsidies to the government must obvioush, covered by lax revenue, imposing costs on all tax-payers (not just
consumers of air transport services). The second of these factors is foreign ownership rules. Currently foreign
o_nership in airlines based in a particular count, is restricted to a maximum of 50% of total equity (often foreign
carriers are only allowed to own substantially less _an 50%). in order to ensure that carriers are covered by the terms
of the ASKS which its base countn" is a signaton, to (that is. that thes" are deemed "national carriers"). These rules."Y.C
" the relative magnitudes of the transfers to consumers and producers respectively, as already discussed, gill be
determined by the position and slope of the supply curve and the extent to which consumers of air transport set, icesalso are holders of carrier equity.
":6.
a can be argued, for example, that the US Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Code acts as an indirect subsidy to US carrier_
however,prevent lower-cost foreign carriers from providing services in particular city-pair markets, either by setting
up their own operations, or by taking over and rationalising the operations of carriers already serving these markets
Over the past decade or so. many carriers have engaged in practices such as (less than 50%) equity purchases, minor
equity swaps, block-purchasing and code-sharing agreements, and marketing alliances, which have enabled them to
circumvent foreign ownership,restrictions and (indirectly) provide services in city-pair markets which the)' are
prevented from (directly) serving b.v the terms of the ASAs which the are subject to 7_.
The third of these factors is infrastructure shortages at airports. Currently man)" of the world's major airports
have severe capacip, constraints, due to the rapid increase in the demand for air transport services over the past decade
or so. These constraints not only hinder the ability of carriers currently serving these airports to maximise their
cost-savings (by captunng economies of traffic density), but also present (possibly lower-cost) other carriers from
serving these markets (_hich in turn provides carriers already serving these markets with a certain degree of
protection). The fourth factor is dispute settlement. Civil aviation is not covered by the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS) dispute settlement mechanism, and hence there is currently no multilateral forum for resolving
disputes over trade in axiation services between countries. ASAs have arbitration clauses, but these are non-binding It
is highly likely that disputes will be more frequent (as well as longer-lasting) should further liberalisation take place.
particularly betxveen those groups which stand to benefit from a more liberal market, and those who will incur
substantial losses. Without an impartial body to resolve them. these could lead to vast amounts of carrier resources
wasted on resolving them themselves.
The last factor is international competition policy. Currently there is no multilateral body which monitors
competition, and many des-eloping countries do not e_'en have national competition policies 7s. Most developed
countries have national competition policies _9 which are monitored by government-mandated regulatory authorities;
howe'er, typically these bodies are only legislated with the authority, to control actions undertaken by carriers which
occur in and affect the domestic economy: the)" have no jurisdiction over actions undertaken by either local or foreign
carriers either in overseas markets (even though these actions might affect the domestic economy), or in local markets
which affect foreigners s''. Hence currently not only are a significant proportion of the actions undertaken by carriers in
their provision of air transport services not subject to competition policy rules, but also those services which are
governed by such rules are often subject to different rules, depending on the counta)" in which the,)' are undertaken.
This would again prevent carriers from minimising their costs by restricting their ability to fully exploit economies of
traffic density inherent in the provision of air transport services.
Hence any further moves to_ards liberalisation (either partial or total) would need to be accompanied by total
abolishment of indirect carrier subsidies and foreign ownership restrictions, efforts to relies'e current infrastructure
shortages at major airports, and the establishment of bodies at the global level mandated with the authority to resolve
disputes and monitor competition respectively, to ensure that the full benefits from such moves are realised.
The Section 4 and 5 results also show (given that its coefficient was (individually) statistically significant)
that by including an index of "'residual" TFP as an exogenous variable in our equation, we can determine not only the
approximate contribution of TFP to carrier total variable cost among the carriers in our sample, but also whether or not
these carriers were allocatively efficient over the time period considered (rather than simply assuming that the)" were).
Obviously, however, we are still unable to analyse carrier technical efficiency, given that the estimated TFP indices
will also contain the effects of (given) technological progress.
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A fuzzy approach to Overbooking in Air Transportation
MATTEOIGNACCOLOt - GIUSEPPEINTURRI
1. Introduction
A flight, like most services, is produced by an airline company while supplying and
cannot therefore be stored. If an aircraft takes off" with some empty seats there is a lost
revenue that cannot be recaptured.
The marginal revenue of an extra passenger occupying a seat which otherwise would
have not been sold, is very large, while the additional supported costs are very small. For
this reason it is very important for the airlines to reach a high load factor of the aircraft.
The problem is that even if a flight is sold out, i.e. the aircraft capacity matches
exactly the number of booked seats, it is almost sure that the aircraft will leave the gate with
some empty seats. This happens because some passengers don't appear to claim their seats
the day of the departure and some cancel their reservation too late to allow the company to
sell the seats again.
To reduce these effects most airlines overbook their scheduled flights to a certain
extent in order to compensate for "no-shows". As a consequence, some passengers are
sometimes left behind or "bumped" as a result. By bumping passengers from an oversold
aircraft, an airline can incur costs ranging from nothing, if the excess passengers can be
rebooked with the same airline on a later flight that day, to meals, hotel rooms, vouchers for
free flights, and the cost of transportation on another airline, not considering the potential
loss of customer goodwill.
Overbooking and automated reservation systems are today an important chapter of
the yield management, which has become a basic tool for the survival of the airlines in the
air transport market, increasing today more and more in competitiveness and complexity.. It
has been evaluated that in the period from 1989 to 1992 American Airlines have saved
through yield management about 50% more than its net profit for the same period.
Generally airline accept reservation requests up to a booking limit, if the number of
initial reservations is less than the booking limit, and decline the reservation requests
otherwise.
As the number of no-show is a stochastic variable, it is possible that the passengers
that show up are more than the available seats for the flight, thus producing the opposite
problem of the seat spoilage, i.e. a number of denied boarding. These may be voluntary, if a
passenger with a confirmed reservation accepts some kind of refund to abdicate the flight
(money, hotel accommodation, meals, etc), otherwise is an involuntary denied boarding,
causing damages to the company image and additional costs.
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Airline Overbooking at Aer Lingus
This paper presents a model of airline overbooking at class level. A level control model, based on
revenue maximisation, is compared with the model used by Aer Lingus, Ireland's national airline.
Solution methods are described and conclusions are presented.
Keywords: Air Transport, Yield Management
Introduction
Most airlines operate their passenger services on the basis of advance reservations. The new
electronic methods of booking through the lnternet mean that individuals no longer have to go
through intermediaries to book seats, and so book on a number of flights in order to ensure that they
get to their destination.
With intensified competition, this is causing problems for the airlines. They find that they are flying
with empty seats, which if full would represent almost pure profit. The solution to this problem is to
overbook; that is to allow more bookings than there are seats. This however is fraught with the
possibility that should all these people show up, some will not get on the flight. This in turn may
oblige the airline to pay standard compensation to the passenger who is denied boarding. There is also
the not inconsiderable cost of customer dissatisfaction.
Initial studies of overbooking were hampered by the fact that airlines did not admit that they engaged
in this practice. The first reported models t.2 sought to determine booking levels by minimising the
lost revenue from flying with empty seats plus the cost of denied hoardings. These models were not
widely implemented because they required the probability distributions of passenger demand and no
shows. Estimating demand remains a problem today, but most airlines use large amounts of recorded
data to estimate it to within acceptable levels.
Thompson's 3 model, which was the next major advance in the area, concentrated on the cancellation
process and looked at the probability of there being denied hoardings for any given booking level.
The basic idea was that the number of cancellations, including no shows could be estimated using the
standard binomial distribution. Thompson's work contained two major assumptions about groups and
cancellations which will be discussed later in the development of the model which is the focus of this
paper. Other researchers were to build on Thompson's work. These included Taylor 4, who
incorporated a consideration of group sizes, Dcetman s, who studied the implementation of Tayior's
ideas, and Rothstcin and Stone 6 who implemented a related model for American Airlines in 1967.
Rothstein _ completed his doctoral thesis in 1968, and produced an overbooking model. This model
moved away from Thompson's work and sought to maximise revenue subject to a constraint on the
proportion of denied hoardings, based on the theory of Markovian sequential decision processes. He
used a dynamic programming approach to solve his model for one class of passenger only. For
multiple classes, he treated each class as a separate flight.
Alstrnp et. ai. s.9 published an overbooking model for flights with two types of passenger. This was
described as a generalisation of gothstein's model. The limitations of the dynamic programming
solution approach became apparent when it was estimated that it would take 100 hours to solve the
model for two classes on a 110 seater plane. Through the use of various heuristics, the solution time
was reduced to under a minute.
Most models mentioned so far have been incremental control systems in which a maximum additional
number of reservations can be accepted in a period. However, several airlines use a level control
system in which reservations are accepted until the total number of reservations reaches a specified
level. This approach requires more detailed information than the incremental approach. When
dealing with a large number of classes the information requirements become prohibitive. The best
known level control model was published by Eriksson to in 1992. in which demand and no shows
were modelled as continuous distributions. This model was solved optimally for flights of two classes.
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% dati = input matrix + output (laStcolumn)
% numMf = number di membership functions for the input (i.e. [3 2 4])
% epochs = number of iterations














InputFismat = genf'Bl (TrainData, NumMfs, MfType);
close all;
for i = 1 :Numlnput;
subplot(Numlnput, 1, i);
plotmf(InputFismat, 'input', i);
xlabel(['input' num2str(i) ' (' MfType(i, :) ')']);
end
title('lnitisi fuzzy sets');
OutputFismat = anfis('rrainData, InputFismat, [NumEpochs nan StepSize]);




title('Real system vs. simulated system');
figure;
for i = 1:Numlnput;
subplot(Numlnput, 1, i);
plotmf(OutputFismat, 'input', i);
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• it is a good approximation of the intrinsic complexity of the problem.












Figure I I - Fuzzy Model Surface
As it can be seen in Figure I1, using a set of training data, ANFIS is able to
approximate the booking process, showing a clear growth in the No-Show Level for
increasing values of the Booking Level and of the Cancellation Rate.
8. Conclusions
A fuzzy approach to the overbooking problem in air transportation has been
presented.
The aim is to show that a complex system, such as the booking process, can be
better controlled in terms of fuzzy sets than crisp numbers and mathematical models.
The underlying idea is that the notion of high booking level or low no-show level
may change form day to day, flight to flight, airlines to airlines, season to season, but the
logic is always the same and is contained in the inference rules. Therefore the method can be
easily tuned just shifting the fuzzy sets averages or the intervals of confidence.
It has been shown the capability of the function ANTIS, contained in the Fuzzy
Logic Toolbox of Matlab, as a simple instrument to build an adaptive fuzzy inference
system. When you try to approximate a function with an adaptive fuzzy inference system,
there are several parameters that you can choose to vary, some relevant to the fuzzy system,
such as number and shape of the membership functions, or the method of inference and
defuz, zification, some relevant to the training method, such as the number or the sequence of
the training data. It would be worthwhile to carry out some analysis to find out which is the
best configuration of these parameters to obtain the best approximation.
The model has been built considering only a fare class of passengers, while in reality
it would be better to extend the forecast of total bookings for each fare class.
A problem that should be investigated with more detail is about the consequence of
the limits settled on the number of seats that can be sold. By this way, in fact, the airline
companies can only evaluate the accepted demand, while no observation can be done on
the demand that was turned away.
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Finally Figure 10 shows the surface representing a 3D view of the overbooking






Figure 10 - 3D view
The model has been constructed using the software "Fuzzy Logic Toolbox", which
is an extension of the MATLAB software application.
Using this fuzzy model an optimal booking policy can be adopted, by dynamically
modifying the booking limit for the reservations that can be authorised in each time interval
of the booking process. The authorisation level to be adopted for each picture is the sum of
the cabin capacity and the number of no-show as calculated by the fuzzy model.
7. Neuro-Adaptive Fuzzy Inference Systems
As already said, the fuzzy sets (number, shape, range and overlapping) and the fuzzy
rules are built by the co-operation of an expert and a fuzzy engineer, which traduces the
experience into the fuzzy model. Otherwise it is possible to automate the process using a
procedure based on the neural networks, such as the ANFIS function, contained in the
Fuzzy Logic Toolbox of Matlab. This is a Neuro-Adaptive Fuzzy Inference System
essentially constituted of a fuzzy inference system, whose rules and membership functions
are derived by a back-propagation algorithm based on some collection of input-output data.
By this way the fuzzy system is able to learn from the example data, applying some
optimisation routines to reduce the error between the data and the fuzzy system output.
To carry out this learning procedure a fuzzy inference system has to be specified, or
alternatively, if no supposition can be made on how the initial membership functions should
be, it is possible to use the command genfisl, which will examine the training data set and
then generate a FIS matrix based on the given numbers and types of membership functions.
The membership functions of the input variables are uniformly distributed in the range of the
training data. Of course this procedure requires that a large amount of historical data are
available.
A Neuro Adaptive Fuzzy Inference System has been built using the Alitalia
reservation database for the flight Rome-New York of the 1993. A simple program has been
written in the internal Matlab language to demonstrate that a fuzzy inference system can be
adopted to simulate the booking process of a flight and that two main aspecys can be
pointed out:














Figure 8 - No-Show Level as a function of the Booking Level
For the modelling of the system the following input control variables has been
chosen:
• the booking level (BL) at any time before departure, as the total reservations made up to
that time minus the total cancellations (in percent of the aircraft capacity);
• the cancellation rate (CR) at any time before departure, as the ratio of the number of
people who had cancelled their reservation to those who had booked (C/B for each
picture)..
The number of no-show passenger (NS) in percent of the aircraft capacity is the
solution variable (output).
In Figure 9 the input and output fuzzy activated by the parallel action of each rule
with the corresponding aggregated fuzzy regions are shown, while the final solution is























Figure 9 - Application of the FIS rules
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consequence of discouraging penalty for lower fare classes, or as a consequence of the high
cancellation rates and no-show rates observed for the higher fares.
The slope of the curve is steeper near a restriction expire for lower fares and near
the very last few days for higher fares. The booking limits tend to flatten the curve and the
airline loses information about the shape of the real curve of an unconstrained demand
The fact that, occasionally in the example shown, the average overbooked seats are
coincident with the average no-show level is scarcely meaningful, as it might be the average
result of flights with many denied boardings and flights with many empty seats. The goal for
a effective forecasting policy is to get the "'perfect hit" for each flight.
6. The Fuzzy Inference Overbooking Model
Following the concepts shown in paragraph 4, a Fuzzy Inference Overbooking
Model has been built. The experience coming from the historical data of a flight reservation
process has been incorporated to construct the membership functions as described in
paragraph 4.2.2 and writing the rules as indicated in paragraph 4.2.3. The No-Show Level
as a function of the Cancellation Rate and as a function of the Booking Level are plotted
respectively in Figure 7 and in Figure 8, for a set of historical data of a typical booking
process.
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Figure 7 - No-Show Level as a function of the Cancellation Rate
As shown by these charts, there is a substantial trend to the growth of the No-Show
Level both with the Booking Level and with the Cancellation Rate. The number of no-
show, as percentage of the cabin capacity, seem to be a function of how much the cabin is
engaged and how much passengers tend to reject their reservation. This means that the
evolution of the booking process depends fundamentally on the state of the process,
described by the Booking Level and by the Cancellation Rate, while the dependency from
the time is weak.
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• booking class
• picture number (from 1 to 13)
• event code (E, C, N, G)
• date of departure
• value of the event.




























Table 1 - Pictures of -
the flight
The event recorded for each picture are:
• B =actual booked passengers, i.e. the difference between
reservations and cancellations;
• C = cancelled passengers;
• N = No-Show at departure, booked at the relevant picture;
• G = Go-Show are the total passengers appearing at the
departure (picture 13) without reservation.
The effective number of boarded passengers is the
minimum between the physical compartment capacity and the
term (B+G-N).
In Figure 6 a typical example of average historical
booking flight data are shown.
The Booking Level is the cumulative sum of B relevant
for each picture. The Cancellation Rate is the ratio of the
cumulative sum of the total cancelled seats to the reserved ones.
Booldng Proce_
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Figure 6 - Average of historical booking database
The falling down of the booking curve at the 13 th picture is the effect of passengers
who don't show up at the day of departure
The shape of the booking curve for a specific class on a given flight depends on
several factors. In fact it is important how early before take-off the reservations are made
and besides it is usually found that leisure travellers usually book early, while business men









I   se.oerl
no _!!iii,,!!i!ii_ii_- =."
Figure 5 - The Booking Process
The result of the economic interaction between potential customers and the airline is
a certain number of reservations and cancellations in each class on each flight.
Without any specific mathematical effort, a Fuzzy Inference System is able to
incorporate all these factors, affecting the problem, as they are perceived by an expert
(marketing specialist).
The booking process is divided into N time intervals of unequal length, i.e. the
duration of each interval decreases as the departure date approaches.
Most airlines keep a record of some data describing the evolution of this process. A
large number of such intervals is computationally impractical, while a small number allows
no adjustment for differences between forecast and actual bookings as the booking history
for each flight develops. Usually airlines hold an historical flight database where the booking
process is photographed by 13 pictures. In details these reservation data contain:
• company
• flight number
• origin and destination
• clay of the week
• type of aircraft
• compartment (i.e. top,'business, economy) 0/1_
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Figure 4 - Application of an inference rule
4.2.4 Agg/'_at/on o£ _e Rules
The application of each rule determines.an adjusted fuzzy set of the consequent part.
The final conclusion is then derived summing the fuzzy sets of the conclusion of each rule,
by a process called "determining M/_X _' (maximum) deriving from the application of the
inference rules
4.2.5 Defuzzi_cation
This step selects the expected crisp value of the solution (output) from the fuzzy
region resulting from theaggregation of the fuzzy sets each activated by all the rules applied
in parallel. -
There are several methods of defuzzification, but the most widely used is the method
of the centroid, where the abscissa of the centre of gravity of the output fuzzy set region
represents the "balance" point of the solution.
5. The Airline Booking Process
The booking process, from an airline company point of view, is rather complex.
From a microeconomic point of view it is an economic interaction between the consumer
(the potential air traveller) who tries to maximise his utility function under some given
factors (travel dates, price, service and restrictions) and the airline trying to maximise its
profit.
In the weeks before the departure many reservations are made for each type of fare.
As the time of departure approaches some cancellations are added to the new reservations.
Moreover at the day of departure there are additional complications due to travellers who
show up without a reservation (go-show), travellers who fail to show-up (no-show) and
travellers who are inserted in a waiting list. Furthermore there are many external factors
which affect the booking process, such as different fare levels for each class, flight
frequency, season or type of aircraft.
When the spaces corresponding to a certain fare class are filled, the request of travel
is denied, but the airline (or the reservation agent) can try to recapture the traveller on a
different class or on a different flight in the requested fare class. Nevertheless the actual
number of boarded people depends also on the level of authorisation which has been
adopted during the booking process.
A typical flow chart of a booking process is shown in Figure 5.
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4,2.2 Choose the system variables
One of the most difficult, parts to achieve a good formulation of the problem is to
identify the data which influence the operation of the system and those which represent the
output value of the model.
In this paper an overbooking fuzzy model has been constructed by selecting as
control variables (input):
• the booking level (BL) at a given time, ie. the difference between the total number of
people who had booked a seat from the opening of the reservation period and the one
who had cancelled it (in percent of the aircraft capacity);
• the rate of cancellation (CR) at a given time, ie. the ratio between the number of people
who had cancelled their reservation and those who had booked.
The number of no-show passenger (NS) in percent of the aircraft capacity is
assumed as the solution variable (output).
A scheme of the proposed model is shown in Figure 3.








Figure 3 - Fuzzy Inference System
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4.2.2 Define the Fuzzy Sets
The shape of the fuzzy set is quite important, but most models don't show a very
wide sensitiveness to it. Triangular, trapezoid or bell curves are often used. Neural networks
models have been used to find natural membership functions in the data and thus
automatically creating fuzzy surfaces.
It is convenient to use a wide and elastic domain rather than a restrictive one.
To obtain a smooth and continuous control of the output variable a suitable degree
of overlap of each fuzzy set should be assured.
4.2.3 Write the Inference Rules
The rules are written in the form described at paragraph 3.2. The rules that activate
the same solution fuzzy set are grouped together. The application of a rule of inference that
gets the shape of the consequent (output fuzzy set) as a result of the implication of the
antecedent is reported in Figure 4 The implication form used is a minimum function, called





There are different defuzziflcation functions, some computing the centroid of the
output sets, some averaging the maximum points of the output sets. However, each of them
inevitably results a compromise between the need to find a single point outcome and the
loss of information that such process produces, by reducing to a single dimension the output
region solution.
4. Fuzzy Inference System
4.1 Introduction
Why should the fuzzy logic be applied to perform an optimal booking policy for a
flight?
If we ask to a revenue management analyst how he settles the level of booking
authorisation to be adopted in the days before the aircrat_ take-off, he probably would say
that if he finds .a low booking level reached in that moment, he takes the decision to
authorise a level of reservations which is more than the aircrat_'s capacity to compensate the
expected no-show passenger. If we ask him what does he mean for low booking level, he
could say that this depends on many factors, such as the type of flight, the season, the ratio
between bfisiness passenger and leisure ones, but anyway, less than 50% of the aircraft
capacity ten days before departure might be seen as a low booking level. The question is if
he will use a different overbooking policy with a booking level of 51%. Actually he thinks
that 50% is a limit for unequivocally saying that an over-sale of seats must be done, but to
lower level, also for higher booking level an overbooking of seats must be accepted.
In other words we see how this kind of problem requires that the variables
controlling the system must shiti from a mathematical and deterministic formalism to a
linguistic representation based on fuzzy sets.
Actually fuzzy systems suit very well in modelling non-linear systems. The nature of
fuzzy rules and the relationship between fuzzy sets of different shapes provides a powerful
capability for the description of a system whose complexity makes traditional expert system,
mathematical, and statistical approach very difficult.
The problem is now to manage the experience of the expert and to transform it in a
set of inference fuzzy rules expressing the dynamics of the system we want to model•
4.2 Building a Fuzzy Inference System
There are five main steps that must to be carried out to build a Fuzzy Inference
System (FIS):
• to choose the system variables (control variables for the input and solution variable for
the output);
• to define the fuzzy sets (number, shape and confidence intervals of the membership
functions);
to write the relationships between the input and the output (inference rules);
to defuzzify to get the value of the solution;
to run a simulation of the model.
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The meaning of the statement is that,
x is a member of (the fuzzy set) Y to the degree that w is a member of(the fuzzy set) Z
The final solution fuzzy space is created by the collection of correlated fuzzy
propositions, called rules of inference, each contributing with its degree of truth.
The main methods of inference used in fuzzy systems are the mm-max method and
the.]ih.',-'y additive method.
3.2.1 The min-max rules of implication
By this method the contribution of the antecedent part to the consequent fuzzy
region is restricted to the minimum, i.e. to the smaller value of the grades of inputs, while
the final output region is obtained as a maximum, i.e. by summing the fuzzy sets region
corresponding to each rule.
3.2.2 The fuzzy additive rules of implication
The fuzzy additive compositional operation is a slightly different approach as the
output fuzzy region is bounded by [ 1,0], so that the result of any addition cannot exceed the
maximum truth value of a fuzzy set.
Both methods reduce the level of truth of the output fuzzy region activated by the
relevant rule of inference
3.2.3 Methods of decomposition and defuzzificatJon
Using the general rules of inference, the evaluation of a proposition produces one
fuzzy set associated with each model solution variable. To find the actual scalar value
representing the solution the method of defuzzification is used. It is the final step of the
fuzzy reasoning. As shown in Figure 2, this is obtained through an aggregation process that














function maps to what degree of confidence each value belongs to the fuzzy set. It is
important to outline that the "degree of confidence" we are talking about has not to be
interpreted as a probabilify but as a degree of truth, i.e. a measure of compatibility of the
value of a variable with an approximate set, and not the occurring frequency of that value.
Formally, ifX is a set of elements indicated as x, a fuzzy set _ ofXis a set of paired
values as shown below:
: x X]
/Jj(x) is called membership function and it associates a degree of confidence p to each
value ofx in ._. For instance the curve of Figure 1 - Fuzzy set of the booking level as
% of the aircraft capacity
can be seen as the degree of membership of each value of the booked seats of an
aircraft to the set "High booking level". In this example, 50% and 150% are the limits of the
so called interval of confidence.
Using the Fuzzy Set Theory it is possible to approximate the behaviour of complex
and non linear systems, which otherwise would require a high level of computational
resources. At the same time it is possible to have a model of the system very close to the
human way of reasoning and to the way experts themselves think about the decision
process, while many traditional expert and decision support systems lose fast
comprehension as the complexity of the system increases because they persist in applying
dichotomised rules with artificial and crisp boundaries.
We are talking of approximate (or possibilistic) reasoning, that is the way the
experts think. So trying to perform an optimal booking policy during the period elapsing
from the opening of the reservations of a flight till the departure day, a revenue management
analyst would give us suggestions such as: "if the booking level is low, and the rate of
cancellation is high, then the number of no-show passenger will be quite high". Actually, the
expert of the problem shows a knowledge of the system through concepts without a well
defined pattern, based on his sensations, experience and intuitions, more than on precise
data. Now the fact is that fuzzy systems are able to directly manage these kind of imprecise
recommendations, reducing the distance that lies between the idea expressed by an expert
and the one coded in a conventional model.
Another basic difference between a conventional expert system and a fuzzy system is
that the former has a series of statements which are executed serially and is carded out with
algorithms that reduce the number of rules examined, while the second has a parallel
processing and activates all the rules at same time.
3.2 Fuzzy Rules
The fuzzy rules are the building blocks of a fuzzy system. A fuzzy rule is a
conditional proposition that settles a link between the fuzzy sets. Each rule is appraised for
its degree of truth and shares to the final output set.
The proposition has the general form,
if w is Z then x is Y
where wand xare scalar values and Zand Yare linguistic variables, i.e. fuzzy sets.
In this example wis the "process state", while x is the "control action".
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However the most part of the proposed models are focused to the determination of
the expected number of no-shows in terms of probability distributions.
The aim of this paper is to propose a method, which minimises the spoiled seats and
the denied boarding at the same time for every single flight. This can be achieved by
monitoring the booking process during the days before the departure and using an Inference
Fuzzy System as an easy decision support system to assist the revenue management
analysts. This allows to undestrand any unusual event or action taken by competitors for
each flight from the opening of the reservations to the take-off.
3. The Fuzzy Logic
As Lotfi Zadeh said, "when the complexity of a system increases, our ability to make
precise and yet significant statements about its behaviour diminishes until a threshold is
reached beyond which precision and significance become almost mutually exclusive
characteristics". The basic idea underlying the Fuzzy Logic is that when we try to describe a
system by a traditional model we use mathematical variables, which represent the state of
the system as existing or not existing. If we represent the state of the system in terms of
.I_:-"Y sets, and not in terms of discrete symbols and numbers, we can obtain a representation
of the system more close to human reasoning and the transition from a system state to the
next is more gradual.
3.1 Fuzzy Sets and Membership Functions
According to Fuzzy Logic, when a system is characterised by an incomplete







Figure 1 - Fuzzy set of the booking level as % of the aircraft capacity
The Fuzzy Set is a function indicating to what degree (between 0 and 1) the value of
a variable belongs to the set. A degree of zero means that he value is not in the set, while a
degree of one means that the value is completely representative of the set. A membership
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The problem we want to face in this paper is what kind of booldng policy should an
airline adopt in the days before the departure in order to reduce the double risk of empty
seats and denied boarding: In other words the company should establish what is the optimal
authorisatio, level at any given time before tlae take-off, i.e., the optimum number of
reservation to be accepted.
Selling more seats than the aircraft's capacity might be seen as an incorrect
behaviour, but the airlines sustain that without the balancing factor of an overbooking
policy, the load factors of the flight would be lower than the actual one, thus producing an
inevitable increase in the average fares.
At the present, the overbooking level limits to be accepted during the reservation
process to meet the airline objectives are the outcome of mathematical models based on
historical data about the behaviour of the seat bookings and cancellations, otherwise they
are fixed by a revenue management analyst, i.e. a specialist who takes the most suitable
decision based on his own sense and experience.
Whatever is the method adopted, we believe that for a given flight the limits of the
authorisation level cannot be evaluated through static considerations owing to the tightly
dynamic nature of the booking process, which requires a continuos check and change of
these limits; in order to suit the unpredictable passenger behaviour, which becomes more
and more changeable as the day of the take-off approaches.
2. Review of the existing models
Several models laad been proposed in these last four decades based on different
approaches to match the objectives of the airline companies.
The cost minimisation model (Beckmann, 1958; Kosten 1960) finds the optimal
authorisation level as the one which determines the minimum expected total cost of
overbooking, calculated as sum of the cost due to denied boarding (that increase with the
number of accepted booking) and the spoilage due to empty seats (that is reduced instead).
Thompson (1961) proposed a model to limit the probability of denied boarding
calculated as the area of a standard normal distribution of the number of show-up
passengers exceeding the aircraft capacity.
A similar approach was used by Taylor (1962), which takes into account the ratio of
denied boarding over the number of booked passengers as a constraint not to be overcome,
while R.othstein (1967) maximises the expected revenue of the flight under the limit of an
acceptable pre-set risk of denied boarding.
The model made by Gerbracht (1979) for the Continental Airlines selects the
optimum level of booking to maximise the expected net revenue as a result of the revenue
obtained from the passengers actually carried, and also the penalty arising from the number
of passengers with denied boarding. Since the number of no-shows varies randomly for each
flight, if the probability distribution of no-shows is given, the statistical expected riet
revenue can be maximised. As it is much more expensive to have a denied boarding than to
spoil an empty seat, the optimum booking levels are always shifted toward low overbooking
values with regard of the average no-shows.
The most advanced researches try to arrange a compromise between the aim of
maximising the net revenues with the need of assuring a more competitive level of service,
avoiding the denied boarding as much as possible.
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[n this paper, a new level control model will be presented and solved using multidimensional search
routines. In the first section the model will be given. Then the solution methods will be outlined and
results will be presented. Finally, the concluding remarks and further research directions will be
discussed.
The Overbooking Model
Much of the research in the overbooking area concentrates on a dynamic programming approach.
The number of transition probabilities and recursion equations grows very large in the multi-class
case and the computation time is adversely affected. A level-control approach rather than an
incremental approach became the feasible option. The drawback of this model is that it requires more
information. This information was sourced from Aer Lingus. Irelands national airline, which was the
basis for the study.
In developing a model for expected revenue the main requirement is to estimate the level of No
Shows. A No Show is defined as a person who has made a booking but has not turned up for the
flight, while a Go Show is a person without a booking who has turned up looking for a seat on a flight
(e.g. a person with an open ticket). Making a number of assumptions about the random distributions
of how customers book and show up, we can calculate expected Show Up levels mathematically at
class level. As Denied Boardings and Boarded Go Shows occur only at cabin level, the contributions
from these are calculated at that level and so class level information is not captured. However, as the
main contribution is from the Show Ups and No Shows the level of error introduced should he small.
Assumptions of the Model
1. The probability of a booking resulting in a No Show is independent of whether that booking is part
of a group.
This assumption is validated by the work of Thompson 3 and by O'Connor i J. O'Connor
makes the following observation, 'group bookings in many cases will come not from
actual groups, but from a collection of individuals booked by an agent'. This means that
group identification is in itself a major issue.
2. The probability of any booking resulting in a No Show at flight time is independent of when that
booking was made.
The justification for this assumption is based on the work carried out on cancellations by
Martinez and Sanchez 12at American Airlines. Their conclusions were based on an
examination of a large amount of historical data.
3. The different classes all book over the same period.
This is a simplification. The model could be extended so that classes book in order as
this represents how some classes book in reality.
4. The number of passenger seeking tickets is assumed to be a normally distributed random variable.
It is reasonable to assume that the receipt of requests for tickets over any given period will
follow a Poisson distribution. In such a case it is reasonable to approximate the number
of requests for tickets by a Normal distribution.
5. The number of No Shows from any given booking level is binomially distributed.
The probability ofx No Shows, out of b bookings, is assumed to be binomial. That is,
where p is the probability that any given booking will result in a No Show i.e. the No
Show Rate. In most cases the No Show rate is estimated from historical data, and is
assumed to be normally distributed. Alstrup et al 9 argue that these assumptions are
reasonable.
6. The flight has one service compartment, with up to five classes of passenger who pay different
fares and have different booking patterns.
In order to simplify the problem and reduce computation time, the limitation to five
classes was chosen. This can be extended in the model.
7. The No Show rate does not vary with time and is independent of the number of bookings in thatclass.
The No Show rate for those passengers who book in the last few days of the booking
period is assumed to be equal to the No Show rate for those who hook at the start of the
booking period. This is termed the forgetfulness property and was first found by
Thompson 3.-
8. The number of Go Shows in any class is independent of the number of Show Ups in any class.
This assumption is based on the independence of Go Shows and booking demand. It can be
argued that the two are dependent, but in general it appears that the assumption of
independence is reasonable.
Notation
N = Number of classes
c = Capacity of Plane
ms = Mean Show Up
ss = Std. Dev. Show Up
mg= Mean Go Show
sg = Std. Dev. Go Show
au = Authorisation
f = Fare
s = Number of Show Ups
es = Number of Empty Seats
b = Bookings
md= Mean Demand
sd = Std. Dev. Demand
db= Number Denied Boarding
dbcost = Denied Boarding Cost
nm= Mean No Show Rate
sn = Std. Dev. No Show Rate
cab = Cabin
bgs = Number of Boarded Go Shows
warfare = Average Fare weighted by Show Ups
brdfare = Average Fare weighted by Go Shows
Subscripts are used to indicate the level to which these apply. The convention used is that the
subscript i refers to data at class level.
The Probability of a booking, P(b), is normally distributed with mean md and standard deviation sd.
The Probability of a Go Show, Q(g), is normally distributed with mean mg and standard deviation sg.
The Probability of a Show Up, R(s), is normally distributed with mean ms and standard deviation ss.
The following are also used. If the number of Show Ups and the number of Go Shows in any class is
independent of the number in any other class then,
mSc. b = ___ msi SSc,_ =
iffil
| iffil
mgc_ = _ mgi sgc_, =
i=l
au,,_ = _ au i
i=l
Development of the Revenue Function
The main revenue is generated from the number of expected Show Ups in each class and multiplied
by the fare in that class. The resulting figure has to be modified to take account of the denied
boardings and the boarded Go Shows.
If there are expected denied boardings then two adjustments have to be made to the expected revenue.
First of all, those passengers who were denied boarding were included in the first term of the function,
thus requiring that this amount must be subtracted from the expected revenue and also they are
entitled to compensation because they were denied boarding.
Because denied boarding occurs at cabin level, and passengers pay different amounts for seats in
different classes, the calculation of the amount to be subtracted cannot be calculated exactly without a
simulation. Because of this, it was decided that an average fare wavfare weighted by the Show Ups in
each class would be used. The same problem arose with the Go Shows in that these occur at cabin
level and not at class level. An average fare brdfare was used to counteract this problem.
The expected revenue function can now be written as,
N
re"-v= 2(ms, x f,)-_×(dbcost + wavfare) )+ b_xbrdfare)
i=I
Mathematical Development
In order to calculate Show Ups, booking levels for each of the classes must be known. In any class,
Let Xi = Number of tickets for which there is demand in class i
aui = Number of tickets available for sale in class i
bi = Number of tickets booked in class i
From this it follows that,
{ Xa_0 ifO < Xi < au'
b i = , ifX, > au,
otherwise




It is important to note that in many of these cases where the values cannot be less than 0, a truncated
gaussian normal distribution is used in the calculation. By truncated it is meant that the area under
the curve between 0 and ** is equal to 1.
Having now calculated the expected bookings in class i, E(b.,), an expression was developed for Show
Ups. Let,
Si = Number of Show Ups in class i
Ti = No Show Rate in class i
Using Assumption 7, that the No Show rate does not vary with time and is independent of the number
of bookings in that class, we can say that, given Ti constant over the time of the booking period,
S,-b,O.o-r,)
e(s,)--E(b,XI.o-
and given bi and Ti are independent,
E/s,)-E(b,X .o-
which is equal to,
ms,-E(b,XLo-, s,)
Denied Boardings
The number of Denied Boardings will depend on the number of Show Ups per class. Integration over
all possible cases is required in order to calculate the expected Denied Boardings. If there are a large
number of Show Ups in a particular class, then any Denied Boarding has a greater probability of
being from that class than from one with a low number of Show Ups. To give an indication of the
complexity involved, Eriksson _0assumes for simplification purposes that all classes have the same
No Show distribution and using this completely integrates across classes for an estimate of expected
Denied Boardings. To calculate this he has to work with an expression containing 2_ terms, each of
which is a nesting of integrals across the N classes. This leads to excessive computation in the multi-
class case. To overcome this, the assumption of independence between the number of Show Ups in
any class and the allowance for the difference in the average fare used by the Show Ups were used.
This achieves essentially the same purpose as Eriksson but with simpler calculations. Therefore,
Denied Boardings are calculated at cabin level.
We are interested in the total number of Show Ups in the cabin, sc.h. If c is the capacity and
sc_ <-au_"b , then,





The main interest is not the number of Go Shows but rather the number of those that get seats, that is
the Boarded Go Shows. There is no penalty cost for refusing a passenger. The calculation of Boarded
Go Shows is more complex in that it depends on the number of Show Ups and the number of Go
Shows. As with Denied Boardings, Go Shows are dealt with at cabin level. Fare becomes an issue
again, as we do not know from which class the Go Shows will come. Therefore an average fare is
calculated based on the number of Show Ups per class.
The calculation is as follows:
Integrating over the range of possible show up values, an expected number of Boarded Go Shows for
each Show Up value is calculated. Let,
G = Number of Boarded Go Shows
g ---Number of GOShows
then,
where,
G= If(g) if c-s¢,, >0
0 otherwise
g ifO<g<_c-s¢_
f(g) = -s,_ if g >c-s,, b
0 otherwise
In the case off(g) and dealing with both _ossibilities of the function, the expected number of Boarded
Go Shows for a given number of Show U _scan be calculated as follows
E(g)= gQ,,_(g)dg+(c-s¢_) iQ¢_(g)dg
0 c -sn,b
This must be integrated over all possible Show Ups to calculate the expected Boarded Go Shows for
the flight.
= gQ,,,b (g)dg + (c- s¢,, ) Qc,_ (g)dg R¢_ (s)ds
Expected Revenue Function
Having carried out these preliminaries, the complete expected revenue function can now be written.
,=tLko "", -
-L!
,..+ gQc_,(g)dg+(c-sc,_) Qc_(g)dg R,_,(s)ds xbrdfare
LOk o "-',,_
Limitations of the Model
The aim in the development of the model was to capture information at class level as far as possible.
However, this has not been fully realised. The assumption relating to the No Show rate being
constant over the time period of the booking process can be questioned. This could be varied to take
account of the time when the passenger booked. The main problem would be access to data.
The estimation of Denied Boardings and Boarded Go Shows cannot completely capture information at
class level. This has been mitigated by using weighted average fares. The final limitation is the form
of the model. It is a 'box' model i.e. each class is given a booking authorisation and even if that
booking level is not met those bookings are not offered to other classes. The alternative would be a
form of nesting. This would entail some form of nesting hierarchy in which one class, or several
classes, would have a higher priority than others. Such a model would take a different form.
Solution Methods
Having developed the revenue function, a number of solution techniques were available. Derivatives
could be sought and solved, either by developing a solution procedure iteratively, or by using a
package. Erikkson at Scandinavian Airlines to with a similar function has used this approach.
However the calculation of derivatives in this case is quite complicated. A simpler approach was
sought.
Direct search methods were investigated. Two methods in particular were looked at which did not
require derivatives. There were the Downhill Simplex Method of Nelder and Mead 13and the Pattern
Search Method of Hooke and Jeeves 13. Although these are designed as minimum seeking procedures,
they can be easily used to find maxima.
Starting Heuristic
A number of different techniques were used in order to find a starting point for the search routines.
The initial supposition was that there were a lot of local maxima however this was not borne out.
Further analysis indicated that there were large fiat areas which were causing problems for the search
methods. In order to find the maximum of the function a starting heuristic was developed to give
reasonable starting points.
The heuristic involves setting an initial overbooking level for each class as follows,
i) Calculate a cabin level default overbooking rate
ii) Use this to deterministically overbook the cabin
iii) Allocate those bookings amongst the classes.




where I.ti is mean demand in class i and nsri is the mean No Show rate in class i. Using this method, a
class with large demand but a low No Show rate will not dominate and neither will a class with low
demand but a large No Show rate.
To deterministically overbook the cabin, the capacity is multiplied by the default overbooking rate
found in step 1.
Level = Capacity × DefOBRt
The next question was how to allocate this level across classes. An examination of the literature
showed that an allocation procedure based on Expected Marginal Seat Revenue was available 14. The
Fare Mix Algorithm allocates seats based on the Expected Marginal Seat Revenue (EMSR) to be
gained from allocating a seat to one i:lass rather than another. This algorithm is based on the
principle that since EMSRi(s) is the additional revenue that is expected to accrue when the sa seat is
allocated to fare class i then
EMSR, ( s) = f, × P(r i > s)
where fi is the fare in class i. This means that the expected marginal seat revenue of the sa' seat in the
i t_ fare class is the price of that seat multiplied by the probability of there being more than s requests
for seats in that fare class. The algorithm iteratively goes through the plane capacity and at each stage
allocates the seat to the class which shows the greatest expected marginal seat revenue.
This algorithm was used, setting the capacity to the value of level rather than capacity. This
procedure would ensure that the level was allocated across classes in a way that reflected the demand
and fare information available.
The above three steps give a starting point from which to begin searching. Computationally it is
quick, and the levels it produces have proved on investigation to be quite close to the optimum levels.
The Aer Ia'ngus Model
At the time of this analysis, Aer Lingus were using the following heuristic model for overbooking.
Their approach was based on a single cabin single class overbooking strategy. It was a three step
process which can be described as follows.
i) Staring with a booking level at plane capacity, c, expected Show Ups, expected Empty Seats and
expected Denied Boardings were calculated in the same way outlined above.
ii) From these values, the total cost of flying with this booking level was calculated. The resulting
cost comprised of the opportunity cost of flying with an empty seat and the denied boarding cost.
iii) The booking level was incremented and steps one and two were repeated until the difference
between the new and the old cost was less than a specified tolerance.
An important difference between this model and the model developed in this paper is that the Aer
Lingus model is cost based. Their aim was to minimise costs dependent upon the empty seat cost and
the denied boarding cost.
Analysis of Results
Testing was carried out in two main phases: first to ensure that the solution strategies were in fact
optimising the functions, and second to see if the results achieved were reasonable.
In order to test for optimisation, a number of examples were completely enumerated. One conclusion
from complete enumeration was that this was not a feasible option due to the number of calculations
involvedandtheconsequent time delay. From the results of complete enumeration, it was found that
the search routines were not always finding the optimum.
This led to the development of the starting heuristic which was outlined in the previous section.
However, even with good starting values it was found that although the Nelder and Mead iJ method
was always in the vicinity of the optimum, it did not always reach that optimum. This led to the use
of the Hooke Jeeves Pattern Search t3. Initially, the Hooke Jeeves method was used in conjunction
with the Nelder and Mead method, however this increased computation time and did not bring about
much of an improvement. This led to further exploration in the area and from complete enumeration
it was found that there were large flat spaces and this is what had caused the methods to terminate in
the vicinity of the optimum rather than at the optimum.
A simulation model was built to test the authodsations that would come from the model. In order to
test the expected revenue model, the model used by Aer Lingus was used. This provided a useful
benchmark to test against. The data for testing was sourced from Aer Lingus.
Strategy
Exp. Rev. Model N & M Search
Exp. Rev. Model H & J Search
Starting Heuristic




Aer Lingus 78/58 116 14811.00
Table 1. Deterministic Testing in the Two Class Case, Capacity 120
The next series of tests carded out were deterministic Table 1. These are tests where there is no
standard deviations for the demand and no shows. It was found that of the models, the Aer Lingus
model was the most conservative. It is interesting to note that the starting heuristic gives results that
are close to the optimum.
Strategy
Exp. Rev. Model N & M Search
Exp. Rev. Model H & J Search
Starting Heuristic




Aer Lingus 1401581113/75/126 512 56,900.81
Table 2. Non-Deterministic Testing in the Five Class Case, Capacity 420
The results from the non-deterministic testing bore out these results, Table 2. It was interesting
however to note that this starting heuristic gave the same authorisations as the Aer Lingus model in
this case. Further testing in the five class case and using other data bore out this observation. In
general the results show that the expected revenue function solved with either of the search routines
improves on the Aer Lingus model.
Conclusion
The expected revenue approach based on the model developed outperformed the Aer Lingus model in
all test cases. The Aer Lingus model was found to be quite conservative in its authorisations. The
expected revenue model requires less data than the Aer Lingus model due to it being a revenue
maximisation approach rather than a cost minimisation approach.
The solution procedures employed do not guarantee optimality, an area which future research will
address. The model uses cabin level data for the Boarded Go Shows and the Denied Boardings.
Further research will look at the feasibility of capturing and using this information at class level. The
model, as mentioned earlier, is a 'box' model. Future research will concentrate on overbooking while
'nesting" the authorisations.
In conclusion the expected revenue model is currently in use by Aer Lingus for overbooking. The
expected revenue model achieves increases of revenue of the order of two to three per cent on average
over the Aer Lingus model
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Abstract
This paper examines the limitations of needs-based positioning strategy, premised on
low cost, for airline companies seeking to establish themselves as long-term market
competitors. In conducting such an analysis, we look at the emergence of low fare
airlines in Europe and critique the most successful of these, the Irish operator,
Ryanair. A critique of strategies for sustainable advantage leads into an analysis of
low price strategy. This is followed by a discussion of the challenges posed to
companies such as Ryanair attempting to sustain low costs and price leadership. We
argue that low operating costs and cheap prices achieved through operational
efficiency are not sufficient in and of themselves to establish sustainable competitive
advantage. Companies also need a clear and focused positioning strategy and unique
corporate capabilities and experiences. Lessons from the US indicate that for low fare
airlines, a needs-based strategic positioning approach may be most appropriate for
establishing sustainable competitive advantage (Porter 1996). Ryanair has
successfully adopted this strategy and adapted it to a more rigid and less open
European market. Strict adherence to the strategy pioneered by Southwest Airlines in
the US is the key to Ryanair's success. An _-la-carte approach, enabling consumer
choice over service levels, adopted by many other low fare airlines, serves to dilute
the advantage accrued from strategic positioning. Deviation from the strategy -
through alliances, over-expansion, or increased operating costs - could result in
Ryanair and other such carriers damaging their position and losing competitive
advantage.
Introduction
In choosing a competitive strategy, a key consideration for company strategists is how
to configure the value equation so as to best meet customer needs and demands. For
many companies this means striving to achieve the lowest possible prices for their
products or services. Low prices cannot be sustained unless a company maximises its
operational efficiency. This largely means that the company has to perform similar
activities better than rivals. One way of doing so is to pursue a rigorous and relentless
policy of cost cutting. Many low price companies believe that there is always room
for improvement when it comes to achieving low operating costs. Some of the most
vigorous competitive rivalry occurs in the low price segment of the market.
Begirming in North America and spreading more recently to western Europe, the
airline passenger market has witnessed a growing intensity in price-based
competition. In this paper we look at the long term viability of needs-based
positioning strategy, premised on low cost, drawing lessons from the Irish airline,
Ryanair, and its attempt to be the leading low fare airline in Europe.
All airlines seek to lower costs and maximise economies of scale. Economies of scale
require significant investments in planes and support facilities. This means high fixed
costs and consequently, capacity utilisation is critical (Hinthorne 1996:255). Cutting
prices is one tried and trusted way of filling seats and maximising capacity. Ryanair is
one of the most cost efficient scheduled airline carder operating in Europe. Its success
rests on a combination of low costs and low fares, together with a high frequency
service and extensive (UK-Ireland) route network to rival larger, more established
carders. Its maverick status - non-membership of assorted airline associations, non-
participation in alliances - arguably leaves the company open to attack from larger
competitors. However, given the firm's gradually expanding route network, its high
passenger-per-mile yield t and cost ratio, and its increasing revenue, Ryanair may be
viewed as a model for both small and large European regional carriers.
A number of questions flow from these issues. Is a simple low cost, price undercutting
strategy the most viable long term strategy option for a company such as Ryanair?
Studies 2 show that many passengers perceive a lack of emphasis on quality and
service by theairline. Consequently,arecheaperfaresenoughto sustain competitive
advantage? In light of their expansion into mainland Europe and longer haul flights,
how will Ryanair balance low fares with increased customer demands for better
o
quality service on longer haul flights? We discuss the limits of a cost-based corporate
strategy. Can the low fare model survive and flourish in Europe? In particular, we
consider whether this strategy is sustainable if an airline 'Europeanises' and expands
beyond its traditional short-haul, geographically limited base.
Strategies for sustainable competitive advantage
Hamel and Prahalad view strategy as comprising both incremental improvements and
rapid advances on the part of a company (1993:84). Put another way, they view
strategy as comprising both operational effectiveness and risk-taking innovation.
Contrary to popular belief in contemporary management, operational effectiveness
does not necessarily translate into sustainable profitability.
The three key strands of value creation may be identified as revenue enhancement,
cost reduction, and reduction of asset intensity. McK.insey management consultants
(1995) argue that for airlines, enhanced revenues will flow from better management of
key capabilities such as pricing, capacity, networks, and schedules. Moreover, better
cost management means that in addition to making general productivity
improvements, the airline will address the issues of crew costs and of further
outsourcing. Finally, asset utilisation is improved when airlines adopt a system-wide
perspective on their fleets, i.e. reducing the variety of aircraft and splitting off non-
core service functions such as maintenance and ramp services. Overall, McKinsey
places considerable emphasis on operational efficiency and focusing on core
competencies 3. Porter argues that strategy consists of neither operational improvement
nor focusing on a few core competencies (Financial Times, July 19, 1997). Real
sustainable advantage comes rather from the way in which the activities of a company
fit together. He bases this argument on the premise that core competencies can be
duplicated and that resting a company's success on a few core competencies can lead
to destructive competition. Successful companies, according to Porter, fit together the
things they do in a way which is very hard to replicate. Strategic fit is reinforced by
successful market positioning and the willingness of a company to make hard choices
in terms of its cost structure and customer focus. Porter identifies three sources of
strategic market positions: variety-based, needs-based, and access-based positioning
(1996:66-7). Needs-based positioning targeting the needs of price sensitive
customers comes closest to conceptualising Ryanair's source of strategic
positioning'. A focused competitor such as Ikea or Ryanair thrives on groups of
customers who are overpriced by more broadly targeted competitors. Successful
competitive strategy hinges upon a company's own actions, the reaction of
competitors, and the ability to anticipate and rapidly counteract the strategic response
of those competitors. Strategic positioning is usually described in terms of customers.
US low fare pioneer, Southwest Airlines, serves price and convenience sensitive
travellers for example. But the essence of strategy is in the activities - choosing to
perform activities differently or to perform different activities than rivals. For
instance, Porter provides evidence that Southwest tailors all its activities to deliver
low-cost, convenient service on its particular type of route (1996:64). Southwest has
staked out a unique and valuable strategic position based on a tailored set of activities.
On the routes served by Southwest, a full service airline could never be as convenient
or as low cost (Porter 1996:64). Collins and Porras argue that genuinely successful
companies understand the difference between what should never change and what
should be open for change, between what is truly untouchable and what is not
(1996:66). Southwest are an example of such a company - regularly innovating and
constantly differentiating themselves from the competition but resisting the urge to
tamper with the fundamental features of their strategy formula. The Southwest model
is not easily transferable. Continental and United Airlines both attempted to copy the
Southwest model for their low-cost US subsidiaries. They were able to duplicate the
route structure and other observable and quantifiable elements but they failed to
emulate the Southwest culture - or organisational capabilities - the key to its success
(Couvert, 1996:61).
The core competencies approach does not work well in the airline industry because
airlines have broadly the same competencies (Couvret 1996:61). Their staff,
equipment, distribution systems and so forth tend towards a standard mean for most
airline companies. Couvert argues that there are three key questions in any evaluation
of an airline's strategy for sustainable competitive advantage: 'Where are you now?
How did you get there? and Where are you going?' (1996:60). He argues that virtually
everyone is competing by doing very similar things in very similar ways. Building on
the work of Collis and Montgomery (1995), Couvret contends that the solution is to
adopt a resource-based view of the company, recognising that an airline's routes are
its main asset. He further argues that organisational capabilities are an important
source of competitive advantage for airlines. Ultimately, the primary physical source
of advantage in a successful airline is the combination of its route structure and its
history/culture, that is the way it developed or its organisational capabilities (Couvert
1996:63). Following on from this, he argues that:
the single most important strategic factor for an airline is a clear sense of regional focus:
knowing where its home base is, and understanding how its network spreads from
there...it is critically important for an airline to identify, maintain, and develop the deep
market knowledge embedded within its route network, in order to maximise the value of
its assets (Couvert 1996:63).
Furthermore, regional focus should not be seen as a limiting factor - a region can have
various definitions. A region for Ryanair could justifiably constitute western Europe
and not just the British Isles. Several regional airlines on both sides of the Atlantic are
amongst the most profitable in the industry. Ryanair is a clear example of this fact.
Companies are reaching the limits of incremental improvement. Many need to
reinvent themselves instead (Hamel 1996:69). Hamel argues that if you take any
industry, you will find three kinds of companies: first, rule makers - incumbents that
built the industry, e.g. American Airlines (or British Airways); second, rule takers -
companies that pay homage to the industrial 'lords', e.g. US Air (or British Midland);
and third, rule breakers - the industry revolutionaries, intent on overturning the
industrial order, e.g. Southwest Airlines (or Ryanair). Hamel contends that strategy is
revolution and everything else is just tactics (1996:70). This concurs with Porter's
distinction between strategy as unique positions and hard choices, and everything else
being merely operational efficiency. Nine routes to industry revolution may be
identified (Hamel 1996:72). Ryanair has taken the route termed reconceiving a
product or service, through radically improving the value equation:
in every industry, there is a ratio that relates price to performance: X units of cash buys Y
units of value. The challenge is to improve that value ratio and to do so radically.., such a
fundamental redefinition of the value equation forces a reconception of the product or
service (Hamel 1996:72).
This is essentially what Ryanair have done on, for example, the Dublin-London mute,
becoming so-called 'value revolutionaries' (Hamel 1996) in the process. This
correlates with Kim and Mauborgne's concept of 'value innovators', wherein a
company refuses to take its industry's conditions and norms as given, preferring
instead to pursue market innovation through making quantum leaps in value
(1997:105). Ryanair has relentlessly pursued this strategy, targeting the mass air travel
market and offering unrivalled value for money. It has served as value innovator on
both secondary routes, dominated by charter carders, and primary routes, controlled
by large established airlines. Prices dropped, the markets grew, and Ryanair
experienced high growth and sustained profitability.
The long term viability of low price strategy: the case of Ryanair
Across a wide range of industries, throughout the global economy, traditional market
leaders are under attack from low price competitors. These low price frrms are
steadily eroding the profit margins and market share of their more established rivals.
This, often cut-throat, competition is particularly evident in the airline industry. In the
US industry, established carders have twice had to face the market onslaught of low
fare carders. They successfully beat many of them off in the early 1980s, through
skilful use of their yield management systems, allowing them to sell spare capacity at
equally low fares (Barkin et al. 1995:87). People Express was the most prominent
victim of this strategy. The traditional carders encountered a renewed challenge a
decade later and have not been as successful in eradicating it. Many of the newer low
fare operators,suchas RenoAir and Markair, have learnedthe lesson of People
Express and are careful not to i_e goaded into rapid over-expansion.
At roughly the same time as the 'second battle' in the US, against the backdrop of
European air transport liberalisation, a plethora of low fare carriers emerged in
Europe. Learning from their American contemporaries, these firms pursued low cost
strategies with direct, short haul services and limited route networks. This approach
was deemed necessary if such firms were to achieve sustainable competitive
advantage. Chief among Europe's low fare airlines is Ryanair. It is an interesting
study given that it predates all other such operators and European airline liberalisation
measures. Ryanair has established itself as the leading independent European low fare
airline, consistently expanding its route network and increasing its profit margins.
Ryanair describes itself as a low fare airline. It believes that it is out on its own and is
a company that break barriers. Its core ideology is encapsulated in its mission
statement:
Ryanair will become Europe's most profitable, lowest cost scheduled airline by providing
its low fares/no frills service in all markets in which it operates to the benefit of our
passengers, people and shareholders (Corporate mission statement 1997).
If we deconstruct this corporate vision along the lines offered by Collins and Porras
(1996), we can identify Ryanair's core values and core purpose. These providethe
overall framework within which the company's strategy is formulated. Ryanair's core
values - its constant and enduring guiding principles - are low price, value for money,
and efficient service. These values should not alter, regardless of market or
environmental changes (Collins and Porras 1996:67). The company's core purpose, by
distinction, is its very reason for being. For Ryanair, this is to provide cheap, safe, and
reliable air travel for all.
With the advent of European airline liberalisation, many more low cost carders have
entered the market. Companies like Virgin Express and Easyjet also pursue a low fare,
no frills service. They, like Ryanair, look for airports with lower charges and shorter
turnaround times, with little concern for interline connections. However, as the UK
Civil Aviation Authority point out, the underlying approach of these companies seems
generallymore like that of ValuJetin the US thanof Southwest.Most notably,they
place less emphasisthan Soufhwestor Ryanair on providing a high frequencyof
operationin all of the marketsthey serve(CAA 1995:57).Most of the other new
entrantlow cost airiinessuchasJerseyEuropeanAirways, Spanair,EuroBelgian,and
Air Southwest,alsooffer a limitedserviceandoperateonasmall numberof routes.
Ryanair'scompetitive advantagederivesin largepart from the way its activities fit
andreinforceoneanother.Fit locksout imitatorsby creatinga chainthat is asstrong
as its strongestlink. Like SouthwestAirlines, Ryanair's activities complementone
another in ways that createreal economicvalue. One activity's cost is lowered
becauseof the way other activitiesareperformed.Similarly, one activity's value to
customers can be enhanced by a company's other activities. That is the way strategic
fit creates competitive advantage and superior profitability. The fit among activities
substantially reduces cost or increases differentiation (Porter 1996:73).
Southwest's sense of regional focus (on the south western United States) and its
development of its route network from that base, is also key to its competitive
advantage (Couvret, 1996:63). Similarly, Ryanair's regional focus is the British Isles
and although it has begun to branch out from there to other parts of Europe, its focus
on the home base remains clear and committed. A danger may be if Ryanair expands
too far, too quickly, losing sight of its regional base and entering into an industry
position where it may be in danger of being sandwiched between the large, global
carders and the more focused regional carriers. Southwest has developed well beyond
its original focus of the south western United States. There is therefore no reason why
Ryanair cannot do the same, provided its new routes are built on the solid base of
home territory.
Porter (1985) described three ways in which a firm can achieve sustainable
competitive advantage: cost leadership strategy, differentiation strategy, and focus
strategy. Cost is generated by performing activities and cost advantage arises from
performing particular activities more efficiently than competitors (Porter 1996:62).
Furthermore, a low cost leader must, as Lynch argues, shave costs off of every
element of the value chain (1997:487). As part of its generic strategy, Ryanair has
chosen a cost leadership strategy where a firm sets out to become:
the low-cost producer in its industry...a low-cost producer must find and exploit all
sources of"cost advantage (Porter i 985:14-5).
Lynch contends that a firm which succeeds in achieving the lowest costs has a clear
sustainable competitive advantage (1997:487). Such a low cost strategy can have
different manifestations. These are described as (i) the 'cheap and cheerful' strategy,
dependent on low cost and low value-added; (ii) reduced price strategy but with an
emphasis on quality; (iii) competitive prices with a better quality and more reliable
product or service than rivals (Johnson and Scholes 1997:253-4). Porter argues that
low cost firms usually sell a standard or no frills product or service and that such a
firm will generally be an above-average performer in its industry, provided it can
command prices on or about the industry average (1985:15). Ryanair pursues a
strategy in line with option one, cheap and cheerful, with low operating costs and low
profit margins. Ryanair believes that it is operating on more than mere operational
efficiency, arguing that cost reduction is more like a religion within the company 5.
Every day, management thinks about how to reduce cost. An example is that Ryanair
was the ftrst airline in countries in which it operates to reduce travel agent
commission from 9 to 7.5 per cent. They did this in the midst of their stock market
flotation - a time when most companies would not be doing anything which might
jeopardise their flotation.
Kay argues that in the European airline industry, costs are dominated by three main
factors - labour, fuel, and capital costs (1993:294). He further contends that:
Substantial differences in costs per unit of output can result from differences in the rate of
fleet utilization (the proportion of potential flying time for which a plane is actually in the
air) and in the load factors achieved in passenger carriage, since a flight costs much the
same to operate whether there are empty seats on it or not (Kay 1993:294).
As figure 1 illustrates, Ryanair directly targets both labour and capital outlay for
continuous cost reduction. Moreover, in striving to maximise aircraft utilisation, the
company indirectly targets fuel expenditure for cost reduction.
Figure1
Where Ryanair cuts costs
1. Secondary airports (lower charges and less congestion means airline can increase
punctuality rates and gate turnaround times).
2. Standardised fleet (lower training costs and cheaper pans and equipment supplies).
3. Point-to-point services (direct, non-stop routes; through-service with no waiting on
baggage transfers).
4. Maximise aircraft utilisation.
5. Cheaper product design (no assigned seating; no free food or drink).
6. No frequent flyer programme.
7. Non-participation in alliances (code sharing and baggage transfer services lowers
punctuality and aircraft utilisation rates and raises handling costs).
g. Minimise aircraft capital outlay (purchase used aircraft of a single type).
9. Minimise personnel costs (increase staff-passenger ratio; employee compensation
linked to productivity-based pay incentives).
10. Customer service costs (outsource capital intensive activities, e.g. passenger and
aircraft handling; increase direct sales through telephone reservation system).
1 I. Lower travel agent fees (reduce associated travel agent commission (9 to 7.5%).
Taken together, these cost cutting principles form a very strong base for the success of
a low cost corporate strategy. Emphasising factors such as fleet utilisation and aiming
overall to maximise passenger load factors rather than yield ratios 6, Ryanair can
reduce its costs per unit of output, along the lines previously advanced by Kay (1993).
It is often feasible to pursue a strategy of low price to achieve competitive advantage
in an area such as air transport, where low price is important and a business has cost
advantage over competitors operating in that segment (Johnson and Stoles 1997:254-
5). This is generally the case with Ryanair. However, as Barkin et at. indicate, 'a
successful concept alone does not turn a low-cost competitor into a major threat'
(1995:91). The critical issue is whether the low-cost airline can sustain its competitive
advantage over time and gradually expand its operations. There are problems linked to
the notion of sustainable cost leadership. Porter does not mean short term cost
advantage or just low cost. Sustainable cost leadership means having the lowest cost
compared with competitors over time. This is unlikely to be achieved simply by
pruning costs - competitors can and will do that too. The question then is, how
competitive advantage can be achieved - if at all - through cost leadership. Market
share advantage might be one possible answer. This provides a company with cost
advantages through factors such as economies of scale and experience curve effects.
There are different perspectives on what degree of advantage a company requires in
order to sustain advantage over a long period of time. Buzzell and Gale argue that a
firm with a high absolute market share may not have a high relative share because
there may be a competitor who also has a comparable share 0987). This is the case
with Ryanair, which possesses roughly the same absolute market share as the state-
owned airline, Aer Lingus, on its main Ireland-UK routes. Buzzell and Gale (1987)
contend that 40 to 70 per cent of the relative market share is necessary in order to
achieve sustainable market power advantage. On routes such as Dublin-London,
Ryanair controls less than 40 per cent of the total share of passenger traffic - a little
less than that controlled by its nearest rival, Aer Lingus. On the basis of this
argument, we must call into question the feasibility of Ryanair's long term strategy of
maintaining competitive advantage on a purely cost based strategy alone. In
developing strategy, it is in any case dangerous to assume a direct link between
relative market share advantage and sustainable advantage in the market because there
is little evidence of sustainability: dominant firms do lose market share and others
overtake them. We need only think of the fall from market grace of companies like
IBM to substantiate this argument. Market share itself is not what is important but
rather the advantage that it can bestow. Relative share advantage can give cost
advantages but this requires a proactive and innovative management. Without this,
advantage will be lost to competitors:
In itself, low cost does not yield competitive advantage; it is how managers employ a low
cost base that matters (Johnson and Scholes 1997:255).
An alternativesolution may be in product cost advantage: the product cost advantage
enjoyed by low-cost airlines such as Ryanair is more sustainable because traditional
carriers have set certain service and quality standards which they would find difficult
to abandon (Barkin et al. 1995:92). The established customer base of many large
airlines may not wish to do without in-flight meals, baggage transfer facilities,
business class seating, and so forth. Process cost advantages may also be sustainable
as established carriers otten cannot emulate the high utilisation practices of their low-
cost competitors. The example of Continental Lite 7 illustrates this weakness among
larger airlines.
An important aside at this point concerns Porter's tendency to use the terms 'cost
leadership' and 'low price' as though they are interchangeable. This is not the case:
cost is an input measure to a firm, whereas price is an output measure. As Johnson and
Scholes point out, because a company is pursuing a cost leadership or cost reduction
strategy, it does not necessarily mean that it will choose to price lower than
competition. For instance, it may choose to invest higher margins in research or in
marketing (1997:255). This is the case with highly cost efficient companies such as
General Electric or Unilever. It is partly the case with several low cost airlines
(notably Easyjet and Ryanair). Witness for instance the in-house central reservation
system which both Easyjet and Ryanair have developed or the high profile advertising
campaign which they maintain in the UK.
All airlines - regardless of size - want to minimise costs. Identifying potential cost
savings is the easy part of the analysis; designing the best way to implement cost
reductions is the difficult part and varies from company to company. The important
point to remember is that the main risks of pursuing a low cost/low price strategy are
price war and low margins. It is vital to be the cost leader and not just one of many
(Johnson and Scholes 1997:251).
There is one further problem with the notion of cost leadership - indeed with cost
based strategies in general. In itself, low cost does not provide competitive advantage.
Competitive advantage can only be achieved in terms of a product or service which is
seen by the user to have an advantage over the competition. Competitive advantage is
therefore achieved through an organisation's output - its cost base being relevant only
in so far as it may provide a means of achieving or improving that output. Porter
(1985)added that it may be more useful to think of 'cost based' strategies, the benefits
of which (such as increased margins or low prices) can be used to achieve competitive
advantage.
In 1995 the UK Civil Aviation Authority identified 34 international routes within
Europe (excluding the UK) where potential existed for a new carder. Eight of these
involved Scandinavian airports and a further nine involved Pads and Brussels.
Ryanair appear to have taken these suggestions into account when choosing new
routes during 1996/7. Moreover, Ryanair have deliberately targeted airports where no
scheduled services previously existed. Airports such as Pads Beauvais, Brussels
Charleroi, and Stockholm Skavska are all up to one hour outside of their respective
cities. Despite this, within three months, Ryanair gained a 20 per cent share of the
London-Stockholm market, a 40 per cent share of the Dublin-Pads market, and almost
a 50 per cent share of the Dublin-Brussels market s. This is further evidence that price -
not location, convenience, service, and so on - is a significant factor in determining a
regional airline's competitive advantage.
Competitive challenges to low cost sustainability
Ryanair claim to have increased the levels of air traffic between Ireland and the UK
considerably. This is a new and relatively unexplored phenomenon in the European
airline industry. British Midland Airways has produced the results of an analysis on
passenger figures in which it contends that:
By examining individual routes, it can be shown that the arrival of new carriers
has a dynamic effect on the number of passengers travelling on a particular
route... By competing with incumbent carriers and with each other to offer better
deals to the customer, whether on price or on service, new entrants serve to
increase the size of the whole market, rather than merely stealing existing traffic
(1997:15).
This is precisely what Ryanair has achieved. The airline encouraged passenger growth
on its routes, by competing on price and not on service. Such a strategy can invoke
problems, both internal and external in nature. First, if another cartier enters the
market, competing on price or on another form of differentiation, this may adversely
affect Ryanair's market share and profitability. An imminent challenge here is British
Airway's fledgling low cost carder, Go, which operates from London Stansted
Airport and competes directly with Ryanair on its Stockholm and Oslo routes for
instance.
A second (internal) problem or challenge concerns market volatility. Ryanair has
consistently increased its profit margins since the early 1990s. However, what
happens to them when an economic downturn is evident, as leisure travel is usually
one of the first areas to be hit 9. In this situation, bear in mind that Ryanair have few if
any allies to support it whereas many other carders are part of strategic alliances or
code-sharing agreements which can act as a support if certain parts of the market
experience declining traffic volumes. Similarly, travel agent co-operation can enhance
the support needed by airlines during times of economic difficulty, by running various
promotions and so forth. Ryanair cannot count on this support mechanism either,
given its generally strained relationship with travel agents as a result of its drive to
reduce commission rates.
Third, Ryanair could face the problem of pricing itself out of the market. For instance,
travel agents are already rejecting the company as a client because Ryanair has cut
their commission rates, and passengers have begun to notice and criticise the length of
time spent on the telephone when booking flights through Ryanair's direct
reservations service _°.
Fourth, all but one of Ryanair's existing fleet will have to be revamped to meet EU
noise laws by 2002, at an estimated cost of $1.4 million per plane. Moreover, with an
average age of 15.8 years, the entire flotilla will have to be replaced come 2005-
2008 _. In addition, the EU-wide phasing out of duty free is likely to hit Ryanair hard:
on-board shopping currently accounts for 5 per cent of total operating revenue and
one-third of flight attendants' wages (Blomberg 1997).
Fifth, the carrier's service record is weak. Although statistically Ryanair appears to
fare quite well in terms of customer satisfaction _', passenger surveys '3 indicate that the
company sometimes experiences significant flaws in customer services. Outsourcing
of ground level customer services activities partly accounts for this problem. In most
airports, Ryanair has no dedicated customer service personnel, which can mean that
passengershave no direct point of contact with the airline if and when problems
occur. This differs from Southwest, which prides itself on having a very good,
awarding winning customer service, with a well-trained and attentive ground crew.
A final problem emanates from labour unrest at the company, as witnessed by the
baggage handlers dispute of early 1998. Although the dispute in question involved
only three per cent of Ryanair employees, a significant portion of flights were either
disrupted or cancelled and public confidence in the company was undermined. Such
unrest arises from the fact that Ryanair refuses to recognise trade unions, preferring to
negotiate directly with workers on issues of pay and conditions. The baggage handlers
dispute arose because Ryanair.baggage handlers at Dublin Airport insisted that a trade
union represent them in their bid to improve wages '4 and working conditions (The
Examiner, p.8, 14 th January 1998). The resultant limited industrial action served to
damage Ryanair's populist corporate image and weaken its strategic fit and position.
The stance of Ryanair management was further undermined when Southwest Airline's
workers (who are unionised) voiced their support for the striking Ryanair ground crew
(The Examiner, 16 'h January 1998). Once again, Ryanair can learn valuable lessons
from their US role model. Ryanair must emulate the Southwest Airlines policy of
maintaining well-paid gate and ground crews, whose productivity in turnarounds is
enhanced by flexible union rules. This flexibility (on working conditions) has been
worked out jointly between the airline's management and trade unions. Ryanair's
rapid gate turnaround, which allows frequent departures and greater use of aircraft, is
essential to its high-convenience, low-cost positioning. It is crucial to the success of
Ryanair's strategic fit and overall corporate strategy. The company's relationship with
its employees is central to such a strategy. Kay argues that the relationship a firm
establishes with its employees constitutes part of its distinct network of relational
contracts - so called 'internal architecture' (1993:66). This architecture (internal and
external) is on of the three primary sources of distinctive capability which a firm
possesses, and which help differentiate it from its competitors and establish
sustainable competitive advantage. Disputes such as that which occurred in 1998
between Ryanair management and baggage handlers could and should be avoided
through a more generous wage compensation scheme on the part of Ryanair and
greater flexibility on the part of Irish trade unions with regards to worker conditions _5.
Such problemsserve to damageRyanair's internal architecture and weaken the
company's distinctive capabilities. This in turn challenges the competitive advantage
attained by Ryanair and could undermine its low cost strategy if adequate strategic
responses are not found.
Whilst some commentators are sceptical that further expansion into Europe is the
correct move for Ryanair, others believe that with the right routes, Ryanair will
succeed (Guild 1995:73). It is commonly agreed that the airline has proven itself in
the Irish-UK market and must now seek new growth markets if it is to survive and
prosper in the long term and truly be the Southwest of Europe. There are however
some real dangers for low-cost.carriers attempting to expand into longer haul markets.
As Barkin et al. point out, the cost advantages accrued on short-haul, high traffic
markets - low input costs and cheaper product and process designs - will weaken for
longer haul markets (1995:93). In particular, the advantage gained through product or
process design will lessen: passengers are likely to demand better in-flight service,
more leg room, and so forth, when they are on a longer flight and the benefit accrued
through fast turnaround is not as important. Moreover, introducing practices such as
baggage transfers, frequent flyer programmes, and so on, merely leads low-cost
operators into seeking landing slots at more expensive airports and other forms of
head-to-head competition with established carders, on their home turf, as it were.
Overall, advantage through utilisation for instance, would be more difficult.
Forecasts and conclusions
The experience and market success of Ryanair is of relevance to other small and
medium sized airlines attempting to consolidate and expand their market shares. A
study of Ryanair's cost leadership, needs-based positioning strategy consequently has
wider implications for the European airline industry, and indeed for other industries
which are being revolutionised by low cost entrants.
To answer the questions advanced at the paper's outset, we can say that first, a low
cost/low price strategy alone is insufficient to ensure the long term market success of
a company. Any advantage accrued by these means is usually short-term as cost
reductions and low prices can easily be emulated by competitors - particularly large,
established market leaders. Moreover, as our Ryanair example indicates, market
volatility, price wars, dubious service standards, and weak internal architecture, can
all have a disproportionately negative influence on the competitive advantage of
stand-alone companies with low profitmargins and limited resources. Second, low
price can increase a firm's customer base but, unless the firm maintains the lowest
prices in the industry, it will not guarantee customer loyalty. Even with the lowest
prices, a firm can lose market share if it fails to respond to changing customer needs
and demands. This may occur in the European low fare airlines market as companies
such as Ryanair expand the economic scale and geographical scope of their services.
Deepening a position involves making the company's activities more distinctive,
strengthening fit, and communicating the strategy better to those customers who value
it. Companies need to resist the temptation to target new customers or markets in
which the company has little special to offer. The moral of the strategy story is, be
distinctive at what you do best rather than simply tackling potentially higher growth
areas, where you take on more competitors, and your uniqueness declines. This is
where low cost companies need to thread cautiously. The urge to expand rapidly and
develop new markets is difficult to resist. However, in pursuing a rapid growth policy,
companies such as low fare airlines risk losing all they have struggled so valiantly to
achieve. Ryanair has consolidated its base and taken time to deepen its strategic
position. Its route expansion is carefully planned, to ensure that the company can offer
something - low price, value for money - which competitors do not emphasise. It is
this adherence to a needs-based positioning strategy, combined with a unique route
network and a dominant cost reduction corporate ethos (resulting in the maximisation
of operational efficiency), which places a low cost company such as Ryanair in a
favourable long term competitive position within the European airline market.
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Endnotes
An airline's passenger-per-mile yield is calculated by dividing the cost per passengerper mile by therevenue per passenger per mile.
Ryanair passenger surveys conducted at London StanstedAirport, August 1997.
3 The concept of 'core competencies' derives from the work of Hamel and Prahalad (1990; 1994). The
authors define core competencies as 'the collective learning in the organization, especially how to
coordinate diverse production skills and integrate multiple streams of technologies' (1990, p.82).
4 It should be noted that Ryanair's expansion swategyhas also been predicated (in part) on a¢cess-
based positioning. Ryanair is the first airline to offer regular scheduled services between Dublin and
Boumemouth or Dublin and Teeside for example. As such, Ryanair has targeted customer segements
previously denied convenient and low price accessto air transport.
5 Interview with Ryanair management, Dublin, September ! 997.
6 • g . °
Ryanalr s objectwe is to fill as many seats as possible on every flight, rather than to achieve the
maximum revenue per passenger on every flight. Its profit is therefore determined by high capacity and
low profit margins, rather than low or standard capacity and higher profit margins, as with manyconventional airlines.
7Continental Lite was established in the 1980s as the low cost subsidiary of Continental Airlines. Its
market failure is generally accredited to its inability to emulate the product and process advantages of
successful existing low cost competitors such asSouthwest Airlines. For further details see Porter
(1996), 'What is strategy?'.
s These figures were obtained from Ryanair's marketing department.
9 Ryanair is no longer as dependent on the leisure travel market as it once was. They have introduced
the practice of not requiring a Saturday night stop-over for a lower fare - a two night stop-over will
suffice. This can be advantageous for the business traveller. A large number of business people are
now beginning to use Ryanair, particularly out of the UK. There are a lot of small companies whose
owners or managers are very close to the numbers and they want the cheapest flight possible when they
are travelling to a meeting. These 'kindred spirits' use Ryanair so as to keep their costs down. Some
large corporations - especially those which are American owned - increasingly push their employees to
fly with the best price operator and not the bestservice.
_oThis argument was sustained in passenger surveys conducted at London Stansted Airport, August!997.
J_This process has begun, with Ryanair's placement in early 1998 of the largest ever aircrat_ order by
an Irish airline (45 Boeing 737-$00's valued at over $2 billion).
J2During the first half of 1996 for instance, Ryanair experienced only 2.62 per cent of complaints per
one thousand passengers. This compares with 3.97 for Southwest and a US average of 5.36.
_3Passenger surveys conducted at London StanstedAirport, August 1997.
t4 Figures show that Ryanair ground crew take home I£ !3,000 per annum, compared with 1£16,000 in
other airline operators (The E,raminer, p.8, 14'_January 1998).
t5 Ryanair salary levels did increase during the 1997/8 period, with the average staffsalary increasing
from IR£20,146 to IR£22,261. Also, the airline became the first Irish publicly quote company to
establish a company-wide share option scheme.
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Assessing Two Means of Promoting Interlining:
IATA versus Alliances
Introduction
Interlining occurs any time the passenger uses the services of at least two airlines when he flies
from his origin to his destination. Three types of interlining can be distinguished according to
the travel. "Roundtrip Interlining" corresponds to the cases when the passengers flies with
airline X from A to B and with airline Y from B to A, whereas, "Connection Interlining"
occurs when X carries the passenger from A to B and Y from B to C. These first two types are
also named "Programmed Interlining" since the passenger decides to fly with different airlines
when he buys his ticket. The last type of interlining is named "Flexibility Interlining": once the
passenger bought his ticket for a travel on a given airline, he has the possibility either to switch
airline or to change his routing within the maximum allowed deviation.
As illustrated above, interlining can be considered as a joint-product: an interlining flight is
made of several elementary goods of the air transport, i.e. several sectors flown by different
airlines. These combined sector flights can be either complementary or substitute elementary
goods.
This paper focuses on the arrangements set up by the airlines to promote these kinds of joint
products and proposes a comparison between them. Very briefly, there are two distinct means
for the airlines to offer interlining. IATA is the multilateral mode and it rests on a tariff
coordination, whereas the bilateral mean to promote interlining, i.e. the commercial agreements
between the airlines, generally don't require any price coordination. The competition policy
background is the following: a block exemption has been granted to the IATA tariffs
conferences provided that they help the promotion of interlining. In this paper, we try to
analyse to what extend could this tariff co-ordination be a necessary device to set up
interlining.
Two different co-operative arrangements are firstly presented: the multilateral system, IATA,
and the bilateral one, the commercial agreements. The presentation focuses on the devices that
are used by the airlines to make their networks compatible in any of these arrangements.
Secondly, the two different interlining, the "universal" one, produced by IATA, and the "club"
interlining, produced by the commercial agreements, are being compared from what could be
the consumer viewpoint: the quality of the travel is examined as well as its final price. Thirdly
and lastly, the issue of anticompetitive effects of these co-operative agreements is being
addressed..
1. How is interlining set-up?
Once they have decided to make their networks compatible, the airlines arrange a co-
ordination scheme, covering technical features as well as the airline's revenue requirements.
The technical features are mainly aimed at monitoring the cooperative relation. Airlines agree
on the issuance of a single transportation document, on the baggage handling procedures and
claims, but also on some financial points, like the date of reimbursement, the currency of
transaction etc.
An airline will commit itself into an interlining relation only if it knows in advance the amount
of the revenue it would receive for the transportation of the "intedining '" passenger. This
condition directly comes from our empirical investigations: airlines put forward that they
cannot accept passenger at any price, nor can they engage a cooperation if they don't know
how much money they would yield out of it! Thus, airlines agree on the amount of the
individual revenue they would perceive out of this joint-production. Our comparative analysis
of the two ways of promoting interlining, IATA and the commercial agreements between
airlines, will be centred on this issue, namely the revenue requirement of the airlines.
IATA : promoting" universal "interlining
IATA provides the airlines with a double device complying with their revenue requirement: the
IATA fare, resulting from the IATA tariffs conferences, and corresponding to the final price of
the interlining ticket and the prorate rules, aimed at dividing the total intedining revenue
according to the number of miles flown on each sector. If the airlines agreed only on the
reimbursement rules, the ticket issuing airline would be free to sell the interlining travel at any
price, and therefore, would determine the revenue that the carrying airline would receive. This
solution is not satisfactory for the airlines as they wish to be ensured in advance of the revenue
they would get.
LATA tariffs conferences: main points
IATA tariffs conferences are devided into distinct geographic areas. The one dealing _ith the intra-EU
traffic is named PTC-2 Within Europe u. Only 25 airlines are concerned _,ith the block exemption granted to
these conferences: all the EU and the AEA "'nation flag carriers" are members, as well as 9 "regional airlines"
(Crossair. Lauda Air. Ponugalia. Air UK, Air Littoral, British Midlands. GB Airways. Maersk
Meridiana) 2.
The output of these tariffs conferences are the IATA fares. If an)" member airline agrees upon a IATA fare,
afterwards, it cannot refuse the right to any other member airline to issue tickets on its own services, provided
that the tickets is issued at a IATA fare.
An), decision must be adopted unanimously. The decision procedure _ithin the IATA tariffs conferences is the
following The tariffs proposals come out of the bilateral negotiations, named Country by Country, or CBC:
each carriers involved in the traffic between the pair of countries must unanimously approve these submissions.
These submissions must then be approved by every airline during the full sessions. Indeed, each airline has a
veto right: it can oppose a tariff proposal during any CBCs or can vote against the final package gathering all
the proposals.
Currently, the most promotional fares are being deleted from the IATA fare structure. The
airlines which ori_nated this trend have rather big networks, either of their own or thanks to
their commercial agreements. Furthermore, they perfectly manage the "new" yield management
and pricing techniques. These airlines prefer to see the following fares discussed within the
IATA tariffs conferences: the Normal fares, targeted on the businessman, and the Pex, the least
restrictive of the promotional fares tageted on the tourist. The reason of this move towards
deletion is that either their "online" revenue or their "bilateral interlining" revenue would be
higher than the "multilateral interlining" shared revenue they could expect for the cheapest
fares.
We assume that IATA produces a "universal" interlining as the agreed fares are available for
every single airline member of IATA Indeed, the rationale behind the IATA system is the
following: once an airline agreed a IATA fare, it is then obliged to grant any other IATA
airline with the right to sell seats on its own services, as long as the seat is sold at the agreed
IATA fare.
52 airlines are member of these tariffs conferences. PTC2 includes the European traffic, included the
European part of the former USSR. Iceland. Acores. and Northern Africa (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia).
: The latter are characterised by a netxvork strate_" _ith a regional hub. Virgin Express is the only low cost
airline which is a member of _ese tariffs conferences, but it neve attends any of them. The no-frills airline's
startegy is rather to enter a highly profitable route and to cut prices: they are not vet)' much interested ininterlininz
The commercial agreements:promoting" club" interlining
The airlines that own i) a wide international and domestic network, ii) many flight frequencies,
iii) a hub strategy that diminishes the connecting times for the multisector flights are capable of
keeping the passenger on their own services from most of the origins to most of the
destinations. For the markets they don't directly fly, these airlines will try to set some
agreements with the concerned regional airlines, which will, in return, have an access to
networks with a wider scope.
The commercial agreements are aimed at putting in common the networks of different airlines
in order to offer a joint product to the passenger, i.e. a travel combining sectors flown by
different airlines but with the benefits of a single airline flight. With the code-sharing
agreements or the joint Frequent Flyer Programs, the passenger "feels" that he will be flown
through by a single airline. Moreover, allied airlines ot_en seek a better schedule co-ordination,
an advantageous gates location at the connecting airport, etc. If the airlines cooperate
successfully, the quality of the service can be as good as for an online flight. Nevertheless, we
will still name it "interlining" since two different carriers are involved in the transportation and
since each exchanged passenger implies a financial transaction.
In these commercial agreements, several devices exist and guarantee the generated unit
revenue to the airlines. Most of the mechanisms used don't require any tariff co-ordination: the
pricing freedom of each partner is not constrained by the agreement. For instance, regarding
the SPA (Special Prorate Agreements), the carrying airline requires a fixed revenue, or a
percentage of one of its own fares and the ticket issuing airline can sell the travel at whatever
price, as long as it pays the carrying airline its required revenue.
We will refer to the interlining set up by the commercial agreements as "club" interlining since
the agreement is restricted to its members.
IATA fare setting and the airlines fare setting: two different approaches
The liberalisation of the European sky led to new competition dimensions for the airlines: the
capability of setting the "right" price and the final distribution.
The capability of setting the "right price" refers to the faculty of discriminating between the
different types of passengers: the final prices must be as close as possible to the willingness to
pay of each passenger in order to maximise the global revenue of the flight 3. This requires to
3 According to their price sensitivity,, different final prices will be proposed to the passengers. On the one hand,
the promotional tariffs must be attractive enough for the tourist, and on the other hand, the normal fares must
CX'I'r,'Icr _'he intpor_lifa r_f" th,= I._,,e;_t,,,- .... "_ ,,..;11: ............
master the pricing and yield management techniques which in turn, require important
technological investment, as well as human s
The final distribution power of an airline lies within its capability to inform the passenger on its
services and prices. In this context, choosing a tariffs distributing channel, or more generally
speaking, a Computerised Reservation System, becomes meaningful. As consequential is the
geographic scope of the final distribution 5 as well as the relations with the travel agencies.
Do all the European airlines master these pricing and distribution techniques. The trend is that
every airlines adopt these techniques. Nevertheless, there are still some discrepancies between
them, reflecting their competitive advantages. All the airlines underline i) the required human
investment and ii) the importance of the relations with the travel agencies, insisting on the
possible anti-competitive effect of the "commission overriding". The regional airlines we met
confirm that they do use the yield management, but in its simplest version. On the other hand,
the Northern Europe "nation flag carriers" master highly sophisticated versions. The Southern
Europe "nation Bag carriers" seem to be the least equipped.
Currently, in Europe, there are two ways of determining the final prices of the airline's tickets
and each way corresponds to a specific air travel product. The role of the IATA tariffs
conferences should be limited to setting up the price of some specific products, the "universal"
interlining travels. On the other hand, the final prices of the products restricted to the services
of a specific airline, referred to as "carrier fares" are determined in a price competition context,
and thanks to the pricing techniques of each airline. The following table sums up the
characteristics of the IATA fares and the carriers coded fares.
4 Sabre is the main proxider for the yield management and pricing techniques. When it sells its system to one
airline, a Sabre top executive spends a couple of years in the airline to set up the whole pricing system. After
"'having tought Air France the pricing basics" -sic the Europe pricing manager- this guy is now doing the.same job in Alitalia since November 97.
' The hubbing developpment leads to an increase in the demand location area. beyond the national frontiers of
the carrier. For instance. British Airways tries to attract passengers from all over Europe to Heathrow to cart),
them on its long haul destinations. But information on the proposed flights and their prices must be available tot potential trnveller_
IATA fare
Interlining travels only
Co-operation contex't: device used to set up the
"'universal" interlining
The IATA structure contains the Normal Fare and the
Pex
Agreed for 6 months at most. Changing unilaterally the
agreement seems to be useless since the other member
airlines can immediately cancel the move
Coming from a collective negotiation: adjusted to the
least efficient airline
Available in every CRS, and thus, for every consumer,
whatever his location
Carrier's fare
Online and on allied carrier's services travels only
Competition context: de,ice set up to extract the
passenger's xsillingness to pay
Trend to the fares multiplication
Can be modified by the airline when it _ishes. Quick
response to the market evolutions
Reflects the commercial strategy. Use more or less
sophisticated of the pricing and revenue management
techniques
The availability depends on the distributing strategy of
the airlines (GDS, CRS, travel agencies)
2. Compared analysis of the "universal" interlining and the "club"
interlining
Here, we will compare the interlining services promoted by IATA and the commercial
agreements. What are the pros and cons for the businessman and for the tourist of the
"universal" interlining and of the "club" interlining?
"Universal" interlining's quality is higher than "club" interlining's one.
Since it allows the construction of any interlining travel for any routing in Europe, the
multilateral IATA system is particularly interesting for the passengers of the outlying areas of
Europe. Indeed, the commercial agreements mainly concern high density traffic zones. One can
assume that for a not very dense route, the setting up and monitoring cost of the relevant
commercial agreement might be higher than the expected benefits, whereas it is relatively not
costly to discuss a marginal route in the IATA procedures. Therefore, we affirm that only
IATA can set up interlining for the outlying areas with little traffic.
We'll now focus on situations where both means of promoting interlining exist, i.e. the
relatively dense traffic zones. The quality of interlining rests on the diversity of two features of
the travel: the frequencies and the possible routings. Table 1 presents the quality of each




Table 1. Which quality for the universal and the club interlinings?










The "universal" interlining produced thanks to IATA provides the passenger with a greater
diversity: more frequencies and/or routings are available for his choice. Conversely, the "club"
interlining produced by the commercial agreements offers less possibilities since a fewer
number of airlines participate to the agreement.
To conclude, the "universal" interlining produced by IATA is of a better quality than the club
interlining produced by the commercial agreements. The geographic coverage of the universal
interlining is comprehensive; any passenger, tourist 6 or businessman, can chose between a
greater variety of travels. At last, only IATA can provide the businessman with satisfying
possibilities of airline switches or re-routing, once he bought his ticket.
The "universal" interlining is more expensive than the commercial agreement's
one r.
The allied airlines seek to attract as many passengers as possible on their services. Their fares
are set up so that the travel resulting from this co-operation is more attractive than the existing
alternatives: the "universal" interlining, or the other "club" interlining on the same market, if
any. A certain competition emerges between these air travel solutions, competition that would
lead to a certain price reduction. Moreover, most of the commercial agreements don't
constrain at all the pricing policy: one can reasonably assume that the prices set up by the allied
airlines would reflect their costs 8.
6 In spite of the current move towards the deletion of the IATA very promotional fares, a Pex remains in the
IATA structure.
The final price comparison is restricted to the roundtrip and coane.,don interlining for the areas with a
sufficient traffic where these kinds of interlining can be proposed either thanks to IATA or to the commercial
agreements.
s On the other hand. it is frequenlp," assumed that some alliances reduce the airline's costs. The ground
maintenance equipements, the boarding gates at the connecting point are being shared by the partners.
Furthermore. the induced extra tm_c leads to a better fleet utilisation and to an improved load factor. These
The rationale behind the IATA pricing is very different from the rationale behind the
commercial agreements pricing. The IATA fare comes from a collective negotiation: it is set up
so that the airline with thehighest costs will be satisfied. Indeed, the IATA fares are supposed
to be applied by a great number of airlines, which all have different costs. The decision
procedures, and specifically, the unanimity rule are such that it is almost impossible to go
against the economic interest of the least efficient member since there is no exclusion
procedure in IATA. The most efficient airlines -with the lowest costs- will be prompt to accept
this price level since it will ensure them a high profit. Two other elements make the IATA price
more expensive. Only price increases are voted, and never price decreases. The deletion of the
promotional fares from the IATA structure is such that the "club" interlining flights are less
expensive than the "universal" interlining flights, which are offered for the higher tariff classes
only.
Some final distribution features make the IATA interlining flight not very attractive. First,
according to the display rules on the CRS, the interlining flight is shown after the direct flight
and the online connection. The code sharing agreements are a suitable response to this
constraint. Secund, the flights are ranked on the screen according to an increasing range:
airlines compete on very small amounts of money to be shown in the first positions and the
IATA fares are at the very bottom of the screens. Third, the travel agencies commissions incite
them to sell certain airlines' flights. Fourth, any pooling of the Frequent Flyer Programs make
the commercial agreement more attractive for the passenger.
To conclude, the "club" interlining is proposed to any passenger, tourist or businessman, at a
more interesting price than the "universal" interlining. Any commercial agreement is aimed at
dragging as many passengers as possible, and most of these agreements don't require any tariff
co-ordination. Conversely, the fares coming from the IATA tariffs conferences must satisfy any
member, even the most inefficient.
3. Anti-competitive effects of IATA and the commercial agreements
The analysis of the possible anticompetitive effects of the two co-operation means aimed at
promoting interlining is threefold: i) what are the exclusionary consequences of any of these
agreements?, ii) where are the smaller airline's interests better defended?, iii) what is the
influence of the IATA fares on all the carriers fares, business or tourism?
The commercial agreements have an exclusionary effect, whereas IATA hasnone.
A IATA fare is available for any IATA airline: nobody can be excluded. Any airline which
attended the tariffs conferences must accept any passenger holding a ticket issued by any other
IATA airline at a IATA fare. In other words, in the IATA system, any airline is allowed to sell
seats on any other airline. Since the only condition to be a IATA member rests on the financial
soundness of the applicant airline, it is very easy to enter this association. Therefore, one can
say that the IATA multilateral system prevents from excluding any airlines that wishes to enterany market.
Any commercial agreement excludes the newcomers since it is restricted to its members. Any
regional airline with a network strategy, i.e. interested in interlining, will have to find the best
partner. On top of that, alliances might create "fortress hubs" where one or two airlines
dominate an airport. This raises barriers to entry, even for the airlines not interested in
interlining, like the "no frills" airlines. One can wonder what will be the future for the airlines
that have not passed any alliances yet?
I IATA I Commercial
,,. . . Agreements
Forclusion effects ] __ I
IATA better protects the smaller airlines' interests than the commercial
agreements.
The national airlines market power could be turned into any abuse of dominant position.
Where is that more likely to happen? Under the auspices of IATA or in the commercialagreements?
Within IATA, the unanimity rule provides every airline with the same rights. Theoretically, this
system protects the smaller airlines against the bigger ones. Nevertheless, this proposal must be
slightly mitigated by the way negotiations really happen. There is a "market leader" effect
which make uneasy for smaller airlines to oppose a national airline like British Airways, for
instance. Airlines also tend to moderate their demands for fear of retaliation. When opposing,
airlines seek to create a opponents coalition, which is always more efficient than opposing
alone. All these reasons tend to lessen the equality of rights granted to the IATA members: to a
certain extent, smaller airlines depend on the bigger ones. Even if they are fully aware of these
minor drawbacks,the smallerairlinesgrant the IATA tariffs conferences with a great role for
the protection of their interests.
For the commercial agreements, there is a mutual interest: it is not necessarily the bigger
airlines that would dominate the smaller one. The form of the agreement plays a great role
here. Some agreements are not very binding and the airlines don't commit too much
themselves. On the other hand, other types of agreements are very close to a merger









IATA fares have no influence on the tourist carrier's fares
Two elements are relevant to assert that the IATA fares play no role on the determination of
the promotional carder fares interesting for the tourists. First, the IATA fare structure includes
only normal fares and a Pex, corresponding to the higher segment of the tourism market. Any
other promotional fare has been suppressed from the IATA structure. Secund, the liberalisation
of the European sky led to a multiplication of the tariffs offered to the tourist, and to a
decrease in their price levels. The counterpart of this price reduction is that the concerned
flights are restricted to the airline's own services, or to its allied partner's ones. For the lower
fares, one can talk about a "spot market". Indeed, if the plane is not full, airlines sell their
empty seats at the last moment, adjusting thus supply and demand. Nevertheless, the
distribution channels of these products are highly specific. The price sensitivity of the tourism
passengers is fully exploited by the airlines.
What role play the IATA fares on the business carrier's fares?
The businessman wishes to have a travel with no restriction at all (no reservation in advance,
no maximum/minimum stay requirement, etc.). Two products are at his disposal: the first one
allows him to switch airline at the last moment, whereas the second one compels him to stay on
the very same airline's services. The first one is produced thanks to IATA and its price is set
up within the IATA tariffs conferences. The second one is produced according to the strategy
of the airline and the competition on the concerned route.
When there is no business carrier fare
When the AEA 9 asserts that the passenger can find a business carrier's fare on the totality of
the relevant intra-EU routes, the CAA '° claims that it is only a very small number of routes that
are concerned. According to a survey 1_ carried out on 31 routes linking European capitals, a
business carrier fare is proposed on only 18 routes, i.e. around 60 % of our sample. What
lessons can we draw, from a competition policy point of view, out of the situations where the
businessman has only the IATA fare at his disposal? This question is relevant as 40 % of the
routes in our sample are concerned.
When the businessman has no other choice than buying the ticket sold at the IATA fare, he is
obliged to accept the possibility to switch airline, even if he is not interested at all in buying an
interlinable ticket. One can assert that this is a case of "purchase obligation ", since the
possibility to switch airline is automatically sold with the other services provided by the
business ticket: buy the ticket at the last moment, arrive later at the airport and come out of the
plane sooner, enjoy a greater in-flight comfort, etc. The alternative tickets offered are not
convenient for the businessman since the promotional tickets content restrictions, like advance
purchase, duration of the stay etc. Thus, we assert that when only the IATA fare is available on
a route, the businessman is complied to buy it. These situations are a disadvantage for theconsumer.
When there is a commercial business fare
Two separate issues must be addressed when the consumer can chose between two types of
business travels: one offered by IATA, and the other by the airlines. First, does the IATA fare
influence the carrier's fare? Secund, how come airlines match their business fares?
The IATA fare doesn't have any influence on the carrier's fare
Since it stands for the higher quality product, the IATA fare is the highest of the air transport
tariff structure. An additional service is provided with a IATA ticket, the possibility to switch
airline. The difference between the IATA fare and the carrier's fare depends on the route. In
9 AEA. Yearbook 1997, p. 24.
*'JCAA. The Single European Axiation Market: Progress So Far, September 1995, CAP 654.
**For 31 routes linking several European capitals, we have the following figures: the level of the IATA normal
fare. the level of the business fares proposed by the carriers, the number of/lights operated by each airl/ne of
the route, the state of the flights differenciation. We refer to "differenciated flights- when their departure times
are different enough to make them not substitutes. For instance, if airline X operates the 8.00 a.m. glight on
route Ab and airline Y the 12.00 a.m one. we bill say that the flights are differenciated since the_"are not
substitute. Conversely, ifX operates the 8.00 a.m. flight'and Y the 8.30 a.m one, the passenger has the choice
between the txvo airlines and the flights are considered as not differenciated. Annex 1 presents these routes'characteristics.
average, the carrier's fare represents 84 % of the ]ATA fare, but this varies from 62 % to 96












Graph 1. C•nier's buskless fare as
• % of the IATA fare
Route and airline
Would the carrier's fares be less expensive if the IATA fares didn't exist? The liberalisation
process led to the development of the discrimination between the different types of passengers
as the pricing basic mechanism. Airlines seek to extract the totality of the business passengers
willingness to pay, independently of the IATA price level. Since these passengers are not price
sensitive, airlines will propose the highest possible fare. The IATA fare play no role in on the
carriers fares levels.
The price matching phenomenon is completely independent from the presence of a
IATA fare.
Only 18 routes present a carrier's business fare out of the 31 of our sample. The carrier's
business fares proposed are equal in half of the cases, as graph 2 illustrates it.
Graph 2. Ro_t-es with s carrier's business fare
{CBF)
Each airline of the route
propose a different CRF
28%
Only one ,lilfine offer •
CBF
17%
All the airlines offer the
same CSF
S5%
The airlines which match their prices offer very similar products since the schedules are very
close in time. The travels are not differentiated. The price matching phenomenon is not
connected to the existence of a IATA fare.
From a competition policy viewpoint, what can we say about the price matching phenomenon.
Does it translate a tacit collusion between the airlines.'? Or, does it mean that airlines extract the
passenger's willingness to pay? This question is beyond the scope of this paper and is a very
delicate one. One can put forward that since the air transport prices are public and displayed
through the CRSs, the tacit collusion possibilities are not neglectible.'2. On the other hand, if
the airlines offer similar products and if their prices are set so that the passenger's willingness
to pay is fully extracted, the price identity is not very surprising.
Concluding remarks
Is IATA the place where airlines set up explicit price fixing agreements? Or, is IATA a co-
operative arrangement aimed at promoting a specific air transport product, the "universal"
interlining? In other words, what is the role of IATA today? Cartel, or multilateral production
mode of a joint-product, namely interlining?
:: In the United States. the case "'United States vs US Airline tariff publishing company "' (ci,,-ilaction no. 92-
2854, DDC, December 21. 1992), led to new rules for the published tariffs in the CRSs. These public prices
became automatically enforcable, since before that. the airlines communicated through the CRSs, displa_ing
.1 . . __rc" -w .v _ , , ,,.
As an interlining production mode,-IATA is today challenged by the commercial agreements,
which offer interlining as well, of a poorer quality but cheaper. Nevertheless, only IATA offers
the flexibility interlining with a quality level that would satisfy the business passengers. And the
geographic coverage of IATA is wider, this benefits the consumer from the outlying areas of
Europe. As far as quality is concerned; IATA is more interesting for the passenger,
businessman or tourist.
Regarding the possible anticompetitive effects of these agreements, the commercial agreements
present a higher risk of empeding the entry than IATA and the smaller airline's interests are
better taken into account within IATA than in the commercial agreements.
On the other hand, the price fixing role that held IATA has been considerably reduced. The
tourist fully benefits from the price competition and the tourism tickets prices have no
connection with the IATA prices. Conversely, the business passenger cannot always chose
between a IATA fare and a carrier's fare. For 40 % of the routes of our sample, IATA remains
the price fixing place. But, when there is a carrier's fare alternative to the IATA fare, the price
level of the latter has no influence on the former. Indeed, the airline's current price setting is
aimed at extracting the totality of the business passenger willingness to pay, whose price
sensitivity is very low.
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Abstract
This paper considers airline scheduling in a small airline network where
at least one of the firms in the market operates a hub-and-spoke system.
_Ve model airline competition in frequencies and prices as a two stage game:
in the first stage, airlines choose frequencies on the legs in their network,
in the second stage they choose prices for direct and connecting markets.
The two-stage setup of the model allows airlines to choose asymmetric
frequency equilibria such that price competition is reduced. _Ve consider
profit maximizing schedule solutions for two types of networks, and compare
monopoly solutions with competition in part of the neuvork. The numerical
results indicate that deregulation in part of the network has a positive
effect on agooTegate consumer welfare. While prices for their tickets go
down, connecting passengers lose because their schedule delay and travel
time costs increase under the duopoly schedule equilibrium. Furthermore,
industry profit decreases after dereo-_ulation.
1. Introduction I
In deregulated airline markets, carriers are free to choose the rabies of the vari-
ables affecting their profits. Out of the large number of decisions to be made in
practice, the decisions on flight frequency and price on each route in an airlines
network are of major importance. Frequency, or the number of flights ofl'ered per
Imit of time. determines consumer welfare by affecting not only the gap between
desired departure times and actual departure times, but also the transfer time of
passengers who are not on direct flights. Also, total flight frequency has a negative
external effect on households suffering from noise and emission of pollutants. In-
terpreting frequency as quality of service, the frequency decision affects both the
number of passengers and their willin_o-ness to pay. On the other hand, frequency
clearly is a major determinant of airline costs, so that quality is costly to provide.
Furthermore, frequency affects both quality of service and - given aircraft size -
capacity at the same time and can thus be assumed to influence prices. A further
basic aspect of airline markets is the ._mall number of competitors, implying that
competing carriers take the possible reactions of their opponents into account
when making decisions, e.g., on frequencies and prices. Finally, it has been ob-
served that prices in the airline industry are adjusted daily, whereas changes in
frequency (schedules) can be assumed to be much less flexible.
The present paper wishes to model airline competition while taking into ac-
count the above observations. Consumer demand is affected by price, schedule
delay and transfer time, while the latter two are determined by the airlines' fre-
quency decisions. We consider airline behaviour in a small airline network, under
monopoly and duopoly competition respectively and we restrict the analysis to
situations where at least one of the firms in the market operates a hub-and-spoke
(HS) system. The difference in decision flexibility between frequency and price
is accounted for by modeling airline competition as a two stage game: in the
first stage, airlines choose schedules, i.e. flight frequencies for each link in their
network, while in the second stage, having observed the respective first stage
choices, they choose prices. The equilibrium is thus computed as the subgame
perfect Nash solution in schedules. A central policy issue addressed by the model
is the welfare effect induced by airline deregulation, defined as the introduction
of competition in (a part of) the network.
l Financial support from the Netherlands" Organization for Scientific Research is _atefully
acknowledged.
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A nllmber of articles in the large literature on airline (network) competition
and deregulation are particularly relevant for this paper. The model has the same
twu stage stntcture as the network design model in Lederer (1993). but differs
in two ways. Firstly. customer demand is distributed with respect to preferred
departure times, so that there is not one least price 'path' pet origin-destination
(OD) market and more than one firm provide transport between OD markets
in equilibrium. Secondly, demand in each market is elastic with respect to both
frequency and price. 2 Brueckner and Spiller (1991) use a model of qllantity setting
duopoly competition in a network; they conclude that with returns to density
or cost complementarities in a network, competition in a part of the network
may result in an overall welfare decrease because of the negative externalities
imposed on the other passengers in the system. Using a similar model Nero
(1996) concludes that airline dereg'ulation unambiguously improves welfare in the
network when returns to density are absent. The present paper analyzes the
introduction of competition in a simple network using the two-stage schedule
competition model outlined above.
The paper is organized as follows. We introduce and calibrate the model in
the next section, and discuss some of its properties. %re then consider simulated
market outcomes under monopoly and duopoly competition for two simple airline
networks. Section 3 discusses monopoly and leg competition in a one-hub network.
In section 4, monopoly and duopoly solutions in a network with two hubs are




A base assumption of the model is that at least one airline operates a hub-and-
spoke (HS) system. Therefore, passengers fly either directly to their destination
(local passengers) or have to transfer to a connecting flight (connecting passen-
gers). Connecting passengers are assumed to use the services of one airline only
during their trip. Furthermore, we do not consider demand for which more than
2Furthermore, passengers are assumed not to 'bundle" flights, i.e., not to switch between
airlines when when making a transfer. Lederer (1993) shows that such bundling may lead to
non-existence of the price equilibrium.
_,netransfer is necessary,so that connecting passengers are on two flights dur-
ing their trip, passing through two spokes or legs s via a hltb. Passengers make
one-wa.v trips between nodes (cities) in the network, so that the maLket m for
transport between cities Y and Z represents two one-way markets my-_z and
Irt, Z _ _'.
A traveler derives gross utility _ from making a trip, and faces a price p.
Fln'thermore. a consumer suffers a linear schedule delay cost 01.r when the flight
leaves at a time distance x --- Ita¢_v- tv,ell from his or her preferred departure
time, :4and a linear travel time cost 02d, where d is the duration of the trip. Given
the network layout, trip duration in the model is fixed for local passengers, whereas
it depends on the departure frequency on the second spoke travelled during the
trip for connecting passengers. When the gross valuation exceeds the sum of price,
schedule delay cost and travel time cost, the traveler buys a ticket. We note that
the schedule delay of a connecting passenger is determined by the departure time
of the first of his two flights, whereas his travel time is partly determined by the
departure time of the second flight.
Consumer preferences with respect to departure time are represented by a
circle of (time) length L on which potential passengers are distributed uniformly.
The departure times of flights on a particular leg of the network are also located
on this time circle: we consider the departure times of flights i and i + 1, ti and
ti+l respectively, which are separated by headway H. Flights are spaced equally
on the circle. Therefore, the headway is determined endogenously as the time
length of the circle divided by the total number of flights F offered by airlines on
the particular leg, i.e.
L
H = _ (2.1)
Potential passengers who are 'located' at some preferred departure time x 6 (0, H)
face a time distance x with respect to the departure time t, of flight i and a distance
(H - x) with respect to ti+l. These potential passengers derive the following net
utilities or consumer surplus from the two options:
v, = 1.-_ - p_ - 01x - 02d (2.2)
v_+l = _ -Pi+l - O(H - x) - 02d
3'_Ve thus make the assumption that the utility loss caused by taking a flight at a time
distance x earlier than the preferred departure time is equal to the utility lo_ caused by taking
a flight at x later than the preferred departure time. The term 'schedule delay cost' is meant to
capture both types of utility loss.
Clearly, a consumer will choose the flight belonging to the larger of the above
expressions and buy a ticket if the net utility is positive. For the moment, we
shall assume that the travel time of the two options is equal. We can now derive
the distance xt, between t, and the boundaIT between the market areas of the two
flights as that value of x for which vi = q+l. This gives
P,+I - Pi + 01H
Xb+ "--
20, (2.3)
All potential passengers located between ti and xb+ will take flight i, if they fly at
all, and those located between xb+ and ti+l will choose flight i + 1, again, if they
fly at all. The number of passengers with preferred departure time x E (0, xb+)
actually taking flight i is calculated as the number of potential passengers with
gross utilities Vii > Pi+ 01x+O.2d; we represent this number by D.g (Pi + alx + O_d),
where D is a density parameter. Demand for flight i from potential passengers
with preferred departure times x > ti can be obtained by adding the number of
passengers over all preferred departure times x between ti and Xb+. We include the
demand from passengers with preferred departure times earlier than ti, 4 giving
Ag_egate demand for flight i is calculated as the sum of direct passengers and
connecting passengers who choose the flight on the first leg of their journey.
We now consider the demand for travel in one-way market my-z, which is
either a direct market for local passengers on spoke s or a transfer market for
which s is the first spoke to be travelled. Aggregate demand for market my__. z
is found by summing qmy_z, i over all flights. Thus, for an airline l operating a
departure frequency ft,, in spoke s, demand Qt,mr_z is
Qt,mr_z = _ q, (pi,p,-,,p,+l,H,d) (2.5)
i=l
4The location xb- which marks the boundary between the market areas of flight i and an
earlier flight i - 1 departing at time ti-! is found in the same way as Xb-, i.e..




Finally. total demandfor city-pair market YZ is the sum uf the demand in the
two one-way markets my-z and mz-_" respectively.
2.2. Configurations
We proceed by analyzing the duopoly configuration of flights in a particular time "
period, represented by the circular 'time' market. For notational convenience,
we consider a one-way non-stop duopoly market in the following. Consider a
departure i operated by airline l. There are three possibilities: departure i may
have either two, one or zero neighbouring departures offered by a competing airline
-l; we refer to such departures as 'unfriendly neighbours', while we call two
"O"
neighbouring flights operated by one and the same airline 'friendly nm_,hbours.
The expression for the market boundary xb in the demand per flight function q
depends on the configuration of the departures. With an interlaced confi,_o-uration,
for each departure i the price for both the earlier and the later departure (i - 1
and i + 1 respectively) is set non-cooperatively by a competing airline. Note that
each airline sets one and the same price for all its tickets, i.e., there is no price
differentiation between departures of one firm. 5 A departure i with two unfriendly
neighbours faces market boundaries
p_-1 - P_ + OH
xb- = 20
pi+, - pi + OH (2.6)
Xb+ = 20
from which demand for flight i is derived using equation (2.4). \Ve refer to the
demand for this type of flight as q_. or completely competitive demand.
In the case of a non-competitive flight (with no unfriendly neighbours), demand
is derived from the market boundaries
g (2.7)
Xb - _" Xb+ _ --_
because prices are the same for these flights. We refer to this type of demand
as qn_. 6 _Ve note that for any specification of the demand function, completely
competitive demand is more price sensitive than non-competitive demand.
5Therefore, in case of a duopoly the price of both competing departures is the same.
SAn explicit analysis of demand for the intermediate case of a "semi-competitive' flight i .
i.e., a flight with only one unfriendly neighbour i- 1 and one friendly neighbour i + 1 is omitted.
For the market as a whole, we can now distinguish between two e.'c.rremes. In
a m_nopoly market, all departures are offered by the same airline: ,_n the othel
hand. there is the completely interlaced equilibrium, in which all flights have ira-
friendly neighbours. Of course, there are many possible configurations between
these extremes. The range of configurations implies that with multiproduct com-
petition, monopoly and oligopoly become relative rather than absolute concepts.












A slightly as_.'mmetri¢ non-
interlaced duopoly
coat]maration
Figure 1: Multiproduct configurations
Note that the number of such flights is always a multiple of 2, and we therefore rewrite the
demand for two 'semi-competitive' flights as tiae demand for one competitive flight q_. and one
non-competitive flight qnc.
The first configuration in figure 1 is a completely interlaced d_lopoly. When a
duopolist analyzes the effect of a unit increase in departure freqllenc.v starting from
a symmetric interlaced configuration, he necessarily considers a 'slightly asymmet-
rid configuration. As is illustrated in figure lb, all non-symmetric duopoly con-
figurations are non-interlaced. An implication of the model strllcture is that the
form of the demand functions in an airline duopoly changes at fl = J-J Aggre-
gate demand over all departures Q consists of two parts. For airline l, aggregate
demand in the market is
Qt = ]lqcc if ft < f-t (2.8)
Qt = (ft- f-t)q,c+f-tq,:.c if fi > I-t (2.9)












The demand and profit function of both duopoly airlines have the exact same
form. Clearly, when the first line of the demand function is relevant for one
airline, the second is relevant for the other. Only when ft = f-t, the two parts of
the demand function give the same value.
2.3. Cost and profit
For each flight, the costs consist of a (major) fixed part FC and a marginal cost
c per passenger. The model assumes that each airline l charges a single ticket
price for each city-pair market m, m = 1, ..., Mt it operates. Furthermore. airlines
decide on the flight schedule, that is, the departure frequency for each spoke
s, s = 1 ..... St in their network. Thus, airline behaviour is represented by the
tHere and in the following, the subscript -l refers to the competitor of airline I.
vet:ors p, = {p, .... ,Pat,} and ]_ = {f, .... ,fs,}. Using (2.5) and (2.1). profits of
air]ine l facing a competitor -l in one or more of the markets in its network are
AI_ St





For the calibration of the model we follow the procedure in Norman and Stran-
denes (1994), viz., solving for the demand parameters using price, frequency, cost
and demand observations for a base monopoly situation in combination with the
monopolist's first order conditions. Firstly, we impose a linear form on the point
demand function g (.) in (2.4): s
g (p + 01x + O2d) = c_ - p - 01x - 02d
Monopoly demand per flight is then derived as
(2.11)
q=D g(.)dx=2Dxb a-p-O_-_-O2d (2.12)
Data are available for a non-stop monopoly route onl): _,Ve note that for such
a trip, the monopolists first order conditions only refer to price and frequency
on the leg. With the demand equation, we have a system of three equations,
which aUows solving for the three demand parameters D, _, and 01, 9 with G =
c_ - 02d. The data thus do not enable us to directly infer a value for 02, which
represents the common value of travel time. Morrison and Winston (1989) report
estimated values of travel and transfer time to be much higher (a factor 10 and
20. respectively) than the value of schedule delay. The relative values seem to
depend on the type of traveler. As indicated by _Iorrison and Winston. business
travelers are likely to have a much higher relative value of 01 than other travelers.
Dobson and Lederer (1993), use a value of schedule delay higher than the value
s Tile demand specification ultimately depends on the assumed distribution of _oss _aluations
_. A well known alternative is the negative exponential distribution, as used in e.g. Evans
(1957). However, that specification does not allow one to solve the calibration equations for the
parameters of the model. The specification used here is conform Greenhut et al. (1987).
9Data refer to the pre-deregulation Tel Aviv- Eilat monopoly, and consist of price, frequency
and passenger observations. Furthermore. we dispose of passenger and per flight cost data.
of travel time in their simulation model, while Berechman and de Wit (1996) ,Ise
a single value of time to calculate utility as a fimction of flight freq_lenr.v for local
and connecting passengers. TM Given the scarcity of evidence and the difficulty of
comparing parameter values between rather different models, we do not assign
a fixed value to 02 here. Rather. we investigate the sensitivity of the restdts to
changes in the relative value, and look for restrictions on the parameter value in
the next section.
As indicated above, for local passengers, the utility loss caused by the time
involved in the trip is represented by the parameter G = a - _)2d. For connecting
passengers, the calculation differs on three accounts. Firstly. the trip consists of
two leg flights. Secondly, the connecting passengers have to wait for a connecting
flight. Thirdly, the gross trip valuation may differ between non-stop and on-
stop travel. In order to simplify the calculations, we have assumed the following.
For connecting passengers', gross trip valuation is higher than for local passengers,
e.g., because of the larger travel distance. However, the difference in trip valuation
is exactly matched by the utility loss derived from the incremental travel time.
Therefore, the parameter G has the same value for both passenger types. The
difference between the demand functions, however, stems from the waiting time
of the connecting passengers, which depends on the frequency of the airline on
the second leg of the trip. We thus have, for connecting passengers
L
d, = #Hteg2 = #_g2 (2.13)
where # is a parameter indicating proportion of the headway time on the second
leg which the passenger has to wait, with 0 _< # < 1. Thus, even at a low frequency
on the second leg, the waiting time can be small when arrival and departure times
of connecting flights are close. _Ve have chosen an arbitrary value of p = 0.5 in
the calculations. The base set of parameters is presented in Table 1. with all
monetary equivalents in US$.













Using these parameter values, we simulated frequency and price decisions in
network markets. The simulation results are presented and discussed in the nextsections.
3. A one-hub network
In this section, we consider the effects of introducing competition in a simple
network consisting of one hub and two spokes, as depicted in Figure 2. We assume
that the network is symmetric in the sense that legs 1 and 2 have the same length,
and that all markets have the same density. Using the same type of aircraft on
both legs, the demand and cost characteristics are equal on non-stop flights.
Figure 2
3.1. hIonopoly
_3,'e first consider the schedule choice of a monopolist, who operates a HS system
in the above network. As the monopolist does not have to take into account the
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possible actions of an opponent,the problem is simply
max II = E (;"-c)Q"_(f'P)-2EJ;FC (3.1)
f"_ rn=l " #=1
where _.[ is the number of markets, and S the numebr of spokes. Clearly, the
number of spokes is two, so that f = {fl,f2}. We distinguish three city-pair
markets, viz.. the local markets AH and HB, and the connecting market AB, so
that p = {PAH,PHB,PAB}.
_Ve start by considering the price solution of the monopolist. Using (2.12), we
derive as the monopoly price solution for a given market
c + a - 0] "_ - 02d (3.2)
Plrt2Olrt 2
We may conclude that, for given flight frequency, the profit maximizing monopoly
price decreases in both 01 and 02, and so, given (2.12), revenues decrease in both
parameters. Similarly, we can derive a expression for the frequency decision of




Next, we analyze the simultaneous solution to the monopoly network problem
(3.1). Using the parameters from Table 1, we solve for f and p for var:_ing 02, we
have calculated profit maximizing frequencies and prices for a range of values of
02. The results are presented in Figure 3, which only shows results for one of the
two identical local markets and legs.
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Figure 3
As Figure 3 illustrates, the price in the connecting market decreases in 02,
as the travel time costs increase. The monopolist can counteract the negative
demand effect by increasing the departure frequency in the legs (which has a
small positive effect on the price in the direct market). The profit ma.'dmizing
frequency is concave in 02. Clearly, the overall effect of an increase in 82 on profit
is negative. From this conclusion, we can derive a restriction on the value of 82.
From the calibration data, we know the profit of a single leg market. A monopolist
will choose a HS network, whenever the profit of such a network is larger than
the profit in a fully-connected (FC) network. Therefore, from the assumption
that the monopolist operates a HS network, a maximum value for 8_ follows, viz..
the value of 02 = 8"_ for which the profit of both network types are equal. Put
differently, values of 02 have to be consistent with the choice of the network type.
In the following simulations, we use the maximum value of 82 consistent uith the
HS network type, viz., 82 -- 0.8 • 81.
3.2. Leg competition
We now consider the introduction of competition in leg 1 of the network in Figure
2. e.g., after entry of a small airline only serving the local market between H and
B. An important asymmetry is thus present in the competition in market 1. The
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incltmbent, airline 1.carriesboth local and connecting passengers on leg 1, while
tile entrant, aMine 2, only carries local passengers.
We consider the outcome of the following two-stage frequency and price game.
Both airlines face the profit function
MI St
II,= E (P,n-c) Qm(fi,P,,f-t,P- 0 - 2EJ'_.,FC (3.4)
rn=l *=1
with 3/1 = 3, M2 = 1 and $1 = 2, $2 = 1. The equilibrium is found by solving
the game backwards: for each pair of schedules {fl, f2} the Nash equilibrium in
prices {p_,p_} is calculated as the set of prices at which
n, >n, t= :,2 (3.5)
(Note that for airline 2, the problem is confined to finding a single departure
frequency and a single price). Given the second stage price equilibria, the first
stage Nash equilibrium in flight schedules is calculated as the set of schedules for
which
The first stage equilibrium choices and market outcomes are compared with the
monopoly solution in Table 2 below.
Table 2
Market equilibria: 1 hub network
Monopoly Leg competition
airline 1 airline 2
schedules {29, 29 } {26, 29 } 13
prices {76, 76, 54} {66.76,52} 57
passengers {1673,1673,1161} {1330,1673,1113} 820
profit 121221 87410 16944
CS ('000) per market {62.4, 62.4, 31.5} {99.9, 62.4, 29.6}
CS total 156326 191952
welfare 277547 296307
\Ve note a few interesting characteristics of the equilibrium. As explained in
section 2, asymmetric frequency choices result in non-interlaced configurations
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of depazhzres.This confers the monopoly power to the airline with the higher
mzmbez, of depaLtvu'es, which explains tl_e asymmetry in _,rirm_
sehedlde asymmetry is determined by the net(_,o-._- " r " _. C/early. the
- ' L_ asymmetry: for airline 1. the
marginal flight has a higher profitability because it serves both the local d_i,.,pol.v
market and the monopoly market for connecting passengers.
The overall conchision is that leg competition raises welfare. Not surprisingly,
a reallocation of surplus from producers to consumers takes place. Aggregate con-
s_lmer surplus increases by some 23_, which represents a gain for local travelers
in market 1 (60%), a loss for connecting passengers (-6_). while nothing changes
for local passengers in market 2. Note that the welfare loss for connecting pas-
sengers catlsed by airline l's frequency decrease in leg 1 is partly compensated
by the lower ticket price. This conclusion is partly in line a'ith the conclusion by
Brueckner and Spiller (1991). In their model, leg competition raises welfare for
local passengers in market 1 and hurts connecting passengers too. The reason for
the latter welfare effect is, however, the existence of negative cost externalities
between markets, which also causes a welfare reduction for local passengers in
market 2. In our model, connecting passengers are affected through the higher
costs of schedule delay and travel time, not through an increase in price (marginal
cost). Therefore, local passengers in market 2 are not affected, a'hile local pas-
sengers in market 1 benefit from both higher flight frequencies and lower prices.
Note that the two-stage character of the model gives both airlines an incentive
not to choose symmetric frequencies: _'ith a symmetric, interlaced configuration
of departures, price competition is more intense and second stage prices are lower
than in a non-s}znmetric equilibrium. Finally, we note that the model outcomes
represent a slight S-curve eiCtrect, that is, airline 1, carries a share of the passengers
tram'cling on leg 1 that is higher than it _sshare of departures. The effect is a result
of the connecting travel carried by airline 1 while having a lower than proportional
share of the local traffic, as a result of the high price in market 1.
4. A two-hub network
In this section, we investigate the solution of firms to the network frequency-price
problem for a slightly more complex network under regmes of monopoly and




The monopoly network problem has the same general form as for the one-hub
network presented in (3.1). In this case, however, S = 3 and we distinglaish M = 5
city pair markets, viz., three markets for local passengers AHj, HIH2, H2B and
two markets for connecting passengers AH2 and HIB. 11 The monopoly network
problem can be interpreted either as the scheduling problem of a single airline
operating two hubs or a as the problem of two airlines maximizing joint profits.
In the latter interpretation, local market HIH_ max- represent a route market
between hubs of flag carriers before deregulation in the European Union, which
until recently were governed by restrictive bilaterals, while the other markets can.
be thought of as hinterland monopoly markets in the absence of cabotage, e.g.,
as in Nero (1996).
Using the same parameters as in the one-hub system, the (base) solution to
the monopoly scheduling problem is 7 = {fl,f_,f.z} = {36.29,29} and _ =
{PH_H2,PAH_,PH2B,PAH2,PHIB} = {79,76,76,58,58}. As before, 82 --- 0.8 • _1, a
value at which the HS system is slightly more profitable than the FC system. As
before, equilibrium profit decreases in 82.
4.2. Hub competition
We now consider the case of competition on the local market HIH2. The sit-
uation can be interpreted as an example of partial dereT]lation , in the sense
that a collusive bilateral, containing capacity and fare restrictions is abolished for
the international route H1H_, while carriers continue to operate monopoly routes
I1As indicated before, we do not consider trips for which more than one transfer is necessary.
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wit]-.in their respectivecolmtries. The model assumes that two identical airlines
wir]-, identical hinterland markets compete on H_H_. In the following, airline 1
operates the monopoly markets AHI and AH_, and airline '_ operates monopolymarkets H2B and HjB. -
The results of the base simulation are compared with the monopoly regime inTab-_e 3. .
Table 3
Market equilibria: 2 hub network
----------- airline 1 airline 2
schedul_ {36.29,29} r-,{24,_28! {21: 28_
passengers , 673,1242,1242} _ (52176:_7_
.4. basic characteristic of the equilibrium is the as.x'mmetric frequency choice
on leg 1. This result is due to the second stage price competition: airlines have
an incentive to avoid symmetry, as this results in lower equilibrium prices.12 In
equilibrium, airline 1 operates 3 monopoly flights, which enables it to charge a
higher price in the duopoly market HIH2. The higher frequency of airline 1 in leg
1 also lowers schedule delay and travel time for its transfer passengers relative to
those of airline 2, so that the price in market AH2 is higher than in airline 2"stransfer market HIB.
_4. comparison of the monopoly and hub competition re, me shows that the
individual duopoly airlines have a lower flight frequency on each leg than the mo-
nopolist. On legs 2 and 3, the difference is quite small. On leg 1, however, the
indix'idual flight frequencies are much lower with competition, while the combined
flight frequency on this leg is much higher. As we have assumed that connecting
passengers never transfer to a flight operated by an other airline, the connecting
passengers suffer from higher travel times as a result from the decrease in airline
flight frequency. This decrease in utility is reflected by the lower transfer demand
r:--_lthough the model is different, the results are close the those obtained in two-stage quality-
price competition (Shaked and Sutton. 1982) , where firms differentiate in order to avoid price
competition. In fact, there are two pure strate_- asymmetric equilibria with identical firms,
oalv one of which is presented. Furthermore, we do not consider mixed strategies here.
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and the mlwh lower pricesin the transfer marketsof both airlines. The local pas-
sengers in dltopoly market H1H_ do benefit, both from increased flight frequency
and lower prices because of price competition. In this market, there is a sig'nificant
increase in passengers.
In Table 4 below, welfare results of both re_mes are compared, where the
welfare total is defined as the sum of consumer surplus in all markets plus industry
profit. A first result of deregulation in market HI H2 is a dramatic decrease in
industry profit. Secondly, there is an increase in total consumer surplus. The
table shows that the aggegate increase is the sum of a gain for local passengers (in
market H1H2) and losses for connecting passengers. The result of these opposing
changes is a net decrease in the welfare sum. _3
Table 4
Welfare results: 2 hub model
industry profit













The general welfare result above is qualitatively in line xxith earlier work on
the effect of deregulation in network markets. Nero (1996), using a similar HS net-
work, concludes that for particular parameter combinations in his model, welfare
(the sum of consumer surplus and profits) over all markets in the network is higher
under monopoly (after an airline merger) than under competition. Brueckner and
Spiller (1991) reach a similar conclusion for leg competition. In these papers,
the form of the cost function drives the results. In particular, the cost function
reflects increasing returns to traffic density, that is, marginal passenger costs are
decreasing.
In our model, marginal passenger costs are constant, so that network external-
ities take the form of demand rather than cost complementarities. This difference.
which follows from the model specification, has a number of implications. As indi-'
cated in the previous section (leg competition), the introduction of competition in
I:_In a number of simulations, the sensitivity of the welfare results with respect to the value
of travel time parameter/),2 has been investigated for parameters in the range 0.20t < (_2 _</91.
As is to be expected, the negative welfare effect of deregulation increases in R2: the qualitative
conclusions remain, however, unchanged.
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a local market doesnot result in highermarshal costsand pricesfor connecting
passengers in ovu- model. Rather. prices decrease for connecting passenger.s, as
their net trip Iltility decreases in travel time. However. conslzmez, s)aplus for con-
necting passengers still decreases, as the price decrease does not compensate the
tzavel time increase. Similarly, the marginal passenger cost of local passengers,
e.g. in market AHj, is constant, so that demand, price and consumer surplus
changes, if any, are due to changes in the flight frequency on leg 2. The consumer
surplus change is still positive, but is smaller than the profit decrease, so that the
overall welfare elect is negative in the two hub model.
Finally, we note that external costs have not been taken into account in the
analysis. However, one can expect increased environmental costs in the network,
e.g. taking the form of noise and emissions, after deregulation. The effects are
not evenly spread over the network. Whereas there is a slight decrease in aircraft
movements at airports A and B, there a significant net increase at the hub airports.
Clearly, including the external cost to the analysis would onh- add to the negative
welfare result for the hub competition model.
5. Conclusion
This paper presents a model of schedule competition in simple airline networks.
We model airline competition in frequencies and prices as a two stage game: in the
first stage, airlines choose frequencies on the legs in their network, in the second
stage they choose prices for direct and connecting markets. The two-stage setup
of the model allows airlines to choose asymmetric frequency equilibria such that
price competition is avoided. We consider profit maximizing schedule solutions
for two types of networks, and compare monopoly solutions with competition inpart of the network.
The numerical results indicate that for both types of networks, the introduc-
tion of competition, deregulation, in part of the network has a positive elect on
aggregate consumer welfare. However, consumers in transfer markets lose be-
cause, under the assumption that they do not transfer to a competing airline's
flight, their schedule delay and travel time costs increase. Furthermore. industryprofit decreases after deregulation.
In the case of leg competition in a one hub model, the positive consumer
surplus effect dominates the profit loss, resulting in an increase in overall consumer
surplus. In the case of hub competition, the profit loss dominates, so that there
19
is a net welfaredecrease.
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The rapid transportation of goods and people over long distances makes aviation
an indispensable part of the global economy. The aviation sector is in a phase of
very positive growth, and in fact is growing at a faster rate than the global
economy. Aviation is an integral component of travel and tourism, the world's
largest industry, and is increasingly important in the movement of freight.
In an unlimited economic model, with no external constraints, continued high
rates of growth could be expected. This, however, is not the case. Increasing
urban pollution, rising greenhouse gas concentrations, national and international
regulatory policies, and finite oil reserves all create external constraints on the
growth of transportation, including the air sector. At this time, there is no
technology that can supplant the speed of air travel for long-haul and
intercontinental routes. However, high-speed rail is a viable substitute for short
haul and intracontinental trips. In this paper, we present an analysis of the
impact that the introduction of high speed rail had on civil aviation in France,
and examine the economic opportunities for environmentally and economically
sustainable aviation.
External Constraints on the Aviation Industry
Urban Air Quality
Air pollution is now definitively recognized as having a significant negative
impact on the health of urban populations. Increased hospital admissions for
respiratory problems (e.g. Burnett et al, 1994) and overall mortality rates (Lipfert
and Wyzga, 1995) are unquestionably linked to poor air quality. Overall,
aviation emissions form a small fraction of total pollutant loading in a country,
but large airports are located near large population centres, and thus contribute
to the degradation of air quality in the city and regional area. Given that there
are reductions occurring in other sectors, it is predicted that airports' relative
contribution to urban airsheds will increase (e.g. Netherlands Ministry of
Housing, 1995; Perl et al., 1997). Emissions from airports may therefore face
restrictions from urban authorities in the future.
Greenhouse Gases
The percentage contribution of greenhouse gases from aviation is rising in North
America. In the U.S., in 1995 aviation contributed 10.0% of total CO2 emissions
in the transportation sector; this is predicted to rise to 12.9% of total CO2
transportation-generated emissions by 2010 (Grant et al., 1998). The international
community has struggled for years, first with the Toronto Summit (1988), Rio
Summit (1992), and most recently at the Kyoto Summit (1997), to set limits on
greenhouse gas emissions. Although the agreement reached at Kyoto still
remains to be ratified by most countries, legislated reductions in greenhouse gas
emissions may be in effect in a few years.
Upper Atmospheric Chemistry
Aircraft are the sole source of anthropogenically generated nitrogen and sulphur
oxides, soot, carbon monoxide, and unburned hydrocarbons emitted into the
upper troposphere and lower stratosphere. The potential for damage to
stratospheric ozone from aviation was first recognized over 25 years ago
(Johnston, 1971), and continues to be the focus of scientific research by NASA
and the European Aeronox programme. Other effects of the effluents from jet
engines on this part of the atmosphere are also being studied (e.g. Fabian and
Karcher, 1997). Depending upon the outcomes of this research, constraints may
be applied to aviation.
Governmental Environmental Policies
Two European examples offer a sense of future trends in environmental policy
being applied to civil aviation. Sweden integrated a carbon tax into
its fuel taxation as early as 1991. As well, differential landing fees
based on noise output have been in place for some time. The Swedish Civil
Aviation Administration is developing a new aircraft classification system
that will incorporate pricing for air emissions into future landing fees. Such
pollution pricing was introduced at Zurich's Kloten Airport (ZRH) in 1997.
The leading role of Swiss environmental management for aviation stems from a
well developed partnership between the public sector airport planners and
private sector leaders of the national carrier, Swissair (Perl, 1996). For Swissair,
environmental responsibility is seen as a means to more efficient operation.
Swissair executives have anticipated that the growth of air transport will trigger
some combination of stricter regulatory limits and pollution pricing schemes and
have committed to be leaders in developing a strategy that marries economic
profit and environmental responsibility. Swissair is thus positioning itself to
develop a long run competitive advantage by implementing leading edge
environmental practices ahead of its rivals.
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Since the Swiss public exhibits an extremely high environmental consciousness
(Inglehart, 1995), a proactive environmental policy was seen to offer an
immediate economic payoff. In the short term, Swissair needed its operations at
ZRH (essential if it is to survive the competition that other major European
carriers provide from their hubs) to meet with public approval. Switzerland's
highly decentralized federal system and direct democracy would have made it
impossibleto expand ZRH without putting the question before the public in a
referendum. Such a vote was taken on June 25, 1995, when voters of the Canton
of Zurich approved financing a major expansion of ZRH.
By committing itself to work on minimizing the air, noise, and water pollution
arising from increased operations, Swissair was able to campaign effectively in
the ZRH expansion referendum. It was also able to have significant input in
defining terms which all other carriers using ZRH will have to abide by. As a
result, Swissair's environmental leadership has yielded a long run advantage at
its principal hub, as other airlines are now charged for various forms of pollution
that they create. Swissair and the Zurich airport authority have a very close
working relationship, and have jointly pursued the environmental research that
has yielded the aircraft emission charges schedule now in effect at ZRH.
This pricing scheme built upon an extensive foundation of environmental
research and planning. From noise restrictions and night time flight curfews, to a
ban on the extended use of aircraft auxiliary power units, to the use of electric
vehicles for ground handling functions, ZRH has pioneered innovations
designed to reduce environmental impacts. The airport conducted its first
comprehensive emissions inventory in 1989, and integrated these findings into its
master planning process. For example, the inventory identified ZRH airside
operations contributing 6.8% to the NOx emissions in metropolitan Zurich, the
single largest source (Zurich Airport Authority, 1996).
The resulting emissions pricing policy began by _ airport landing fees by
5% across the board to make the scheme revenue neutr01. The classification
scheme is based upon an Engine Emission Factor (EEF), calculated by
multiplying an emission index (drawn from ICAO or FAA references) by the
maximum engine thrust. The EEF is then subdivided into 5 classes for pricing.
Class 5, with the most efficient engine technology (e.g., A320-200 equipped with
CFM56-5-A1 engine) pays no pollution charge, and thus receives a 5% reduction
in landing fees compared to the previous tariff. Class 1, with the least efficient
engine technology (e.g., L1011-500 equipped with RB211-22B engine) pays a 40%
premium on the basic landing fee as a pollution surcharge. Revenues generated
from the pollution surcharge are dedicated to financing infrastructure
improvements that would further reduce airside emissions, such as additional
taxiways to reduce taxi time, ground base power hookups to eliminate the use of
auxiliary power units, and emissions monitoring equipment.
Fossil Fuel Reserves and Resources
The ultimate limiting factor on aviation is fuel. The spectacular growth of world
economies in the 20th century has been driven in part by cheap, abundant oil.
This however, faces limits. Recently, experts have analysed world estimates of
reserves, rates of consumption, and the rate of discovery of new reserves. The
next decade is predicted to see the end of the abundant supply of cheap
conventional crude oil (Hatfield, 1997; Campbell and Laherr_re, 1998). This is
not to say that the world will run out of oil - rather, that as reserves decline it
will be more difficult, and costly, to extract the remaining oil from the ground
(ibid). Any unconventional liquefied petroleum product also will be more
expensive (ibid). In an industry such as aviation, which is so fuel intensive, this
is bound to have a profound impact.
Summary
External constraints on the aviation industry, then, will come in the form of taxes
on pollution, potential legislation to reduce greenhouse gas and other emissions,
and, ultimately, increasing costs and availability of fuel. Current rates of growth
in aviation may therefore not be sustainable. Recognizing these constraints, then,
the question is: what are the opportunities that can be created for the aviation
industry to become economically and environmentally sustainable?
High Speed l_ail in France: Les Trains _ Grande Vitesse fTGV)
The first TGV line opened serving the south-east of France on September 27,
1981, with service between Paris and Lyon, with a downtown-downtown travel
time of two hours 40 minutes (Haycock, 1995). In May 1982, the service was
extended to Marseilles, at five hours 33 minutes. Speed on the Paris-Lyon
segment was increased in 1983, and travel time was reduced to exactly two hours
(ibid).
On September 24, 1989, the TGV Atlantique, serving western France opened
(Haycock, 1995). Travel times were as follows: Nantes, two hours 5 minutes;
Bordeaux, three hours, and Toulouse five hours 10 minutes. In the southeast,
Nice was accessible by TGV in seven hours 14 minutes (Lewino and Dauvergne,
1989). These travel times remained constant, with the only exception being a 14
minute shortening of the Nice travel time (Fortin, 1994). Projections for the year
2005 include reducing the Marseilles travel time from 4 hours 40 minutes to three
hours, and Toulouse from five hours six minutes also to three hours (ibid).
A second advancement in TGV service in France came in the 1990's. At two
airports, Charles de Gaulle (CDG) and Lyon-Satolas, a rail terminus was built
within the existing airport infrastructure. This created intermodal
complimentarity, and while the benefits have yet to be maximized at Satolas, the
ability to switch modes within the airport terminal has been successfully adopted
and utilized at CDG.
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All TGV equipment in France is electrically powered. More than 90% of the
electricity in France is produced by nuclear generation, a zero emission source.
Thus, the TGV is a virtually emissions free mode of transport.
In the following section, the impact of the introduction of high speed rail in
France on the civil aviation sector is presented. First, the impact of the TGV on
domestic air travel between Paris and regional cities is examined. The
intermodal complementarity created by the construction of TGV terminals in
CDG and Satolas airports is examined second.
The TGV Effect: the impact of high speed rail on French civil aviatiQn
The purpose of this section is to quantify the changes that occurred in French
civil aviation with the introduction of high-speed rail. Five airports, in cities of
comparable size, were examined in detail; Lyon, Bordeaux, Toulouse, Marseilles,
and Nice. Only partial data was available for a sixth city, Nantes. Because
inception of the TGV service was staggered across France, it is possible to
compare airports of similar size to see the variation in growth rates with and
without TGV service to those cities for a specific interval of time.
The parameters analysed were:
1) intercity passenger traffic, between Paris and each airport, 1976-1997
2) total domestic passenger traffic for each airport 1975-1996
3) aircraft movement data, between the two Parisian airports, Charles de Gaulle
(CDG) and Orly, and each regional airport, 1975-1996
Multiple sources were used for the collection of data. Intercity passenger traffic
between Paris and the individual airports was obtained from the International
Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO; Table 1; Figure 1). Total annual domestic
passenger volumes for each airport were obtained from the annual ICAO Digest
of Statistics (Table 2; Figure 2).
The data on aircraft movements for the Paris-regional airport trips was collated
from the Official Airline Guide, International Edition, published annually. Data
concerning the number of flights per year by model of aircraft was extracted
from these volumes for each city. A programme with a perpetual calendar was
written in Microsoft Visual Basic 4.0 to facilitate the counting. At this writing,
the work is complete enough to allow a comparison of aircraft movements
between Lyon and Bordeaux (Table 3).
The data in Tables I and 2 was analysed to obtain growth rates for intervals of
different levels of TGV service. The starting year (1975 or 1976) is the earliest
year for which complete data was available. The interval up to 1981 is the pre-
TGV era. The years 1981-1984 are the period in which the impact of full TGV
service to Lyon developed. From 1984-1989, Lyon and Marseilles had TGV, but
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the other cities did not. The period 1989-1997 is the time when TGV service was
in place for all cities in the analysis.
The data in all cases was fit to a growth model y=b*m x, minimizing least squares
errors. The growth rates obtained (Tables 4, 5, and 6) represent an average
annual compounded rate of increase. These rates are not dependent just on the
first and last points, but rather, the model fits the entire curve.
The first, pre-TGV interval shows healthy growth rates at all cities (Tables 4 and
5). The most dramatic evidence of the TGV effect is the 17% drop in passenger
traffic in 1981-1984 Paris-Lyon (Table 4). This drop in passenger traffic was so
dramatic that it even impacted on the entire annual total domestic passenger
traffic at Lyon-Satolas airport, with an 8% drop (Table 5).
In France, most head-to-head, n0n-connecting flights to Paris go to Orly, while
those arriving from or embarking on trans-oceardc or intercontinental flights
transfer through CDG. A drop in total domestic passenger volumes at both CDG
and Orly is seen (Table 5), although it is not justifiable to attribute this
exclusively to the TGV effect without taking into consideration other external
market factors.
The period of 1984-89 is a period of stabilization. The overall growth in total
domestic passengers (Table 5) is very close for all cities. The loss of the Paris
market at Lyon-Satolas seems to have been made up, with a growth rate in total
domestic passengers at 8.7%, second only to Orly for that interval. The growth
was clearly not made up in the Paris-Lyon market, where the average annual rate
of growth was just 0.8% (Table 4).
With the opening of the TGV Atlantique, the TGV effect was again seen, this time
most strongly in Nantes, with a 5% drop in passengers to Paris (Table 4). The
drop was slightly less dramatic at Bordeaux, with a 0.3% annual rate of increase
(Table 4). The decreases were not as dramatic as Lyon, as the travel time is
longer, supporting the conclusions of Pavaux (1991).
The magnitude of the drop is a manifestation of the travel Eme. If high-speed
train travel is less than three hours, three quarters of the people travelling by
public transportation (air or rail) will take the train (Pavaux, 1991). The market
share of travellers using the train decreases linearly with the logarithm of the
time of train travel (ibid). This is dearly visible in the minor impact that the TGV
has had on Marseilles, Nice, and Toulouse.
The pattern of the TGV effect on aircraft movements between Bordeaux-Paris
and Lyon-Paris also shows a TGV effect. In the interval 1984-89, after two hour
downtown-downtown Lyon-Paris TGV service was in effect, the rate of increase
in annual air movements to Orly was only 0.53% (Table 6). This is in stark
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contrast with Bordeaux, with no_TGV service at this time, and a 9.3% increase in
traffic to Paris in the same interval.
The dominant aircraft used between Paris, Bordeaux and Lyon pre-TGV were the
Caravelle, DC-10, and Dassault-Mercure. The Airbus 300 came into service on
both these routes in 1978. Post-TGV, in 1984-89, on Bordeaux-Paris it was the
Caravelle, Dassault-Mercure, and Airbus 300. However, Paris-Lyon traffic was
handled by the Caravelle and Dassault-Mercure, and increasingly, the small ATR
turboprop. Therefore, there was not only a decrease in the number of flights
serving Lyon, but also in the size of aircraft. Generally, aircraft weight
corresponds to quantity of pollutant produced (Woodmansey and Patterson,
1994). Therefore, fewer flights with smaller aircraft mean significant emission
reductions on the Lyon-Paris flight path and at Lyon-Satolas airport, when
compared to Bordeaux for the same interval. Calculation of these emissions are
part of the ongoing research for this project.
Intermodal Air/Rail at Airport_
A second major phase in the TGV development occurred in the 1990's with the
construction of rail terminals for high-speed trains at CDG and Lyon-Satolas
airports. Previously, CDG airport was not connected effectively with either rail
or road links to the rest of France (Perl, in press, 1998). A collaboration between
the Soci_t_ Nationale des Chemins de fer Fran_ais (SNCF) and A_roports de Paris
(ADP) resulted from independent external pressures on the two corporations
(ibid). The net result was the construction of facilities which permitted linked
intermodal travel, opening first in November 1994 at CDG, and later at Lyon-
Satolas.
The construction of a TGV station inside the air terminal made it possible to
switch from a plane to a train almost as easily as changing planes. The
intermodal baggage handling facilities at CDG and Satolas are not yet in place,
but eventually one will be able to check a suitcase at the airport and then pick it
up at the train station at the final destination (or vice versa). As for the moment,
elevators, moving sidewalks, and luggage carts make the air/rail transfer
relatively easy. Given the enthusiasm with which the travelling public switched
to rail for intercity travel on short-haul routes, the same modal switch on short-
haul routes may be anticipated for travellers connecting to long-haul flights to or
from short-haul feeder routes. For example, a passenger arriving at CDG from
North America, whose final destination is Lyon, can now connect easily at CDG
to the TGV, instead of another flight, and arrive in central Lyon in approximately
the same travel time.
In summary, the partnership between SNCF and ADP interconnected France's air
and high speed rail networks at two airports, and generated mutually
advantageous opportunities for growth for both companies (Perl, in press, 1998).
With this new infrastructure, opportunities for inter-modal complimentarity
7
occur, offering economic gains t9 both air and rail. The introduction of
intermodal facilities at airports creates the possibility for linkage between the two
transportation modes, instead of head to head competition. It allows for an
optimization of technology mixing between modes. The transfer of short haul
traffic to rail at airports opens up the runway and terminal capacity, thus
creating an opportunity to have growth in long haul flights. Finally, joint co-
operation between air and rail companies moves aviation closer to sustainable
development.
Op.vortunities for economic growth
Sustainability in civil aviation is about more than the environmental impacts of
aircraft engine emissions. In its broadest conception, it is about finding the real
opportunities to "do better with less" that will enrich those firms and jurisdictions
that pioneer ways to make aviation less polluting without a proportionate
(drastic) reduction in mobility. For medium distance travel, high speed rail has
proven itself capable of substituting, in part, for aircraft. The "TGV Effect"
demonstrates this, and we have quantified the resulting changes in civil
aviation. But even greater environmental savings may arise from linking air and
fast train journeys over medium to long distances, in the way that aircraft on
short routes feed long-haul flights at hub airports.
Airlines can share in the economic benefits of such intermodal innovation. By
freeing up space (in both physical and ecological senses) at crowded and
polluted hub airports, fast trains could feed passengers into longer distance
flights. Both airlines and railroads could profit from such interline connections.
And as Richard Branson has shown in England, airline and fast train ownership
are not mutually exclusive.
As in any economic transformation, there will be leaders and laggards in
capitalizing on the opportunity to link fast train travel with aviation. Leading
firms will reap significant rewards by moving people and freight with reduced
environmental impact. There will also be laggards that cling to 'business as
usual" strategies even after they have become a significant liability.
Environmental leaders can gain credibility from their early initiatives, which in
turn facilitate partnership with government and environmental advocates in
framing sustainable transportation practices. Swissair's example at ZRH
illustrates the formative role that an innovative firm can play in shaping the rules
that its competitors will then have to abide by. Leaders like Swissair are able to
translate their initiative into bottom line business success by shaping sustainable
transport options that fit with their organizational and technical strengths. On
the other hand, laggards will have to react to sustainable transport priorities that
are not of their own making. Catching up to implement programmes that their
rivals helped create will be costly, so costly that some laggards might not survive
the transition (similar to the casualties of global economic competition). The key
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difference between firms that identify the economic opportunities of leading
sustainable aviation initiatives and those that resist change as a threat to their
business will be understanding the lessons of recent evolution in the relationship
between air and other transport modes, as illustrated by the TGV effect.
n.Co..u.c_h _om
The aviation industry is in a period of expansion, growing at a faster rate than
the global economy. In an unconstrained economic model, this growth could be
expected to continue unhindered. However, several external factors may limit
the aviation industry. Increasing urban air pollution, greenhouse gases, and
changing upper atmospheric chemistry could lead to regulations restricting
emissions from aircraft. Some jurisdictions, notably Sweden and Switzerland,
have already applied pollution pricing, a carbon tax, and differential landing fees
(based on noise) to civil aviation. The ultimate restriction on aviation (and
indeed all carbon-based energy use) is the finite quantity of fossil fuels on earth.
But, there are options for the aviation industry.
It has been demonstrated in this paper that the introduction of high speed rail
produces a dramatic modal shift in passenger traffic on short haul routes, from
air to rail. The construction of intermodal facilities (high-speed rail stations) in
airports, such as those at CDG and Satolas, provides opportunities for
complimentarity between air and rail, rather than competition. The ability to
switch from air to raft at an airport with the same degree of ease as switching
planes makes possible all kinds of economic opportunities for airlines to expand
the travel options offered to the public. As these trains are electrically powered
in France this provides emission reductions when the trains replace short-haul
flights. This optimization of travel modes moves aviation closer to economic and
environmental sustainability.
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Total Domestic Passenger Traffic 1975-1996
Year Toulouse Marseilh Nice
1975 455000 *** 719000 1177000 1188000
1976 499000 _ *'* 1118000 1277000 1262000
1977 *** 1227000 1402000 1324000
1978 658000 1495000 1420000
1979 654244 742879 1615751 1583197
1980 784799 929000 1561373 1825259 1819785
1981 854203 1065752 1600670 2057919
1982 961029 1194000 1522169 2189409 2213102
1983 1082583 1332759 1420256 2384083
1984 1174255 1430804 1242762 2504481
1985 1246422 1499748 1251379 2587000
1986 1376036 1638953 1409467 2475768 2741758
1987 1478054 1823663 1499441 2627166 3089100
1988 1620432 2000878 1616046 2766050 3270435
1989 1392772 2282775 1882226 2988460 3579445
1990 1920000 2345000 3185221
1991 1740000 2394239 2027594 2998955 3626000
1992 1782648 2431679 2085565 3782731
1993 1800953 2416699 3172377 3778575
1994 1855382 2542568 2215542 3252915
1995 1933349 2893916 3451194


































Table 3. Aircraft Movement Data
Aircraft movement data: City
to Orly
Year Bordeaux Lyon
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1990 1238 1282
Growth rates in Paris-other city passenger data (from Table 1)
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_Z[g.G Growth rates in intercity aircraft movements (from Table 3).
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Policy Issues in the Express Carrier Sector
Michael D'Arcy
D'Arcy Smyth & Associates
Dublin
The Competitive Market for Air Transport in the new millennium will be characterised by:
• A global marketplace;
• Air Transport being a facilitator not a driver;
• International, Regional and National policies and regulatory frameworks evolving to
reflect this reality.
The true drivers of the global market are:
- The Internet
The Global Financial Markets
• - Integrated International Express Delivery Services
• They are the precursors to how information and goods will move around this global
economy;
• Their primary effect has been to make distance, time and national borders increasingly
irrelevant in the global marketplace for goods and services;
• The movement of goods by air must continue to evolve organisational, operational and
regulatory conditions to facilitate, and benefit from, these forces.
According to WTO Secretary General Renato Ruggiero:
"The borderless global economy _ "' will, create opportunities and be marked by:
- Increasing indifference to geography, distance and time;
- Transaction costs for consumers and business falling rapidly;





A far greaternumberof suppliersenteringamarketbecausestartinga
newbusinesswill bemucheasier.
Theglobaleconomy as defined by Renato Ruggiero (Cont):
- SME's joining MNC's as "fullparticipants" in the global marketplace;
Business in developing countries being able to overcome many of the
obstacles of infrastructure, capital and transportation which limited their
economic potential in the past;
- Consumers everywhere benefiting from, and so supporting personally
and politically, this growing global competition;
- Ireland today proves the WTO Secretary General's model works.
Global Integrators have pioneered services which are characterised by:
• Providing a Physical Communications, not a transport, service;
• Operating highly integrated, tightly managed, multi-modal, _ door to _ door,
delivery services for information and goods which an individual can carry;
• Achieving for every individual shipment, irrespective of its origin or destination,
exceptional levels of speed, control, reliability, information and security;
• Offering a, generally, transparently priced service, with many value added features
possible including the movement and delivery of items being electronically tracked, traced,
re-routed and (via the Internet) confirmed;
• Establishing consumer brand identities which have defined not just their business but their
sector.
Air Transport Services are a crucial link for delivery services, but they:
• Are only used by integrators to the extent they can be combined with offices, buildings,
telecommunications facilities, computers, sorting equipment, automobiles, trucks, aircraft,
shipsand other vehicles, services and people as may be necessary to deliver every package,
anywhere, ever/time;
Rarely prioritise the facilitation of goods ahead of people;
Often see freight as, at best incremental revenue, and at worst an awkward but necessary
evil.
The Air Transport of goods in the next millennium will be predominantly by this express
model:
• According to the Avmark Aviation Economist the % of express (or J.J.T.) freight to all air
cargo will be 39% by 2000 (up from 18% in 1990);
• Airbus Industries forecasts the number of all-cargo aircraft will be 1,701 by 2005 (up from
1184 in 1994);
• A Boeing survey has calculated that 90% of all U.S. air cargo will be 'express' by 2010.
The air transport opportunities created by these developments may include:
• A fundamental re-structuring and re-organisation of the traditional air cargo market;
• The development of new streamlined, seamless, integrated and flexible freight only
airports and airport facilities;
• The development of new fiscal procedures for the customs control of goods and the
collection of duties and
• VAT;
• A dramatic expansion of I.T. services to track, trace and record seamless integrated door to
door delivery;
• The evolution of diverse air and logistics services.
In my opinion the key questions for regulators, policy makers and indeed air transport
operators in the realisation of these opportunities and the enhancement of the role of air
transport in delivering services include:
• Will the regulatory framework governing delivery services ensure that all providers can
innovate cost-effectively, and continue to reliably serve their customers constantly
changing requirements?
• Will the regulatory interventions which create questionable and increasingly archaic and
costly barriers be removed quickly enough?
• Will competition be extended to include the markets traditionally reserved to public postal
operators?
• Will opportunities for new players to enter the market be facilitated?
• Will the movement of goods by air be given the separate, distinct and relevant attention it
needs and deserves?
Governments policy makers and regulators provides the necessary leverage to ensure user
friendly answers to all of these questions:
• Most importantly, the WTO must include delivery services in the proposed GATT's on
services;
• The significant implications of a truly global market for air transport services, must be
positively embraced, not resisted or, worse, ignored;
• Flexible and responsive 'open skies' policies and agreements which allow carders plan
their route network, capacity and frequency on the basis of commercial considerations are
essential;
• Establishment criteria limiting air carriers to their own 'national' state should be removed;
• EU airport users which meet relevant, objective and nondiscriminatory criteria, established
and regulated by the Member State, must be allowed to self-handle;
• Customs procedures based upon the sharing of responsibility with approved operators and
not exclusively on the surveillance and checking of individual shipments must continue to
be developed;
• Security procedures, based upon credible threat assessments, which accommodate the
particular needs of trade, are essential;
• Monopolies in any aspect of the transport chain must be eliminated if not economically
and operationally justified according to objective, fair and relevant criteria;
• Dominant providers must be rigorously policed to ensure no abuses of competition law
take place;
• Any operator granted reserved services or exclusive rights must be rigorously regulated to
ensure no cross-subsidisation takes place from these privileged businesses to their
activities in competitive markets;
Credible, authoritative and user focussed cost accounting procedures for airports and
airport authorities must be developed, implemented and enforced by effective
Ireland is addressing much (but not all) of this agenda and so is rapidly evolving as
a case study of the benefits to be accrued:
• A vibrant and competitive delivery services market, liberalised financial and investment
services and an increasingly competitive telecommunications and IT sector;
• The elimination of many of the disadvantages of being a peripheral island some distance
from our markets;
• Competitive air transport services moving substantial and growing volumes of people and
goods;
• A pro-active, progressive and, generally, supportive Government committed to facilitating
trade and sustaining this growth;
• Growing pressure on Government to remove residual investment gaps and operational
inefficiencies especially in the transport infrastructure;
• Thriving value added, fast growth businesses, industries and sectors, especially those
which are knowledge based.

The Air TransportResearchGroupof the WCTR Society was formally launched as a
special interest group at the 7 th Triennial WCTR in Sydney, Australia in 1995. Since then,
our membership base has expanded rapidly, and now includes over 400 active
transportation researchers, policy-makers, industry executives, major corporations and
research institutes from 28 countries. It became a tradition that the ATRG would hold an
intemational conference at least once a year. In 1998, the ATRG organized a consecutive
stream of 14 aviation sessions at the 8 th Triennial WCTR Conference (July 12-17:
Antwerp). Again, on 19-21 July, 1998, the ATRG Symposium was organized and
executed every successfully by Dr. Aisling Reynolds-Feighan of the University College
of Dublin. The Aviation Institute at the University of Nebraska at Omaha has published
the Proceedings of the 1998 ATRG Dublin Symposium (being co-edited by Dr. Aisling
Reynolds-Feighan and Professor Brent Bowen), and the Proceedings of the 1998 WCTR-
ATRG Conference (being co-edited by Professors Tae H. Oum and Brent Bowen).
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